Sunday, March 9, 2025

Europe’s Response to Trump: Time to Grow Up?

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Three years ago, Russia invaded Ukraine, starting the largest-scale and deadliest war in Europe since 1945. However, Ukraine’s heroic resistance—bolstered by military and political support from Europe and the US —thwarted Vladimir Putin’s plans. 

Unfortunately, American support is now uncertain. Donald Trump is eager to strike a deal with Putin, seemingly regardless of the cost. At stake is not only Ukraine’s future as an independent state but also the broader security of Europe.

Had the proposed deal merely involved a ceasefire in exchange for the de facto recognition of Russia’s territorial gains, it might have been tolerable—even for Volodymyr Zelensky—provided that it included Western security guarantees for Ukraine.

The real concern, however, is that Trump appears willing to make far-reaching concessions. These could include lifting US sanctions on Moscow, granting the Kremlin—rather than Ukrainian voters—the power to determine Kyiv’s leadership, effectively withdrawing the US from NATO, and renegotiating Europe’s political order.

Alarming Signs from Recent Events

Recent developments provide ample cause for concern.

  • The US-Russia Talks in Riyadh: These discussions signal a step toward normalizing diplomatic and economic relations. The White House hopes that Putin is open to compromise, with some even fantasizing about Russia becoming a US ally in its competition with China.
  •  Trump’s Criticism of Zelensky: Trump has labeled Zelensky a “dictator” for imposing martial law, which prevents elections from being held—conveniently echoing a Kremlin talking point. In reality, Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, made that decision. There is growing concern that the US might accept the return of a pro-Russian leader, akin to Viktor Yanukovych or Alexander Lukashenko, who would steer Ukraine back into Moscow’s sphere of influence. Trump has already blamed Kyiv for the war’s outbreak, indirectly supporting another Russian demand: the disarmament of Ukraine, making it entirely dependent on Moscow.
  •  The Implications for NATO: Trump’s stance threatens to fracture the Alliance. Vice President J.D. Vance’s aggressive rhetoric toward Europe at the Munich Security Conference hints at a shift in Washington’s priorities. Even without a formal NATO withdrawal, the US could pull its forces from Europe, including from the Alliance’s eastern flank—an outcome that would be a clear victory for Putin. A potential Trump-Putin summit could be a personal triumph for the Russian leader, with no one surprised to see Trump on Red Square for the May 9 celebrations.

Europe’s Strategic Challenge

Europe faces two critical challenges: Ensuring Ukraine’s survival and developing a new framework for strategic deterrence of Russia—without relying on US support.

Recent events have vindicated French President Emmanuel Macron. Even before Trump’s election victory, Macron was the first to propose sending a European military contingent to Ukraine. With the UK also signaling readiness to participate, the likelihood of such an operation has increased. The key question is not whether this or that country in Europe will join or not, but rather what US military capabilities—such as intelligence, air defense, and logistics—would still be needed. Ironically, a European-led mission might align with Trump’s interests, as it could facilitate his ceasefire deal with Putin. This argument will likely be central when Keir Starmer and Macron visit the White House.

The European response

EU is enacting a 16th round of sanctions against Russia, signaling its resolve to continue with the pressure.  Europeans will continue to provide financial aid to Ukraine too. One pressing issue is the fate of Russian currency reserves frozen within the EU. Legal complexities have so far prevented their confiscation, but circumstances may eventually leave Europe with no other choice. Meanwhile, European defense industries—whose stock values continue to rise—are ramping up production of ammunition for Ukraine. However, Europe cannot fully replace the US in critical areas such as air defense systems and long-range missile capabilities.

To navigate these challenges, Zelensky and European leaders will attempt to strike a deal with Trump. After much negotiation, Ukraine may be forced to accept some form of the controversial rare minerals extraction agreement—though its implementation remains uncertain.

A Future Without US Security Guarantees

Even if a temporary compromise is found, Europe must acknowledge a hard truth: it can no longer depend on NATO’s Article 5 security guarantees. Should Russia directly attack a NATO member—such as Estonia or Latvia—Trump may refuse to intervene, or worse, exploit the crisis to extract maximum concessions from European allies. 

This grim reality underscores Macron’s calls for European strategic autonomy.   There is acknowledgment from other quarters as well.  “For me, the absolute priority will be to strengthen Europe as quickly as possible so that, step by step, we can really achieve independence from the USA,” the incoming Chancellor Friedrich Merz said after polls on 23 February showed that his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) had won the largest portion of the vote in Germany’s snap elections. 

Macron, Merz, and Starmer agree that Europe has no choice but to take responsibility for its own security. This requires increased defense spending, investment in military technology, and commitments to joint European projects like the European Sky Shield. 

Moreover, France and the UK must guarantee that their nuclear arsenals protect the entire NATO territory, including the eastern flank.   Germany has initiated a conversation on an European nuclear deterrent, independent of the safeguard provided by the United States via NATO.   Reconfiguring strategic deterrence will have lasting consequences for Europe’s security order, including for Turkey which profits from the nuclear cover extended over the Atlantic Alliance. 

The Challenges of European Defense

Building a credible European defense is easier said than done. It requires significant financial commitments, yet key nations face fiscal constraints. The UK and France struggle with budgetary pressures, while Germany is constrained by the so-called “debt brake”, a restriction on annual structural deficits inscribed in the Federal Republic’s constitution. Friedrich Merz has so far resisted calls to revise the country’s debt brake. Now that he has been elected, Merz will come under pressure to move. Possibly with support from the Social Democrats, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)’s coalition party, and even from Die Linke (the Left) which will be in opposition.   One potential solution to the conundrum is issuing joint EU bonds, similar to the financing mechanism used during the COVID-19 recovery—but deep divisions remain in Brussels, making swift action unlikely.   Payments for the joint debt issued to underwrite the post-COVID Next Generation EU program are to start in 2028 which will complicate the conversation over defense bonds further. 

There is a shortage of manpower too.  According to some estimates,  Europeans need to recruit up to 300,000 additional troops to meet the requirements of territorial defense.  Some states will probably do so by bringing back conscription. Countries like Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Sweden have it even now.   Another option may be to open European militaries to Ukrainian veterans – well trained and with extensive combat experience.      

Ukraine may prove to be at the center of the remilitarisation of Europe, not just a consumer of security. President Zelensky has become an ardent advocate of what he calls “and European Army”. Beyond manpower and experience,  Ukraine would be contributing technology.  The war has turned it into a global leader in some areas such as the development and manufacturing of drones.  

Despite the Kremlin’s celebrations, Ukraine will not easily fall under Putin’s control. As of now, Russia does not even fully control Donetsk Oblast. However, Europe cannot afford complacency. It must prepare for the possibility of a future conflict with Russia—without relying on US intervention. That is the only way to safeguard its security.

 

 

Dimitar Bechev
Dimitar Bechev
Dr. Dimitar Bechev is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also a research fellow at the Center of Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the director of the European Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Sofia, Bulgaria. Dr. Bechev has published extensively, in both academic and policy format, on EU foreign relations, the politics of Turkey and the Balkans, Russian foreign policy, and energy security. His book Rival Power, published by Yale University Press in 2017, explores Russia’s role in Southeast Europe (Balkans, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey). He has held research and teaching positions at Oxford and Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo as well as visiting fellowships at Harvard and the London School of Economics. From 2010 to 2014, he was the head of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) office in Sofia. Dr. Bechev is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy, Al Jazeera Online, Oxford Analytica, POLITICO, and EUObserver. His quotes have appeared in leading newspapers such as the Financial Times, the Economist, the Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times. He holds a DPhil in international relations from the University of Oxford.

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