4th Week of November: An Öcalan Visit without Concrete Steps

Weekly Turkey Report: 5th Week of November 2025 – An Öcalan Visit without Concrete Steps

Executive Summary

• A parliamentary commission visited PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island for the first time in years, but no clear roadmap, timetable, or institutional framework has been announced, reinforcing perceptions of a highly personalized Erdoğan–Bahçeli–Öcalan process outside transparent state structures.

• CHP Chair Özgür Özel was re-elected with the unanimous support of 1,333 delegates at the party’s 4th convention under his leadership, while former leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu gave an interview to the pro-government daily Sabahaccusing CHP of corruption, deepening intra-opposition tensions.

• Özel used his convention speech to underline CHP’s commitment to a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue, condemn trustee appointments to elected Kurdish municipalities, and frame a “Greater Turkey Alliance” inclusive of Kurds as equal citizens.

• Detailed notes disclosed by DEM Party MP Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit about the İmralı visit suggest Öcalan emphasized democratic reconstruction, a legal and political settlement, and warned that failure of the process could reactivate “coup mechanisms” targeting multiple segments of society.

• Despite a finalized ECtHR violation ruling, Selahattin Demirtaş was not released; meanwhile, President Erdoğan praised the “Terror-Free Turkey” process and portrayed the İmralı visit as a step that will accelerate the “liquidation of terrorism.”

• Repression of critical speech continued: veteran journalist Fatih Altaylı received a sentence of 4 years and 2 months in prison for allegedly “threatening the President,” while a new wave of detentions hit the circle around convicted crime figure Ayhan Bora Kaplan.

• A match-fixing and betting scandal implicating referees and players in thousands of games prompted international coverage, with The Economist describing Turkish football as “as dirty as its politics” and treating the scandal as symptomatic of deeper institutional decay.

• The IMF’s latest assessment on Turkey, relayed by economist Şenol Babuşçu, warns that with current policies inflation will not fall durably, reserves remain inadequate, and real interest rates must rise back toward mid-2025 levels; domestic data on hunger and poverty lines confirm a severe cost-of-living crisis.

• Economic fragility is reflected in the bankruptcy of Hitit Seramik, a long-established industrial firm employing more than 300 workers and carrying debts exceeding 1.5 billion TL.

• Climate indicators point to an entrenched water crisis: rainfall is at its lowest level in 52 years, major cities are again discussing water cuts, and experts warn that drought and shortages have become permanent rather than exceptional.

• A new TÜİK survey claims that only 12.8% of women in Turkey have experienced physical violence in their lifetime, a figure that, implausibly, would put Turkey “ahead” of countries like Sweden; the data raise serious concerns about under-reporting, methodology, and political pressure on statistics.

İmralı Visit: Contact with Öcalan but No Institutionalized Process

Turkey concluded another week in which no positive steps were taken on either the economic or legal front. The agenda was dominated by the visit of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s “National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission” to İmralı Island to meet PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan.

The visit itself was initially shrouded in denial and ambiguity. AKP MP Hüseyin Yayman first flatly denied having gone to the island, only to confirm his participation after the Office of the Speaker of Parliament issued an official statement listing the delegation. The episode highlighted a broader pattern: opaque decision-making, weak institutional ownership, and a process effectively managed between President Erdoğan, MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, and Öcalan, with state institutions such as parliament, the judiciary, and relevant ministries largely sidelined or instrumentalized.

Parliament’s official statement confirmed that, following a 21 November vote, the commission delegation traveled to İmralı on 24 November 2025, met Öcalan, and took both visual and written records during a 2 hour 50 minute session. The statement framed the visit as part of a broader effort to promote “social cohesion, brotherhood, and a regional perspective,” and stressed that the commission would “determinedly” continue its work.

However, the communiqué did not offer:

• any concrete timetable for subsequent steps,

• any transparency on the content and sequencing of measures, or

• any indication that parliament, rather than the executive and security bureaucracy, will be the real center of decision-making.

In this sense, the İmralı contact appears more as a tactical move in Ankara’s internal and regional calculations than as an institutionalized peace process.

CHP Convention: Özel Consolidates Leadership and Reframes the Kurdish Issue

Amid the noise around İmralı, the main opposition CHP held its 39th Ordinary Convention, the fourth since Özgür Özel became leader. Özel was re-elected with the unanimous backing of all 1,333 delegates, consolidating his control over the party apparatus.

The day of the convention was overshadowed by an interview given by former CHP Chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu to President Erdoğan’s flagship newspaper Sabah, in which he accused CHP of involvement in corruption. The timing and venue of the interview were widely interpreted as a blow to opposition unity and as ammunition for the government narrative against CHP.

In his keynote speech, Özel tried to position CHP as both a vehicle for democratic change and a party willing to confront the Kurdish issue head-on:

• He promised a “purging” of those who want to drag CHP back to its losing habits and declared that “no one will accustom us to defeat again.”

• He framed the political landscape as a fork in the road between “the rusty chains of the establishment” and a Turkey that breaks those chains through democratic struggle.

• He explicitly used the term “Kurdish issue,” criticized the denial of Kurdish existence and identity, and condemned the ongoing practice of appointing trustees (kayyum) over municipalities elected by Kurdish voters.

• He recalled CHP’s insistence on a democratic and parliamentary solution and defended the party’s dialogue with DEM Party against accusations of “terrorism,” pledging that Kurds will feel like equal citizens of the Republic.

Özel reiterated CHP’s proposal to establish a parliamentary commission to address the Kurdish issue through democratic means and anchored this proposal in CHP’s status as the country’s largest party after the local elections. He closed with a promise that CHP would “courageously lead Turkey’s democratic future” and bring peace, stability, and prosperity to every corner of the country.

Symbolically, the second day of the convention featured the delivery of 25.1 million signatures collected under the “Freedom for İmamoğlu and Early Elections” campaign, transported to the hall by truck. This figure corresponds to roughly 40% of registered voters, offering a visible show of support behind Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and the demand for a return to competitive politics.

DEM Party’s İmralı Notes: Democracy, Law, and “Coup Mechanisms”

Confusion and speculation around the İmralı visit intensified as various pro-government voices attempted to spin the meeting. In response, DEM Party parliamentary group deputy chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit, who was part of the delegation, publicly shared detailed notes of the conversation.

According to Koçyiğit:

• Öcalan expressed regret that CHP had not joined the delegation, reportedly saying “I wish CHP had come as well,” signaling his view that any sustainable process must include a broad democratic opposition, not only the government and its allies.

• He offered a retrospective on the 2013–2015 resolution process, highlighting how “solution-hostile” centers sabotaged the talks and contributed to their collapse.

• Critically, he warned that if the current initiative fails, “coup mechanisms” could once again be triggered and eventually target multiple social and political actors, not only Kurdish actors.

More substantively, Öcalan is said to have emphasized:

• that the issue is not only about disarmament but also about a broader project of “democratic construction,”

• that a one-sided process is insufficient; a genuine transformation of the state and its institutions is required,

• that the strengthening of society, self-organization, and “democratic republic” principles must be anchored in a legal framework,

• and that, while some form of understanding with the state exists, the critical missing element is a clear, comprehensive political settlement.

Taken together, these points suggest that Öcalan is trying to shift the debate from a narrow focus on “PKK laying down arms” to a more expansive agenda involving legal recognition, constitutional and institutional reform, and pluralistic democratic guarantees. Yet none of these ideas have, so far, been translated into transparent, accountable policy steps.

Rule of Law: Demirtaş, Altaylı, and the Kaplan Network

Despite the European Court of Human Rights’ finalized violation judgment in Selahattin Demirtaş’s case, domestic courts have not acted to secure his release. His lawyers’ application for release was taken under review by the regional appeals court once the official Turkish translation of the ECtHR ruling arrived, but no substantive progress has been reported.

On his way back from South Africa, President Erdoğan framed the ongoing process as a “Terror-Free Turkey” project that must be shielded from day-to-day political debates. He praised the commission’s latest decision as one that will “open the way for the process” and “accelerate the liquidation of terrorism,” declaring that the government will move decisively “until we reach the Terror-Free Turkey destination.” The gap between such rhetoric and the continued imprisonment of major Kurdish political figures like Demirtaş reflects the deep ambivalence of Ankara’s approach.

Repression of dissenting speech also continued. Journalist Fatih Altaylı, detained since 22 June on charges of “threatening the President” over comments made in a YouTube broadcast, appeared for the second time before the Istanbul 26th High Criminal Court. He was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months in prison, and the court ordered the continuation of his detention.

In parallel, the circles surrounding Ayhan Bora Kaplan, a figure already sentenced to 68 years in prison on organized crime charges, were hit by another wave of operations. His lawyer, Tarık Teoman, and several police officers were among nine individuals detained this week. The case has long been viewed as a window into the complex entanglement of criminal networks, segments of the security apparatus, and political actors.

Institutional Decay on Display: Football and Betting Scandal

The massive scandal involving referees and footballers betting on thousands of matches in Turkey continued to attract international attention. The Economist characterized Turkish football as “as dirty as its politics,” treating the affair not as an isolated episode in sports, but as a symptom of systemic rot in state institutions and regulatory bodies.

For many observers, the scandal illustrates:

• the breakdown of oversight and integrity in one of the country’s most visible and commercially important sectors,

• the normalization of conflicts of interest and illicit enrichment, and

• a broader culture in which rules are selectively enforced or ignored, depending on political and financial interests.

In this sense, the football-betting crisis functions as a microcosm of Turkey’s governance challenges.

Economy: IMF Warnings, Cost-of-Living Crisis, and Corporate Failures

On the economic front, the signals were similarly discouraging. Former Ziraat Bank Deputy General Manager and economics professor Şenol Babuşçu shared key points from the IMF’s latest assessment of the Turkish economy on X:

• Inflation and exchange-rate volatility remain high;

• The overall economy is still fragile;

• Foreign exchange reserves are insufficient by IMF metrics;

• Real interest rates should be increased, with the policy rate brought back toward its June 2025 level around 46%;

• Interest rate cuts should stop until inflation is brought into line with target levels.

According to this reading, the IMF does not find the government’s optimistic narrative persuasive and believes that under current policies inflation will not be durably reduced. Markets and external observers therefore remain skeptical of Ankara’s disinflation story.

Domestic data from the labor confederation Türk-İş paint a stark picture of household welfare:

• The “hunger line” (minimum cost of nutrition for a family) for Ankara in November was calculated at 29,828 TL;

• The “poverty line” (overall minimum monthly household expenditure) reached 97,159 TL;

• By contrast, the average civil servant salary is around 56,700 TL, the net minimum wage is 22,104 TL, and the lowest pension is 16,800 TL.

These figures indicate that:

• minimum-wage earners are far below the hunger line,

• much of the middle class, including civil servants, are drifting toward poverty,

• and pensioners are among the most vulnerable groups in society.

Corporate balance sheets are also under strain. Hitit Seramik A.Ş., one of the long-standing names in Turkish manufacturing with nearly half a century of history, declared bankruptcy after failing to overcome a deepening financial bottleneck. The company, which employed more than 300 workers, was reportedly burdened with debts exceeding 1.5 billion TL. The collapse underscores how tightening financial conditions, weak domestic demand, and policy uncertainty are feeding into real-sector failures.

Deepening Climate and Water Crisis

The environmental picture is equally troubling. According to the Ministry of Environment, rainfall in Turkey has fallen to its lowest level in 52 years. Regions of the Black Sea that were traditionally considered water-rich are now appearing on national drought maps.

Major metropolitan areas, including Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, are again discussing water rationing and possible cuts. Climatologist Assoc. Prof. Doğukan Doğu Yavaşlı summarized the situation bluntly: “The water crisis is not at our doorstep; it is inside our home. Drought years and water cuts are no longer exceptions; they have become permanent.”

This assessment implies:

• that Turkey has moved structurally into a period of chronic water stress,

• that existing water management policies and infrastructure are inadequate, and

• that without a fundamental shift in agricultural practices, urban planning, and climate adaptation, water scarcity will increasingly constrain economic activity and public health.

TÜİK’s Violence against Women Data: A Statistical “Paradise” with a Dark Reality

Finally, the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) released a study on physical violence against women that raises serious questions about methodology and credibility. According to the report:

• only 12.8% of women in Turkey report having experienced physical violence at any point in their lives after age 15;

• this category includes even the mildest forms of physical abuse, such as pushing, slapping, and hair-pulling;

• by contrast, the reported figure for Sweden is 28%.

On paper, this would make Turkey a “paradise for women” compared to advanced democracies with far stronger rule-of-law and gender-equality frameworks. In reality, however, reports from women’s organizations, bar associations, and international monitoring mechanisms consistently depict a much harsher landscape: pervasive domestic violence, high femicide rates, weak protection orders, and frequent impunity for perpetrators.

The contrast between TÜİK’s numbers and lived experience suggests:

• severe under-reporting driven by fear, stigma, and distrust of institutions;

• survey designs that fail to capture the full spectrum of violence; and/or

• political pressure to present a rosier picture of women’s safety and rights.

As with other sensitive indicators, the credibility of official statistics has become part of the broader struggle over truth, accountability, and policy in Turkey.

Conclusion: Contact without Reform

This week encapsulated Turkey’s structural predicament:

• high-stakes political maneuvers, such as the İmralı visit, proceed in a personalized and opaque manner,

• the opposition oscillates between attempts to articulate a more inclusive, democratic project and self-inflicted wounds,

• courts and security institutions are used selectively, both in high-profile political cases and in the management of organized crime,

• economic policy remains trapped between inflation, low real incomes, and external skepticism,

• and climate and gender issues expose the widening gap between official narratives and social reality.

The central message of the week is clear: contact with Öcalan has been re-established, speeches about democracy and law abound, but without concrete, transparent, and institutionalized steps, Turkey remains stuck in a cycle of managed crisis rather than moving toward genuine normalization.