A Pragmatic Reset in EU–Turkey Relations

Turkey and the EU are going through a honeymoon of sorts. Friedrich Merz’s recent trip to Ankara capped a season of renewed engagement between the two. After years of estrangement, Turkey and Europe are mending ties. And there are two men who take credit: Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkey has re-emerged as an indispensable partner in Europe’s security architecture. The steady parade of German dignitaries to Ankara — from Olaf Scholz to Frank-Walter Steinmeier and now Friedrich Merz   — reflects this recalibration. Once condemned for its democratic backsliding and interference in German domestic affairs, Turkey is now valued for keeping the Black Sea open, mediating between Moscow and Kyiv, and managing the flow of refugees that could otherwise destabilize European politics. The prospect of US pull-out from Europe has revived a conversation about European defence and “open strategic autonomy”  raising the prospect of a reinvigorated relationship with Turkey.  

European leaders see Turkey, a top-tier member of NATO, as a key partner in fending off Russia and reinforcing the so-called Eastern flank. Accordingly, they are investing into stronger security and defence relations. Merz’s visit is a case in point. It was made possible by a defence deal— the USD 10 bn purchase of 20 Eurofighter Typhoon jets.  The sale was formally finalised on October 27, during a visit by British Prime Minister Keir Starmer.   But it was made possible only after Germany, another key member of the Eurofighter consortium, had lifted its objections.  The German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul visit to Ankara on 17 October seems to have ironed all remaining issues.  And the Typhoons are part of a bigger package. Last year, German authorities authorised the transfer of missiles and torpedoes to Turkey’s navy, as well as material packages for modernizing Turkish submarines and frigates.

While Germany has grabbed most headlines, there is a notable evolution in France’s position on Turkey too.  Not long ago, President Emmanuel Macron sparred with Erdoğan over the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya.  In 2021,  France and Greece signed a defence agreement which sought to send a strong signal towards Turkey.   Macron now welcomes Turkish participation in his “Coalition of the Willing,” pledging to deploy a peacekeeping force in Ukraine should a ceasefire agreement is reached.  Turkey has been welcomed with open arms in the European Political Community (EPC), another brainchild of Macron’s which sprang up in the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.  France and Turkey have converged on other high-profile issues too such as Gaza, with Erdoğan supportive of the French-Saudi plan for a Palestinian state, unveiled at the UN last summer.  The Turkish president appreciates Macron’s willingness to diverge from US and take a critical stance on Israel.

Turkey has other friends among the EU heavyweights.  Italy and Poland have both signed new defence and energy agreements with Ankara.  And then there is the UK which has What unites these disparate engagements is pragmatism. The Ukraine war has forced Europe to look beyond moralising rhetoric and rediscover the value of geopolitical flexibility — a skill Erdoğan has mastered.

That pragmatism now extends to Brussels. After a five-year freeze, the EU–Turkey high-level dialogue was revived in spring 2024, after being frozen five years prior. Working groups on trade, migration, and energy are back in motion. The European Commission has also launched talks on updating the 1996 Customs Union — a long-standing Turkish priority — and Ankara has promised to align its climate policies with the European Green Deal to avoid new tariffs under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). None of this amounts to a revival of Turkey’s stalled EU accession bid, but it does reflect a new appetite for “flexible integration” — a partnership built on common interests rather than shared values.

That is not to say that it is all plain sailing.  Old-standing obstacles remain. Greece and Cyprus continue to block Turkey’s participation in European defence schemes such as PESCO or the European Defence Fund. Ankara’s 1994 resolution authorizing war should Athens extend its maritime borders to twelve nautical miles remains a diplomatic time bomb. Unless this long-running dispute is defused, Turkey will miss the chance to join new EU initiatives like the €150 billion SAFE programme aiming to bolster the defence industry  or the €1.5 billion European Defence Industry Foundation (EDIP) running until 2027.    

Turkey is looking for workarounds.  Its defence industry is quietly integrating itself into Europe’s security ecosystem from below. The Baykar–Leonardo joint venture and Baykar’s acquisition of Italy’s Piaggio Aerospace illustrate how Turkish firms are embedding themselves in EU supply chains even without formal political access. Similar partnerships with Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria reinforce a pattern: Ankara is pursuing strategic convergence through markets and technology rather than institutions. 

The regional context also favours cooperation between EU and Turkey. 

For starters, politics in Northern Cyprus may offer an unexpected opening. The election of leftist Turfan Erhürman, who has criticized Ankara’s heavy-handedness, could rekindle talks on reunification — a development Brussels would welcome. A modest breakthrough there could ease Greece’s resistance and inject momentum into Turkey’s broader European engagement.

Syria offers as good a prospect for collaboration too.  The Assad regime toppled and an EU donor conference pledging billions for reconstruction, Turkey has positioned itself as a gateway for European engagement in the Levant.  The EU has lifted most sanctions on Syria and hosted a donor conference. Ahmad al-Sharaa even visited Paris for talks with Macron.  

The normalisation of Turkey’s relations with Armenia is another bright spot.   Both Turkey and the EU favour a rapprochement between Yerevan and Baku, based on a peace treaty.   A durable settlement will help Turkish-Armenia ties too, unblocking the border and reducing Russian influence.   Armenia will have a freer hand in engaging with the West as well, in such a scenario.     

The EU and Turkey are working together in the Western Balkans. As a NATO member contributing troops to EUFOR in Bosnia and missions in Kosovo, Ankara already acts as a bridge between Brussels and regions where the Union’s own presence is limited.

To be sure, Erdoğan’s Turkey is and will remain at best an awkward partner. Ankara continues to align with only about ten percent of EU foreign policy declarations, refusing to endorse sanctions on Russian energy firms. It prefers strategic autonomy — balancing ties between Moscow, Brussels, and Washington — to the discipline of alliance.  Turkey envisions itself as a middle power in a multipolar global order, not a supplicant ever stuck at the gates of the EU. Europe has adjusted to this reality.  It has largely stopped lecturing Erdoğan about democracy or human rights. 

Of course,  Europeans cannot drop norms and values.  “There have been decisions in Turkey that do not yet fully meet the standards of the Copenhagen criteria,” Friedrich Merz said during the joint press conference.  He was hinting at the case of Ekrem Imamoglu, the detained mayor of Greater Istanbul as well as a lodestar for the Turkish opposition.  But Erdogan brushed aside such soft criticism by pointing that no one was above the law in Turkey (who gets to interpret the law is another matter).  He also referred to the “Ankara criteria”, a familiar rhetorical device.   Still, Erdogan did not lash out at Europeans’ double standards and alleged Islamophobia, as he  would do in the not-to-distant past.  The moderate tone on both sides highlights a political reality: as Turkey delivers on migration, energy, and security, Brussels will not take it to task on domestic repression.   Uneasy pragmatism defines the current phase of EU–Turkey relations. Gone is the romantic talk of accession that animated the 2000s. What has replaced it is transactional cooperation based on interests. 

Erdoğan understands this dynamic well. By recasting Turkey as a regional power indispensable to Europe’s security, he has neutralized critics who once saw him as a spoiler. For all his authoritarian habits, he now commands grudging respect in European capitals. The West may not like him, but it has learned to live with him — and increasingly, to rely on him.

In the end, Merz’s handshake with Erdoğan was less about fighter jets than about a new European realism. Faced with war, instability, and migration, the EU is rediscovering the virtues of engagement over isolation. Turkey, ever the pragmatic player, is seizing the opportunity. The two sides are not rekindling the love affair of the early 2000s — but they are learning, once again, how to coexist.