Weekly Turkey Report: 3rd Week of August 

Polls indicate that the public neither trusts nor supports the government’s latest “Kurdish opening.” Unlike the AKP’s first opening period, Ankara is keeping its distance this time and is not mobilizing different segments of society around the process—a major factor behind the skepticism. The on‑again, off‑again talks with Abdullah Öcalan suggest a lack of clarity at the center of power.

A key reason for Ankara’s reluctance is that any genuine opening would inevitably require a return to the rule of law and democratic norms. Erdoğan does not wish to abandon the arbitrary system he has built with Bahçeli’s support. Although this regime consigns broad swathes of society to hunger and poverty, it somehow persists—how long is uncertain. Looking at one‑man systems globally, they all collapse sooner or later, but they tend to leave behind wreckage and chaos.

This reality was clearly visible in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. It is hard to see how Turkey can avoid a similar fate. If Israel—feeling insecure in the region—deepens its cooperation with various actors, especially the Kurds, and if Turkey fails to resolve the Kurdish and Alevi questions, it would not be prophetic to say that dark days lie ahead.

The AKP–MHP partnership is a structure that delivers large gains to the parties with little risk. Figures close to the leaderships, as well as party loyalists, have amassed wealth rarely seen elsewhere and display it with abandon. Although tensions arise from time to time, the partners manage to get past them.

The critical variable is the Kurdish opening initiated at Bahçeli’s instigation. How insistently the MHP pursues this and whether it abandons the quest for a settlement will shape not only Turkey’s present but its future. Parliament’s commission has been meeting regularly, but no concrete step or package of legal proposals has yet emerged. If the leaks are accurate, the Kurdish side is unlikely to accept the changes the AKP envisions. What the MHP would do in that case remains unclear.

Judging from the writing and commentary of Mümtazer Türköne—an academic from the MHP tradition who remains close to the party—Bahçeli is determined to resolve the Kurdish issue and return to the rule of law and democracy. After the 7 June 2015 elections, Bahçeli entered into cooperation with the AKP under pressure from power centers within the state.

At that time, the Gülen movement was very strong within the state, and fears peaked that the Kurds might establish a state in Syria along Turkey’s border. An alliance—reportedly including the CHP—formed around the idea that these two issues could be solved outside the normal (i.e., lawful) order. By moving to the presidential system, law and democracy were suspended; Turkey carried out incursions in Syria; and thereafter Kurds and members of the Gülen movement were subjected to an extraordinary wave of repression. Today, it may have been concluded that this system has exhausted its function, that lawlessness is harming the state, and that the Kurdish question, seen as a growing threat to the future, requires a return to the “old settings.” We will see more clearly once Parliament reconvenes.

The AKP Is Eroding but Still Strong

According to the latest poll by the reputable firm Metropoll, when undecided voters are allocated the CHP rises to first place with 32.2%, while the AKP drops to 31.3%. The research indicates a significant increase in the combined vote of nationalist parties and reveals broad public opposition to the new “opening process.”

There is visible movement among nationalist voters: the İYİ Party, the Victory Party (Zafer Partisi), and the Anahtar Partisi together reach 16.3%. In addition, the DEM Party stands at 7.6%, the MHP at 5.1%, and the New Welfare Party (Yeniden Refah Partisi) at 2.7%.

One of the survey’s most striking findings concerns perceptions of the new opening: 59.7% of respondents oppose it, while only 34.9% support it. Even among MHP voters, support has fallen to 35.6%.

Pressure on the CHP Continues

Beyoğlu Mayor İnan Güney, who was detained and then arrested as part of operations targeting the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), has been suspended from office. The Interior Ministry announced that Güney was removed as a “temporary measure.”

CHP Parliamentary Group Deputy Chair Ali Mahir Başarır criticized the lifting of the house‑arrest order for Aziz İhsan Aktaş—detained as an alleged “organized crime leader,” who then benefited from “effective remorse” provisions and was released under judicial control—stating: “Nowhere in the world does someone labeled an ‘organization leader’ walk free while those alleged to have cooperated remain behind bars. This is not justice; it is the official portrait of a political setup.”

Bahçeli Denies Rift, Reassures the Palace

Bahçeli forcefully denied widespread claims of tension with the AKP and emphasized that no one can steer the MHP: “No one can set the calibration and direction of the MHP.” He again expressed his belief in the innocence of Selahattin Yılmaz, a mafia boss seen as close to the MHP: “I believe he is innocent and guiltless; this will become clear in due course.”

Toward the end of the week, the MHP leader issued another statement again denying a crisis with the AKP and taking aim at the CHP leadership: “No one will be able to sow discord between the components of the People’s Alliance; even if they attempt it, they will fail. It is my sincere wish that CHP administrators—ground down by the machinery of bribery and corruption—understand and internalize this reality.”

The Kurdish Issue

On the morning of 19 August, just before a meeting of the commission established under the solution process, a “white Toros” (Renault Toros)—a symbol of the unsolved murders of the 1990s—was set on fire at the TBMM’s Çankaya Gate. The Interior Ministry stated that the arsonist was mentally unstable; nevertheless, he was arrested and jailed.

TBMM Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş rejected a request by Nezahat Teke, representing the Peace Mothers, and by Türkiye Bozkurt to speak in Kurdish, citing parliamentary rules. Instances of Kurdish in the remarks were entered into the record as “a non‑Turkish word was uttered.”

Economy

The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announced that, effective today, renewals and new openings for FX‑Protected Deposit (KKM) accounts for individuals will cease. The CBRT said the exit from the KKM scheme has been completed. As of 23 August, renewals and new openings for individual KKM accounts (excluding YUVAM accounts) will not be processed. Experts estimate the KKM’s cost to the Treasury at $60 billion.

Turkey’s top individual income taxpayer for 2024 is Selçuk Bayraktar, Chair of Baykar, on the strength of export earnings. He is followed by Baykar General Manager Haluk Bayraktar and Koç Holding Honorary Chair Mustafa Rahmi Koç. Of the top‑100 list, 21 names were disclosed while 89 remained undisclosed.