On April 8, 2025, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared alongside President Donald Trump in the Oval Office and made a striking public appeal: “We do not want Türkiye to use Syria as a base against Israel; we do not want a confrontation with Türkiye.” Netanyahu’s urgent request for U.S. mediation revealed one of the motives behind his second White House visit in a matter of weeks—concern over a potential conflict or standoff with Türkiye. President Trump’s response appeared to set the parameters of that tension, at least for now.
Trump says he has a great relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom he likes very much and calls “very smart.” “Any problem that you have with Turkey, I think I can solve. I mean, as long as you’re reasonable, you have to be reasonable.”
Only days earlier, on April 4, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, speaking to Reuters in Brussels during a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, stated that Türkiye has no desire for a confrontation with Israel in Syria. He further argued that Israel’s activities in Syria are laying the groundwork for future instability.
These reciprocal statements reflect the emergence of a real possibility of conflict between Türkiye and Israel—yet both sides seem to lack either the will or the readiness to pursue one. While short-term confrontation appears unlikely, the conditions for a future clash are gradually taking shape, and both governments are actively preparing their domestic audiences for such a scenario.
A History of Deteriorating Relations
Türkiye’s relations with Israel have followed a downward trajectory, particularly under President Erdoğan’s leadership. Türkiye was one of the first countries to recognize Israel in 1949 and initially enjoyed constructive relations. However, this changed dramatically in 2010 with the Mavi Marmara incident—a Turkish ship en route to Gaza without Israeli authorization was intercepted by Israeli forces. The event marked a turning point, as Türkiye’s foreign policy axis began to shift under Erdoğan.
The Mavi Marmara episode was not merely a diplomatic crisis; it signaled a broader realignment. For Erdoğan, it served as a provocation that paved the way for a strategic encirclement of Israel, with support from Iran and non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. This reorientation also damaged Türkiye’s standing with Arab governments, as Erdoğan’s populist rhetoric aimed more at Arab public opinion than at bilateral state relations. These policies formed part of a broader ideological initiative rooted in neo-Ottomanism.
The Rise of Antisemitism in Turkish Political Discourse
Since 2010, antisemitism in Türkiye has intensified significantly, culminating in a particularly alarming phase in October 2024. During a speech before Parliament, President Erdoğan declared that Israel, driven by “religious fanaticism” and the “delusion of the Promised Land,” would inevitably target Türkiye after Palestine and Lebanon. Parliamentary leaders and senior cabinet members echoed his remarks, effectively designating Israel as a national threat.
This rhetoric is part of a growing wave of antisemitism that increasingly appears to serve a political purpose: preparing the Turkish public for potential conflict with Israel. Antisemitism in Türkiye today has metastasized into a social phenomenon, pulling large segments of the population into its orbit. According to the Pew Research Center, 86% of Turks view Israel negatively, while only 2% hold a favorable view. Given the state’s role in amplifying antisemitic messaging—especially after October 7, 2023, amid the Gaza war—these numbers are likely even higher today.
Moreover, antisemitism in Türkiye is closely tied to anti-Americanism. In 2014, Pew found Türkiye to have the highest levels of anti-American sentiment globally, at 73%. These two forms of hatred—against Jews and against the U.S.—have become deeply intertwined, often manifesting in joint acts of protest, such as the burning of Israeli and American flags together.
Imported Hatred: Three Pathways to Turkish Antisemitism
Antisemitism in Türkiye does not originate from the country’s historical, cultural, or religious traditions. In fact, Türkiye has historically served as a refuge for Jews—from the Spanish expulsion in 1492 to the Holocaust era. Nor is anti-Americanism historically rooted; during the Cold War, the U.S. was viewed as a reliable ally against Soviet threats.
Instead, modern Turkish antisemitism has largely entered through three ideological channels:
- The Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwan): Initially adopted from Arab nationalism and popularized after Israel’s creation and the Arab defeat in 1948 and 1967, the Brotherhood’s antisemitic literature and ideology have been widely disseminated in Türkiye.
- Post-Revolutionary Iran: Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini labeled the U.S. as the “Great Satan” and made reclaiming Jerusalem a central tenet of Iran’s foreign policy. Groups like Hezbollah placed antisemitism at the core of their ideology. These ideas, imported into Türkiye, brought with them virulent anti-Israel and anti-American sentiment.
- Political Islamism in Türkiye: Under Necmettin Erbakan and the Islamist parties he founded, antisemitic and anti-American rhetoric became a tool of political mobilization. The constant invocation of the Palestinian cause and the religious importance of Jerusalem further entrenched these attitudes.
While radical leftist groups also harbor anti-Israel and anti-U.S. views, their influence pales in comparison to these three dominant ideological currents.
Erdoğan and the Politicization of Antisemitism
Erdoğan’s rise to power within these ideological ecosystems has accelerated the spread of antisemitism and anti-Americanism to unprecedented levels. Today, even secular opposition parties like the CHP adopt variations of this rhetoric to remain politically relevant. The result is a national political culture where such views are deeply embedded in the public consciousness.
The convergence of anti-Israel and anti-U.S. sentiment is particularly evident in Türkiye, where demonstrations about Jerusalem frequently involve the desecration of both nations’ flags. The AKP has successfully politicized this resentment, transforming it into an enduring pillar of its governance.
The Paradox of Trade Amid Rising Hostility
Perhaps the most striking contradiction lies in the ongoing trade between Türkiye and Israel. Despite public declarations of an embargo following the events of October 7, 2023, bilateral trade has increased. This suggests a dual strategy: feeding antisemitic sentiment domestically for political gain while quietly maintaining economic ties. It is, in effect, a policy of rhetorical hostility and pragmatic cooperation.
Ironically, the antisemitic rhetoric initially used by the AKP to consolidate its base has boomeranged, forcing all political actors into alignment with this sentiment. Antisemitism has become a political necessity, shaping not only public opinion but also limiting the room for alternative foreign policy visions.
Conclusion
Although an imminent military conflict between Türkiye and Israel appears unlikely, the steady rise of antisemitism in Türkiye creates a combustible atmosphere. Coupled with diverging geopolitical ambitions—particularly in Syria—this environment harbors long-term risks. If current trends persist, future Türkiye-Israel relations may be shaped less by strategic calculation and more by the emotional pull of hatred institutionalized in political discourse.
