After UNIFIL: A New Watch Over Southern Lebanon

In Lebanon, the question of who possesses weapons is never merely a security issue. It is also a question of who governs, who protects the country, and who has the authority to decide between war and peace. This is why the approaching end of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, commonly known as UNIFIL, is generating an unusually sensitive debate. The issue is not simply which international force will replace it. The deeper question is whether a new international arrangement can help the Lebanese state establish effective authority in the south without weakening the sovereignty it is supposed to defend.

The future of the international presence in southern Lebanon was therefore at the center of President Joseph Aoun’s recent visit to Italy. Aoun, a former commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces, discussed with Italian officials what might replace UNIFIL, how large the new presence would be, and—most controversially—what authority it would possess. Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal subsequently continued these discussions at the military level.

With another extension of UNIFIL’s mandate no longer expected, two broad alternatives have emerged. One is a smaller, predominantly European force led by countries such as Italy, France, and Spain, possibly with German participation. The other is a system of verification committees involving the United States. Although these arrangements are being discussed as different models, they could eventually become complementary parts of the same structure: a European-led presence operating on the ground and an international committee verifying compliance with political and security agreements.

To understand why this debate matters, however, one must first understand UNIFIL’s history, Hezbollah’s position within Lebanon, and the incomplete political bargain contained in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701.

What is UNIFIL?

UNIFIL was created in 1978 after Israel invaded southern Lebanon. Its original purposes were to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, help restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in reestablishing its authority in the south. The mission remained in Lebanon through subsequent Israeli invasions, occupations, civil conflict, and repeated confrontations between Israel and Lebanese armed groups.

Its role expanded considerably after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. That war ended with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The resolution called for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli forces as the Lebanese army and UNIFIL deployed in the south, and the establishment of an area between the Litani River and the Blue Line free of unauthorized weapons and armed personnel.

The Blue Line is the line identified by the United Nations to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. It functions as the practical line of separation between Israel and Lebanon, although it is not in every respect a formally agreed international border. The Litani River, which runs across southern Lebanon north of the frontier, has become an important strategic boundary. Under Resolution 1701, the territory between the Blue Line and the Litani is supposed to contain no armed forces or weapons other than those belonging to the Lebanese state and UNIFIL.

UNIFIL, however, was designed as a peacekeeping mission, not an occupying or enforcement force. It could patrol, observe, report violations, maintain communication between the parties, support the Lebanese army, and help prevent accidental escalation. It did not have unrestricted authority to search private property, forcibly disarm Hezbollah, or conduct military operations independently of the Lebanese state.

This distinction is essential. UNIFIL could monitor a political settlement, but it could not create one. It could report the presence of unauthorized weapons, but it could not resolve the political conflict over Hezbollah’s arsenal. Its effectiveness consequently depended on cooperation from the Lebanese government, the Lebanese army, Israel, Hezbollah, and the major international powers. Whenever that political cooperation disappeared, the limitations of the mission became evident.

Hezbollah and the weakness of state authority

Hezbollah is not merely an armed organization operating outside Lebanese politics. It is simultaneously a Shiite Islamist movement, a political party represented in parliament and government, an extensive social and religious network, and a powerful military organization supported by Iran. It emerged during the Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon in the 1980s and established much of its legitimacy through armed resistance to Israel.

For Hezbollah and many of its supporters, its weapons remain necessary because the Lebanese army cannot independently deter Israeli attacks. Hezbollah portrays itself as a resistance movement defending Lebanese territory and protecting the country from a militarily superior neighbor.

Its Lebanese opponents see the matter very differently. They argue that Hezbollah’s independent military organization prevents the state from exercising a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Because Hezbollah can retain weapons, launch attacks, and influence decisions about war and peace, its critics contend that Lebanon is not fully sovereign. In their view, no political party should possess an army more powerful than the institutions of the state.

This disagreement cannot be separated from Lebanon’s confessional political system. Political authority is divided among religious communities: the president is traditionally a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim. Parliamentary seats and major government offices are similarly distributed according to sectarian arrangements.

This system was designed to prevent any single community from dominating the others, but it also fragments authority and makes major decisions dependent on bargaining among political parties, religious communities, and external patrons. The Lebanese government therefore cannot simply issue an order to disarm Hezbollah and assume that it will be implemented. Any attempt to do so by force could divide the army, provoke Shiite opposition, and potentially push the country toward internal conflict.

The Lebanese army remains one of the country’s most respected national institutions, but it operates within these political constraints. Its caution does not necessarily reflect sympathy for Hezbollah. Rather, it reflects an awareness that an army representing all Lebanese communities must avoid becoming an instrument of one sectarian coalition against another.

The unfulfilled bargain of Resolution 1701

Resolution 1701 contained an implicit reciprocal bargain. The Lebanese state would deploy its army in the south and prevent nonstate armed groups from operating there. Israel, in return, would withdraw its forces, respect Lebanese sovereignty, and cease military operations inside Lebanon.

That bargain was never fully implemented. Hezbollah retained weapons and military infrastructure, while Israel continued actions that Lebanon regarded as violations of its sovereignty. Each side used the other’s failure to justify its own conduct. Israel argued that Hezbollah’s military presence made surveillance and military intervention necessary. Hezbollah argued that Israeli attacks, territorial violations, and continued occupation demonstrated why its weapons remained necessary.

This produced a self-reinforcing security trap. Israel would not fully withdraw or end its military operations without guarantees that Hezbollah had been removed from the border. Hezbollah would not surrender its weapons while Israel continued to occupy Lebanese territory or attack inside Lebanon. The Lebanese state was caught between the two.

UNIFIL helped contain this conflict, maintained channels of communication, supported civilians, and reduced the risk of unintended escalation. But it could not compel either side to fulfill the political bargain behind Resolution 1701. Its inability to forcibly disarm Hezbollah was sometimes described as a failure, but such enforcement powers had never been part of its realistic peacekeeping mandate.

The post-UNIFIL debate is therefore an attempt to address a problem that UNIFIL could monitor but never resolve.

The European option

The first proposal under discussion would establish a smaller international force with a predominantly European composition. Italy, France, and Spain would form its core, with Germany possibly joining. These countries have experience in UNIFIL and established relationships with both the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army.

According to reports in the Lebanese media, the Italian government has prepared a four-page proposal for the post-UNIFIL period. It envisages a smaller but more active international presence. Its responsibilities could include assisting the Lebanese army, protecting civilians, supporting the mechanism overseeing the cessation of hostilities, monitoring violations, reporting developments, and promoting de-escalation. If the Lebanese parties reach a political agreement, it could also support measures intended to bring weapons under state control.

A European-led force might be more acceptable to Lebanon than a mission dominated by the United States. France and Italy, in particular, possess long-standing diplomatic and military relationships with Lebanon. European countries may also be regarded as somewhat less politically identified with Israel than Washington.

But the European proposal leaves important questions unanswered. Would the new force operate under a UN Security Council mandate, or would it be deployed through a separate agreement with the Lebanese government? Would it be authorized merely to observe and report, or would it be able to inspect suspected military sites? Could it seize weapons? What would happen if Hezbollah or local residents denied it access? To whom would it report, and who would decide whether a violation had occurred?

Without clear answers, a smaller European force could reproduce UNIFIL’s limitations while possessing less international legitimacy and fewer resources.

The American-backed verification model

The second option involves verification committees with possible American participation. These committees would determine whether the Lebanese army was bringing weapons south of the Litani under exclusive state control and whether Israel was fulfilling its corresponding obligations.

Washington appears to favor a verification mechanism with stronger executive authority than UNIFIL. Such a mechanism might be allowed to inspect locations, investigate allegations, verify the removal of weapons, and certify whether the Lebanese army had completed particular operations.

The attraction of American participation is clear. The United States has considerable influence over Israel and is an important supporter of the Lebanese army. It may therefore be able to connect Lebanese security measures to Israeli withdrawal more effectively than a European force acting alone.

Nevertheless, an American role is politically sensitive. Many Lebanese, especially Hezbollah and its allies, do not regard Washington as a neutral actor because of its close strategic relationship with Israel. A verification mechanism perceived as monitoring only Lebanese conduct while ignoring Israeli violations would quickly lose legitimacy.

The term “verification” must also be carefully defined. There is a fundamental difference between confirming that the Lebanese army has completed an operation and directly supervising that operation.

Suppose international monitors receive information about a weapons depot south of the Litani. The Lebanese army could inspect the location, remove any weapons it finds, and submit a report. International monitors could then visit the site, examine the evidence, and verify the result. Such a procedure would preserve the army’s command authority while providing international confirmation.

It would be a different matter if foreign personnel accompanied the army during the raid, directed the search, decided which buildings should be entered, or ordered Lebanese soldiers to seize particular materials. At that point, the committee would no longer be merely verifying state action. It would be participating in the exercise of state authority.

The Lebanese army is unlikely to accept a foreign body operating inside its chain of command. Such an arrangement could undermine the army’s credibility, expose it to accusations of acting on behalf of Israel or the United States, and generate confrontation with local communities. A mechanism supposedly designed to strengthen the Lebanese state could therefore end by weakening it.

Israeli withdrawal and reciprocal verification

Lebanon does not, in principle, reject international verification south of the Litani. Lebanese officials maintain that the government is committed to establishing exclusive state control over weapons in the area. They also argue that Hezbollah’s visible military presence in the south has already been substantially reduced.

Their central concern is reciprocity. What happens if the Lebanese army clears an area of weapons while Israeli troops remain in control of nearby Lebanese territory? What prevents Israel from delaying its withdrawal after Lebanon has fulfilled its obligations?

Beirut therefore wants Israeli withdrawal incorporated into the verification process. The preferred approach would proceed in stages. The Lebanese army would enter a designated area, remove unauthorized weapons, and establish permanent control. International monitors would verify the army’s actions. Israel would then withdraw from the corresponding position, and the monitors would confirm its departure. The Lebanese army would subsequently assume responsibility for preventing the return of armed groups.

This synchronized process would help avoid the familiar problem in which each side waits for the other to act first. It would also give the Lebanese government a visible achievement to present to its population: the extension of state authority would produce the recovery of occupied territory rather than merely satisfying an external demand.

Without such reciprocity, a verification mission would be politically vulnerable. If it rigorously monitored Lebanese weapons while remaining silent about Israeli forces, airstrikes, or territorial violations, it would appear less like an impartial international mechanism and more like an instrument for imposing obligations on Lebanon alone.

Strengthening the state without replacing it

The European-force proposal and the verification-committee proposal do not necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. A carefully designed arrangement could combine them.

A European-led presence could conduct patrols, protect civilians, support the Lebanese army, maintain liaison across the Blue Line, and provide continuous reporting from the field. A separate committee involving the United States, France, Lebanon, and other relevant actors could verify compliance, resolve disputes, and coordinate the sequence between Lebanese deployments and Israeli withdrawals.

Under such an arrangement, the Lebanese army would retain operational command. International personnel would verify outcomes rather than direct raids. The mechanism would monitor obligations on both sides, not merely the removal of Hezbollah’s weapons. Clear procedures would determine how alleged violations were investigated and how disagreements were resolved.

International financial and logistical support would be equally important. Lebanon’s prolonged economic crisis has severely strained the army’s salaries, equipment, transportation, and operational readiness. The army cannot permanently control the south merely because international diplomats declare that it should do so. It needs personnel, surveillance capabilities, infrastructure, transportation, training, and reliable funding.

The forthcoming Paris conference on support for the Lebanese army and security forces will therefore be central to the post-UNIFIL arrangement. Italy, France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia can help build the army’s capacity. But military assistance cannot substitute for a Lebanese political agreement. The question of Hezbollah’s weapons is ultimately political, even when it appears in the language of military verification.

The real test of the post-UNIFIL order

The end of UNIFIL will not end the conflict that produced it. The underlying problems remain: Lebanon’s fragmented sovereignty, Hezbollah’s independent military power, Israel’s security demands, Israeli forces on Lebanese territory, mutual distrust, and the weakness of Lebanese state institutions.

Any successor arrangement will have to navigate between two dangers. If it is too weak, it will merely observe violations without changing conditions on the ground. If it is too intrusive, it will compromise the authority of the Lebanese army and provoke resistance from the communities whose cooperation it needs.

A workable arrangement must therefore rest on several principles: Lebanese operational command, credible international verification, reciprocal Israeli withdrawal, sustained support for the Lebanese army, equal reporting of violations, and a domestic political process addressing the future of Hezbollah’s weapons.

The central paradox is unmistakable. Lebanon needs international assistance to recover its sovereignty, but too much external control could further diminish that sovereignty. The success of the post-UNIFIL order will depend on whether international actors can help the Lebanese state become the sole authority in the south without behaving as though they themselves are the sovereign.

The decisive question is not simply who will watch southern Lebanon after UNIFIL. It is whether the new watcher will strengthen the Lebanese state—or quietly take its place.