With the end of the Baath regime, Syria has entered a totally new era. However, stability has yet to be achieved among the country’s diverse religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups. The Salafist group HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) and its affiliates currently hold the initiative. The pressing question is what governance model Syria will adopt in the coming period.
Rational thinking necessitates the establishment of a just socio-political order. However, how such an order will materialize is always a complex issue—one that is particularly relevant to Syria, which has lived under an oppressive regime for decades.
Syria faces two possible paths:
The first is for Syria’s social communities—what I refer to as sociologies—to come together, engage in negotiations and dialogue, and reach an agreement based on “common good and common interest,” thereby deciding to coexist. I believe that such a consent-based new social contract would be the best path forward.
The second path is for one of these sociologies to center its own interests and impose its political and administrative rule on others. This would inevitably mean the use of power, secured through internal or external support, by various means.
Throughout the Islamic world, the second model has largely been in effect. Consequently, the entire Muslim world is experiencing a socio-political crisis, differing in degree and form but identical in nature. In many cases, a religious, sectarian, ethnic, or class-based group—or a doctrinaire-ideological cadre—seizes power and subjects others to political domination, turning problems into crises.
It is clear that this approach will not bring peace and stability. People of conscience and rational thought, who advocate for justice and fairness, recognize that a system built on oppression cannot last indefinitely and should not be allowed to continue. They call for an end to this domination-based model. The solution lies in the first option.
With rational thought and goodwill as guiding principles, it is possible for people to live together in peace, regardless of geographical location. I believe that such an approach is not only possible for Syria today but also imperative. The only viable solution for Syria is the establishment of a new social contract.
What prompted me to write this article is an encouraging development: both the current leader holding the initiative, Ahmad al-Shara (Colani), who has been issuing reassuring messages, and former PYD Co-Chair Salih Muslim from the Syrian Kurdish side, have been discussing the idea of a “social contract.”
What is a Social Contract?
In short, a social contract involves the coming together of existing sociologies within a geographic region to first understand and recognize each other face-to-face (mu‘arafa) without involving external actors. After gaining a thorough and accurate understanding of one another, they discuss what kind of societal order or governance they desire and how they can coexist justly and equitably, without attempting to establish material, political, or military dominance over one another (muzakara). Finally, they draft a mutual agreement based on the consensus reached (mu‘ahada).
The essence of the social contract is identifying “common good and common interest” (ma‘ruf), mutual consent (ijab and qabul), and producing a binding text (aqd, ‘ahd, mithaq). The concepts I have chosen—mu‘arafa, muzakara, mu‘ahada, ma‘ruf, aqd, and mithaq—are key terms from the theoretical and historical Islamic political tradition.
If a new contract based on consent, justice, and the rule of law is not established, we can expect the dominant sociology to follow one of three paths, as seen in countless tragic historical examples:
- Establishing an authoritarian or totalitarian regime by politically, socially, and militarily dominating others.
- Engaging in ethnic and religious cleansing.
- Committing massacres that could culminate in genocide.
None of these approaches have any positive precedent in the Quran, the Sunnah, or the Seerah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). A legitimate Islamic governance system must ensure freedom for all, moral integrity, the rule of law, just distribution of resources, mutual respect among sociologies, and the right for individuals to be responsible to God solely based on their voluntary actions and way of life.
This model has been implemented in history and has regulated practical socio-political life (see Ali Bulaç, The Constitution of Medina, 2nd ed., Çıra Publications, Istanbul, 2020). There is no reasonable excuse for not taking this model as a reference in any geographical region or in areas struggling with societal conflicts. The main drivers of political and social conflicts are the lust for power, colonial ambitions, domination over others, and land appropriation.
Looking at the situation in Syria from this perspective, we see a country—perhaps more so than any other in the Middle East—that is multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and multi-sectarian.
Although it is difficult to determine an accurate religious, sectarian, and ethnic distribution of the Syrian population, estimates suggest the following demographics (based on post-Baath regime Wikipedia sources):
Ethnic Distribution of Syria’s Population (2024, Joshua Project)
- Sunni Arabs: 17,100,000
- Turkmens: 1,902,000
- Arab Alawites: 1,755,000
- Kurds: 1,674,000
- Druze: 760,000
- Assyrians: 231,000
- Circassians: 80,000
- Armenians: 73,000
- Others: 725,000
- Total: 24,300,000
Another Estimate of Ethnic Groups (2021):
- Arabs: 68-90%
- Kurds: 9-10%
- Turkmens: 4-5%
- Others: 1-5%
Religious Distribution (2021):
- Islam: 87%
- Sunni: 74%
- Alawite: 13%
- Christianity: 10%
- Druze and others (Ismailis, Yazidis): 3%
While these numbers do not precisely reflect today’s Syria, they provide a reasonable approximation. Accurately assessing Syria’s demographic distribution is crucial for ensuring the fair and just allocation of political, administrative, and economic resources. This is why one of the first actions taken by those who seek to manipulate events is to destroy population and land registry records.
Ultimately, Syria is a country with a pluralistic structure, and any governing framework must reflect this reality. A social contract that includes all sociologies must be pluralistic rather than majoritarian.
Unlike Turkey and Iran, which have relatively totalitarian socio-political models, Syria has historically maintained a multi-legal and relatively pluralistic system—even under the Baath regime. While political oppression was prevalent, religious and sectarian groups were not forced to adopt a uniform lifestyle, unlike in many other Arab countries. Egypt serves as a good model in this regard: civil law for Muslims follows Islamic principles, while Christian communities adhere to their own legal traditions. Even among Sunni Muslims, different schools of thought (Hanafi and Shafi‘i) have been allowed to practice their jurisprudential interpretations.
If the groups currently holding power in Syria and their opposition insist on engaging in a power struggle based on the modern nation-state model, internal conflicts will not cease.
Four key obstacles prevent social groups from uniting on the fundamental Islamic political goal of “common good and common interest” (ma‘ruf):
- The lack of trust among communities due to past negative experiences.
- Political, ideological, and doctrinal prejudices.
- Religious-sectarian fanaticism and ethnic chauvinism.
- Intervention by regional or global powers with geostrategic or geopolitical interests.
If Syrian groups fail to unite under “ma‘ruf,” which represents “common good and common interest” for all, they will instead be bound together by “munkar”—that is, “common evil and common harm.” This means they will either live under the dominance of one group or engage in endless cycles of warfare and bloodshed. This scenario, an “agreement not to agree,” is the greatest disaster, and it is precisely what the Islamic world is experiencing today.
The reason why now is the right time for a new social contract is clear. On December 8, 2024, both the leadership and the governing regime changed, offering a unique opportunity. Often, people assume that when governance changes hands, the regime changes as well. However, political science differentiates between governance and regime. In my view, governance is the mechanism for implementing a regime, encompassing its principles, rules, institutions, and forms.
Throughout history, Islamists who have taken initiative in politics—often referred to as proponents of “political Islam” today—have established different models. The first modern nation-state founded with Islam as its core ideology was Pakistan in 1947. However, even before Pakistan, the first state whose foundational legitimacy was based on Islam was the Republic of Turkey. Regardless of the circumstances, when Mustafa Kemal launched the national struggle in Anatolia, he declared his aim to protect the Caliph and defend Islam. Until 1928, the Turkish Constitution explicitly stated that “the official religion of the state is Islam”. Thus, in 1923, the Republic of Turkey was established as an Islamic state, continuing the Ottoman legacy. The principle of secularism was added to the Constitution in 1937.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a Kemalist, and his associates who led Pakistan’s independence movement were inspired by early Turkish republicanism. Pakistan remains an Islamic Republic, but it has yet to fully achieve the ideal Islamic governance model.
Before Pakistan, Saudi Arabia was the first state to derive its legitimacy from Islam. Established as a monarchy in 1932, Saudi Arabia was later followed by the formation of Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—all of which are monarchies that claim to base both civil and public law on Islamic Sharia.
In 1979, Iran transitioned from a monarchy to an Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khomeini convinced the Shia clergy and population that awaiting the Mahdi’s return did not necessitate deepening oppression and injustice, but rather hastening justice through the establishment of an Islamic Republic.
The major ethnic groups in Iran are as follows: Persians (65%), Azerbaijanis (16%), Kurds (7%), Lurs (6%), Arabs (2%), Baloch (2%), Turkmens (1%), Qashqai and other Turkic groups (1%), Armenians, Assyrians, and Georgians (less than 1%). Recognized languages include Azerbaijani, Balochi, Kurdish, Arabic, and Turkmen.
Previously, Iraq and Syria—both under Baathist rule—were essentially dictatorships. Both were considered “Arab Republics,” where Arab nationalism was imposed on other ethnic groups, including Kurds and Turkmens.
More recently, following the Taliban’s takeover, Afghanistan was officially renamed the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.” The ethnic composition includes Pashtuns (40%), Tajiks (24%), Hazaras (15%), Uzbeks (11%), Turkmens (4%), Aimaqs (3%), Baloch (2%), and others (1%). Afghanistan has two official languages: Pashto and Dari. Additionally, Uzbek, Turkmen, Balochi, Pashayi, Nuristani, and Pamiri are recognized as regional languages.
Other notable Muslim-majority states include Algeria (Democratic Republic), Tunisia (Republic), Morocco (Kingdom), Oman (Sultanate), Sudan (Republic), and Mauritania (Islamic Republic). Pakistan, Iran, and Mauritania are classified as Islamic Republics, while Gulf states and Afghanistan operate as emirates.
This classification highlights three primary political structures: monarchies, republics, and emirates.
It is evident that Western-style democracy is absent in these regions. Whether they are monarchies, emirates, or republics, countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, and Syria are fundamentally “Arab” states. Algeria brands itself as a “democratic republic,” while Tunisia and Sudan are generic republics, Morocco is a kingdom, and Oman is a sultanate.
Syria’s Future: Monarchy, Republic, or Emirate?
It is clear that Syria will remain a republic, but the question remains: What kind of republic will it be? Will it retain its status as an “Arab Republic,” imposing Arab identity on other ethnic groups? If not, why should non-Arab groups like Kurds and Turkmens continue to live under an official “Arab Republic” identity?
Unlike Iraq and Syria, Iran and Afghanistan are not named after a specific ethnic group, allowing for a degree of coexistence among different ethnic communities—provided that their fundamental rights, including language and public representation, are protected. Whether such coexistence is successful depends largely on the wisdom and political acumen of the dominant ethnic groups—Persians in Iran and Pashtuns in Afghanistan.
The term “Syria” itself does not evoke a specific ethnicity but rather a historically and culturally rich geographic identity. This gives Syria a unique advantage, which should not be squandered by tying the state’s identity exclusively to Arab nationalism.
Sectarian and Ethnic Tensions in the New Order
All religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups in Syria appear to accept the country’s republican structure. However, concerns remain about the nature of the political and administrative system that HTS will establish.
Since taking control, HTS has faced several internal challenges, including:
- Tensions with Kurds,
- The treatment of Alawites,
- The stance of the Druze community,
- The position of Christians in the new system,
- Policies towards secular groups adopting Western lifestyles.
“In northeastern Syria, where the Kurds control nearly one-third of the country, an agreement was signed between them and the new rulers on March 10. Disturbing reports and videos circulating on social media suggest that Alawites are facing persecution and extrajudicial executions. Even if these actions are not directly ordered or sanctioned by Ahmad al-Shara and his close associates, if Alawites are being targeted as ‘remnants of the old regime,’ then—if these reports are not fabrications—those in power must urgently intervene. Otherwise, Syria risks descending into an unmanageable state of chaos.
The challenges faced by Islamic republics, ‘religious monarchies, and emirates’ are well-documented.”
At present, Syria is under the control of a Salafist group with both a political and theological Islamic ideology. The key issue is how to create a governing structure that accommodates Syria’s diverse religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups, ensures judicial and social justice, safeguards freedoms, upholds public morality, fosters mutual respect, and establishes a socio-political system focused on security and prosperity for all.
Syria must not have an official religion, sect, or ideology. Instead, public law should be based on the shared good and benefit (ma‘ruf) of all religious, sectarian, and ethnic groups. By adopting this approach, Syria can become a model for the broader Muslim world, which has long struggled to overcome the obstacles of the nation-state system.
