A hundred days into Donald Trump’s second presidency, the contours of transatlantic relations have shifted dramatically. US foreign policy, once anchored in multilateralism, now revolves around transactionalism. With Washington angling for a deal with Vladimir Putin and a potential Russian victory in Ukraine no longer unthinkable, European capitals are scrambling to adapt. Defence budgets are on the rise. Security cooperation is intensifying—not within EU frameworks, but among nation-states acting in concert.
One byproduct of this realignment is a revitalized EU-UK relationship. Strategic imperatives have raised the prospect for upgrading post-Brexit framework. A major summit is planned for 19 May where Prime Minister Keir Starmer will sign a security partnership with the Union. At the same time, the inroads made by the populist Reform party headed by Nigel Farage at the recent local elections would be a reason for Starmer to thread carefully. Progress on a Youth Mobility Scheme, a major ask by Brussels, could be hindered by the shifting domestic dynamics in Britain. Though London needs a reset – as part of a Labour’s agenda of reinvigorating the economy – politics could throw a spanner in the works.
EU’s renewed interest in Turkey is another ongoing story. The Union sees Turkey as a partner in containing Russia—proof that necessity overrides normative qualms. Ankara has made steps too – with key investments in European defence companies, notably a partnership between Baykar and the prominent Italian firm Leonardo. As defence ties solidify, they are beginning to spill over into trade and economic cooperation. But there too Turkey’s domestic politics raise question how far the rapprochement could go. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu and his associates back in March and the mass protests that followed constrain European policymakers. Equally, they are bad news for those in Ankara who would like to reengage Europe, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
Despite the institutional and political hurdles, the direction of travel is clear. A looser, more pragmatic Europe is emerging. Since security and defence is the common denominator individual states play a leading part. Brussels has wider powers than before – e.g. on funding industrial projects – but still is in a supporting role.
These coalitions often include non-EU players such as the US, UK, Norway, South Korea, Japan, Turkey and others. They have been developing joint capabilities including tanks, infantry vehicles, missiles, fighter jets. The underlying goal is to achieve scale and incentivise defence industries to invest as serving several customers makes a project viable. Meanwhile, EU member states like Hungary that remain out of sync with the collective mood are being sidelined on security policy. The case in point is policy in Russia. In case Budapest vetoes sanctions, there is no doubt that the EU will be implementing them at the level of 26 member states.
Flexibility is the key to keep the United States involved in Europe too. With the erosion of NATO credibility owing to Trump, many countries may double down on bilateral projects with America. That is clearly the preferred course of action in the UK but also Poland and the Baltic countries. Despite the development of European defence – e.g. more robust spending by core states like Germany – US has capabilities in areas such as missiles, air defences and intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR) which cannot be matched. That debate has come to the fore in the context of the so-called Reassurance Force that could be deployed in Ukraine to uphold a ceasefire. Britain and France won’t be able to put boots on the ground without an US “backstop”. Precisely the capabilities listed above. All in all, while there is a recognition in Europe of the need achieve strategic autonomy, many countries prefer phased transition. NATO’s forthcoming Hague Summit will be discussing the modalities of Europeanising the alliance. That is variable geometry should serve as a wake-up call to candidate countries waiting at the EU’s gates. In many of them—from Ukraine and Moldova to the Western Balkans—the assumption still holds that enlargement is the only game in town. But that logic belongs to a bygone era. Today’s EU is less an engine of normative transformation than a security hub bracing for geopolitical storms.
However, some leaders have adjusted accordingly. Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić maintains the formal appearance of EU accession talks but has long since mastered the art of playing all sides. Brussels remains a source of funds and legitimacy, but so too are Moscow, Beijing, Ankara, and even Abu Dhabi. Vučić’s strategy—strike deals with whoever’s in power, Trump included—signals to domestic audiences that Serbia has alternatives. He is not alone. Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party has announced a suspension of its EU membership bid until 2028, following a contested election and rising tensions with the West. In both cases, the calculus is the same: extract benefits from the EU without submitting to its political conditions.
Even states once seen as frontrunners risk backsliding. North Macedonia, having swallowed bitter compromises to unblock its EU path, now looks enviously at Serbia’s maneuvering. In Moldova, upcoming elections may empower voices that, like Georgia, advocate hedging rather than committing.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine injected fresh momentum into enlargement. It reminded Europeans of the costs of leaving grey zones on the continent. Yet as the Trump era unfolds, that momentum may falter. Enlargement is no longer the self-evident response to instability. Nor is it guaranteed. Non-enlargement—in some cases, even de-alignment—is very much an option for political elites on the European periphery. And again, the case of Turkey is instructive. Though size does matter in international affairs, the geopolitical position Erdogan has manoeuvered the country into – partly integrated into the European structure but charting its own course – sets a precedent the likes of Serbia or Georgia are mindful of. And who knows, Ukraine can also become another case if the magic of EU enlargement wears off in a decade or so. For the first time in decades, being left out of the Union may not feel like a failure to some governments, but a strategic choice.
The EU must now contend with a dual challenge: the resurgence of geopolitics and the erosion of its own transformative power. In response it is seeking to pump up its military muscles, reset ties with strategically important neighbours and revamp enlargement. However, ambitions would surely come short of performance when they come in contact with political, economic and institutional realities.
