The Weekly Turkey Report: 3rd Week of May
In terms of political operations, Turkey increasingly resembles a softened version of Stalin’s Russia. The regime periodically purges elements it perceives as threats. There are no Gulag-style camps or extrajudicial killings, but we are witnessing a period in which the judiciary is entirely subordinated to the Palace, and all dissenting voices are suppressed using state power.
Since its founding, Turkey has never fully been a rule-of-law state or a true democracy. There were moments of breathing space during the early electoral victories of the Democrat Party (DP), the Justice Party (AP), and the AKP. However, politics has always remained confined within the boundaries set by the state, and those who dared to step outside these limits were severely punished.
Today, we have moved past the times when an oppressive regime would temporarily restore order and later allow free elections again. During past coups, such as those of March 12 or September 12, the state would eliminate perceived threats and then initiate a normalization process. In contrast, the current autocratic regime in Turkey seems to have taken on a permanent character. Even though opinion polls suggest the AKP is losing support, the likelihood of a fair electoral competition is increasingly doubtful.
Yet, despite all the manipulation and coercion, Erdoğan still seeks to derive his legitimacy from the ballot box. In pursuit of this, he is trying to sideline powerful opponents like Ekrem İmamoğlu with fabricated charges, while keeping pressure on the CHP through an investigation into its party congress. Erdoğan is also aware that such measures alone won’t be enough to secure a fraudulent electoral victory. Hence, he needs Kurdish votes. The Kurds hold the key not only to enabling a constitutional amendment that would allow Erdoğan to run again but also to delivering the voter base necessary for an electoral win.
Whether under a presidential or parliamentary system, any serious contender for power needs Kurdish support. At this point, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli steps in, positioning himself as a dove of peace. Bahçeli continues to praise PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the organization itself. Following the PKK’s declaration of dissolution, Bahçeli expressed gratitude to Öcalan and the group and made a notable statement last week:
“Peace is not a bird with one wing. A bird cannot take flight with one wing. For the second wing to be added and for flight to be possible, it depends on the sacrifice, self-confidence, magnanimity, patience, prayers, and ownership of our entire nation. One wing has clearly manifested through Abdullah Öcalan’s call on February 27 and the subsequent dissolution decision. As a nation, we must attach both wings to the body together. We must wait patiently and avoid unnecessary debates if we are to reach our goal of a peaceful, terror-free Turkey.”
Bahçeli further stated that the PKK’s decision to disarm and dissolve has ushered in a sensitive and delicate new phase. He proposed forming a parliamentary commission involving all political parties that represent different segments of society to determine a roadmap for the coming period.
In turn, PKK leader Öcalan responded positively to Bahçeli’s call. Through a delegation from the pro-Kurdish DEM Party that visited him in İmralı on Sunday, he issued the following message:
“There is a need for a new social contract based on the law of brotherhood. What we are doing represents a major paradigm shift.
The nature of Turkish-Kurdish relations is unique. What has been broken is the bond of brotherhood. Brothers may quarrel, but they cannot do without each other.
We are clearing the traps and mines that have disrupted this relationship and repairing the broken paths and bridges.
I extend my gratitude to the intellectuals who have sent messages of support for me and our process of peace and brotherhood—especially Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek. I look forward to future collaborations in international socialist initiatives.”
While appearing to support these developments, the AKP continues to drag its feet. Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç sparked controversy with his remarks on the “right to hope” for Öcalan. Asked by journalists before an AKP parliamentary group meeting whether Öcalan had such a right, he replied, “There is no such situation. No such meeting is taking place.”
Former AKP MP Mehmet Metiner strongly criticized Tunç’s comments. “If the wise leader Bahçeli says ‘right to hope,’ then contradicting that is not just wrong—it is unacceptable,” said Metiner. “When the time comes, whatever is necessary for the ‘right to hope’ will surely be done.”
DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan also commented: “Your tone is far from the constructive language we need at this moment; unfortunately, it has a toxic effect. We need not polemics but law and democratic consensus.”
Meanwhile, Erdoğan’s main focus remains Ekrem İmamoğlu and the CHP. In his address to his party’s parliamentary group, he stated:
“Once we achieve a Turkey free of terrorism, the trustee appointments to municipalities will become exceptional.”
Describing the operation against the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as “an unprecedented criminal organization in the history of the Republic,” Erdoğan signaled upcoming legislative changes targeting local governments:
“The ongoing investigation in Istanbul reveals a criminal network unlike anything seen in Republican history.
What began as corruption and extortion has evolved into a threat to national security—becoming an octopus-like structure with international ties that extends beyond Istanbul, encompassing multiple municipalities, institutions, and individuals.
Initially thought to be limited to certain political figures and parties, this web of corruption is now seen to stretch into bureaucracy, business, media, some religious sects, and even intelligence agencies.
What lies at the root of this decay is the corruption in municipal governance and the failure to adequately enforce oversight mechanisms. This corruption can be found across municipalities, regardless of party affiliation. Our concern is not partisan—it is systemic.
At this point, it has become essential to comprehensively address and reform the local government system.”
Following Erdoğan’s remarks, reports emerged of an operation targeting a religious community and several business figures. It was claimed that members of the group known as the “Süleymancılar” were targeted and that four individuals, including a high-level judicial official, were taken into custody. The Süleymancılar are generally considered aligned with the center-right and somewhat distant from the AKP.
Erdoğan also hinted at curbing the authority of major municipalities, especially those he has lost at the ballot box:
“The division of powers between metropolitan and district municipalities needs to be reconsidered.
Confusion over authority between the two often leads to conflict.
Powers must be clarified, and for those who fail to fulfill their duties, mandatory, coercive, or reassignable measures must be put in place.”
A piece of news that would surely please Erdoğan came from Saudi Arabia. U.S. President Trump met with Syria’s Interim President Ahmad al-Shara in Riyadh. Anadolu Agency reported that Erdoğan, Trump, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and the Syrian President convened in an online meeting. Following the meeting, the White House announced Trump’s demands from al-Shara. Erdoğan, declaring an end to sanctions on Syria, also asked al-Shara—who comes from a known fundamentalist background—to take over the management of prisons housing ISIS detainees.
While the European Union continues its silent support for Erdoğan, the European Parliament has maintained its warnings. EP Rapporteur on Turkey, Nacho Sanchez Amor, emphasized that Turkey is increasingly diverging from its EU membership path and likened the country’s current system to the Russian model:
“Doesn’t it feel like the system smells a bit like the Russian model?” said Amor.
“The societal model AKP offers resembles that of Russia: one-man rule, elections with varying levels of fairness, conservatism, and a lack of checks and balances after elections; weak parliamentary activity, absence of media freedom, and suppression of all criticism.
Opposition figures are prosecuted—now İmamoğlu, but before him, many mayors from DEM and CHP, as well as journalists, lawyers, bar associations, medical chambers, and students.
Doesn’t it really seem like this model is incompatible with a mature democracy?
If you’re not a mature democracy, then you cannot be a member of the European Union. That’s the truth.”
