In Turkey, the mission of safeguarding the authoritarian regime has been assigned to two institutions that appear to be in competition with one another and seemingly do not get along. The first of these is the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). It is understandable for the TSK to be the guarantor of the state’s and regime’s security—every state has armed forces that serve such a mission.

Paradoxically, however, the second institution tasked with this role in Turkey is the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, or DİB). Both institutions were established on March 3, 1924, independently from ministries and directly under the Prime Ministry. In one respect, this arrangement represents the continuation of Ottoman state tradition.

The military, as the regime’s guardians, had regularly intervened harshly in politics and society up until the year 2000, which led to a decline in their public legitimacy and reputation. The Turkish Armed Forces, which had waged a century-long battle against “reactionism” (irtica)—a term coined after the March 31 Incident—had become worn out by this struggle and increasingly found it difficult to intervene in society.

Moreover, as in the rest of the world, religion and religiosity were on the rise in Turkey as well. In such a climate, the greatest deception of all time was put into action: religious clerics took over the flag of regime protection from the military. With the involvement of clerics, both the tools and methods of regime preservation began to change. In fact, the regime itself had mutated to maintain control over Turkey’s evolving social and political fabric.

To protect the regime, religious clerics implemented a four-phase plan:

In the first phase, a politically religious-looking movement suited to the circumstances would be formed, and the public would be encouraged to support it. Indeed, clerics played an active role in the founding of the AKP. Former Diyanet President Tayyar Altıkulaç, who had devoted his life to combating religious sects and communities, describes his efforts in the party’s founding in his memoirs. These memoirs offer insight into the true power behind Erdoğan. The clerics went so far as to issue fatwas justifying the corruption committed by Erdoğan and his circle, while excommunicating those who fought against corruption.

The second phase of the plan involved creating a legal framework for the clerics—similar to the one that had once justified military interventions. In 2010, significant legislative changes were enacted. First, the offense of irtica (Islamist reactionism), which had long stigmatized religious conservatives, was removed from the criminal code. The law governing the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) was amended to expand its operational reach. After these changes, Diyanet personnel began functioning like intelligence agents both within Turkey and abroad. In fact, some of DİB’s overseas activities even triggered espionage investigations.

What the military once did during the February 28 process—profiling individuals and organizations—was now being carried out by muftis, imams, and muezzins. National Security classes, formerly taught by military officers in schools, were abolished and replaced with regulations that allowed imams to teach in schools. Diyanet began appointing “Youth Coordinators” to schools across the country. Meanwhile, posts that had previously been occupied by military officials—such as university rectorships, council board seats, and general directorates—were now being filled by figures from the religious establishment. The rivalry between the military and the clerical class became evident across all institutions, almost like a counterrevolution in motion.

The third phase of the plan unfolded on July 15. For the first time in the history of the Republic, the religious establishment played an active role during a military coup attempt. Imams called the public into the streets to confront soldiers, effectively setting off the spark of a potential civil war. Had the military not acted with restraint, the country could have witnessed a massacre of unimaginable proportions. The clerics, who played a central role in the killing of soldiers on the bridge, not only broke the military’s power but also solidified their own grip on the regime. In time, it became clear to all that clerics could be even more brutal and bloodthirsty than the military.

A society that had once lived under a form of military dictatorship now found itself ruled by the dictatorship of the religious class. Some clerics went so far as to issue fatwas sanctioning mass killings of regime opponents. Others openly called for the forced exile of dissidents, invoking the model of 1915. There were even those who declared that the property, wives, and daughters of political opponents were halal—permissible to seize and take. In their cruelty, they competed with one another.

After July 15, the final phase of the plan was set into motion. It’s worth recalling that one of the original purposes behind the establishment of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) was to combat religious communities (cemaat) and orders (tarikat) deemed dangerous to the regime. This mission is not new. DİB has historically prepared numerous reports against various religious scholars and community leaders, often leading to their prosecution. As in the past, DİB continues to profile members of religious groups today, advising the regime on how to neutralize those it sees as threats. Even if the regime itself has changed, Diyanet’s role as guardian of the regime has not.

In 2017, DİB declared the Gülen movement to have deviated into heresy and fallen outside the bounds of Islam, laying the ideological groundwork for a sweeping campaign of political and social extermination. But it turns out DİB’s profiling of religious communities was not limited to the Gülen movement. As revealed by Yeni Asya newspaper and Artı Gerçek, DİB has categorized and profiled nearly every major religious order and group in Turkey.

The report classifies religious communities into eight categories and lists criticisms for each:

• Under “Qur’an Islam,” figures like Abdülaziz Bayındır, Ercüment Özkan, Haksöz/Özgürder, Mehmet Okuyan, and Mustafa İslamoğlu were scrutinized.
• Under “Salafi Rhetoric,” groups associated with Abdullah Yolcu, Alparslan Kuytul, Feyzullah Birışık, Halis Bayancuk, Kul Sadi Yüksel, Mehmet Balcıoğlu, and Mehmet Emin Akın were profiled.
• Under “Messianic and Mahdist Movements,” Adnan Oktar, Ahmet Hulusi, and İskender Evrenosoğlu were included.
• Under “Traditionalists,” the report covered İhsan Şenocak, Nurettin Yıldız, and Şahımerdan Sarı.
• Under “Religious and Political Formations,” the Dawah and Brotherhood Foundation (Davet ve Kardeşlik Vakfı), Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Hezbollah were profiled.
• Under “Risale-i Nur Groups,” various Nurcu branches like the Kırkıncılar, Med-Zehra, Okuyucular, Tahşiyeciler, Yazıcılar, Yeni Asya, and Zehra groups were listed.
• Under “Sufi Orders,” major Naqshbandi branches such as Erenköy, Hazneviler, Işıkçılar, İskenderpaşa, Somuncular, İsmailağa, Cübbeli, Menzil, Norşin, Ömer Öngüt, Süleymancılar, El-Cezeri, and Yahyalı were profiled—along with the Halveti, Rifa’i, and Qadiri orders.
• Nurettin Şirin and İhsan Eliaçık were categorized under “Others.”

One of the more striking aspects of the report is that certain groups—whose existence and activities are well known—are not evaluated at all. It is highly likely that these groups are fully under state control and operate entirely in line with state objectives, thus exempting them from critique or classification.

While the report mostly offers negative assessments of the listed groups, describing them as potential threats to the state and regime, it curiously praises some individuals who have been convicted of terrorist acts. This, of course, is not surprising—considering that in its 2015 report titled “The Core Philosophy and Religious References of DAESH,” the Diyanet conspicuously avoided labeling the group as a terrorist organization.

This same approach is evident in the current report. For example, it contains a surprisingly favorable description of Şahımerdan Sarı, who was imprisoned for carrying out a bombing attack on Müjde Publishing House, which had distributed Bibles at a book fair in Gaziantep in 1997. The report states:

“Sarı adheres to Sunni Islam and follows the Hanafi school. He is pro-state and pro-ummah. No anti-state rhetoric has been detected in his speeches or publications. Nor has any marginal religious view been identified. Overall, his organization appears to follow a moderate path.”

Such remarks—made to whitewash someone involved in a terrorist act—reveal much about the current regime’s ideological leanings. Equally concerning is the absence of any critical remarks about Halis Bayuncuk, who was arrested for carrying out multiple operations in the name of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Despite a follower of Nurettin Yıldız being responsible for the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara, the report’s only critique of Yıldız is related to his tone. He now lectures at several universities—including Boğaziçi University—while students protesting his presence are arrested.

The report also avoids labeling Hezbollah (based in Turkey) as a terrorist organization. Instead, it minimizes the group’s violent history by describing its acts as “temporary manifestations of violence.” Today, HÜDA PAR—Hezbollah’s political successor—is part of Erdoğan’s electoral alliance and holds seats in the Turkish Parliament.

The report identifies some religious communities as a direct terrorist threat to the state. One of the most notable among them is Alparslan Kuytul’s Furkan Foundation. The report accuses Kuytul of promoting anti-state rhetoric, defending coup plotters, and siding with enemies of Turkey on key national issues. It also accuses him of exploiting the Prophet Muhammad’s name by falsely claiming the Prophet attended his rallies.

All Nurcu groups are criticized for their allegiance to Said Nursi and the Risale-i Nur collection. However, the Yeni Asya group, in particular, is accused of supporting terrorism. The report claims that due to its strong opposition to the government after the July 15 coup attempt, Yeni Asya produced content sympathetic to the Gülen movement:

“Following the coup attempt on July 15, the group adopted an extremely oppositional stance toward the government and published content perceived as supportive of FETÖ.”

The Erenköy Community is profiled in great detail—even including the number of students it brings to Turkey from abroad. According to the report, the group brought in 56 PhD students, 255 master’s students, and 2,200 undergraduate students, among others. While the group is seen as close to the government, the report notes that it maintains ties with political actors critical of AKP. This is likely a reference to factions within the ruling party itself. The report concludes with a veiled warning:

“Certain traditional Sufi practices and religious interpretations observed in the Erenköy community may pose risks by fostering division and weakening unity, solidarity, and brotherhood.”

The İsmailağa Community is also subject to Diyanet’s criticism:

“By presenting personal preferences—particularly in dress and appearance—as essential Islamic obligations, they risk reducing the Prophet’s Sunnah to mere formalism. Such reductionist approaches can divide the Muslim community and undermine social cohesion.”

The Menzil Community is portrayed not only as theologically problematic but also as a security threat:

“Their beliefs are incompatible with a sound understanding of Islam. These dangerous views, common in other Sufi groups as well, are more pronounced in the Menzil movement and have spread widely among the lower classes. Recently, public opinion has noted Menzil’s growing presence in the bureaucracy. If true, this development could cause serious problems for the country in the medium to long term.”

Reading the report’s section on the Süleymancı movement, one can’t help but think they may be next in line for a major crackdown—perhaps even the largest since the operations against the Gülen group. The report essentially declares waron the Süleymancılar. Here’s a direct excerpt:

“The Süleymancı movement is characterized by symbols and imagery that distinguish it as a unique formation. In regions where they are strong, they display a negative attitude toward other institutions engaged in similar activities, including the Directorate of Religious Affairs. They also promote certain ideas and rhetoric that do not align with orthodox Islamic understanding. The global scale and structure of their operations raise important questions about the forces backing their activities behind the scenes.”

The report goes even further, suggesting that the group may have ties to foreign intelligence services and that they should be investigated to prevent another “FETÖ” scenario. One former insider, known within the movement as the “Kozan Imam,” Mustafa Akyıldız, has made serious claims about the group’s internal hierarchy—such as a nationwide structure organized under so-called “corps commanders,” who allegedly receive significant financial privileges.

The report also cites the testimony of Hilmi Türkmen, a former MP and regional leader within the Süleymancı network, who later broke with the group. According to Türkmen:

“Some members of the community are working within state institutions not just as public servants, but with the intent to take control of the state and establish political dominance. Their inner teachings—which are said to contradict the Qur’an and Hadith—are so secretive that even followers are instructed never to reveal them.”

The state, it seems, has adopted a dual strategy toward these groups: those it can co-opt are being brought under the control of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, while those it cannot are being targeted for destruction under the pretext of terrorism. This conclusion is not only reflected in the report’s final section but is also visible in the state’s current actions.

Following the purges of the Gülen movement, we have already witnessed operations against Alparslan Kuytul and Adnan Oktar. It is no longer speculative to expect that more such actions are coming.

President Erdoğan himself has hinted at a possible connection between Ekrem İmamoğlu and the Süleymancı movement. Recently, rumors and reports have begun circulating suggesting that operations targeting the Süleymancılar have already begun in Turkey. In light of all this, it is becoming increasingly clear: after the Gülen movement, the next major target is likely to be the Süleymancılar.

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