Is the Regime in Iran endangered?

Demonstrations that began in Iran during the final two days of 2025 have continued, even if they appear to have lost some momentum. In the early phase, protesters cited high inflation and the Iranian currency (the toman) suffering an extraordinary loss of value. Iran’s economy is clearly under strain; still, the country is not a “basin of poverty,” even if living conditions could be considerably better. Yet the torching of mosques and public buildings—and the death toll reported in the unrest—suggest that the visible, stated causes and the deeper drivers behind the agenda may not fully coincide.

Protesting the authorities over unresolved economic or social grievances is a basic right, as is the exercise of institutional opposition and freedom of expression. If the protests were fundamentally about “the economy,” the main object of criticism should logically be the elected administration—President Pezeshkian—rather than the Supreme Leader (Velayat-e Faqih), Ali Khamenei. While it would be inaccurate to claim Khamenei has no influence, economic management is not his primary mandate. In functional terms, Khamenei represents the regime; Pezeshkian represents the government.

However, the protests soon shifted in character. Discontent began to target the Supreme Leader and his political line directly. What initially resembled civilian protest evolved into violence: killings, the destruction of public and private property, the torching of mosques and shrines, and assassination attempts against members of the Revolutionary Guards. The trajectory suggested that protests framed as economic grievance were, in practice, being carried by anti-regime actors. The target was no longer merely the administration or its officials, but the Islamic Republic’s founding ideology and the legitimacy framework underpinning the state.

The events do not appear spontaneous. On the visible stage, two actors—one domestic, one external—seem to have reached an implicit convergence at the point when unrest crossed a critical threshold: domestically, President Pezeshkian and his team; externally, the United States and Israel.

What aligns Pezeshkian’s political thrust with U.S.–Israeli preferences—at least for now—is not opposition to “the government” as such, but opposition to Khamenei, or in short, to the regime. Economic issues (inflation, devaluation, cost-of-living pressure) function as the pretext. In this respect, the pattern recalls Turkey’s 2013 Gezi protests. What began as a localized reaction against cutting trees and rebuilding the Artillery Barracks (Topçu Kışlası) quickly took on a different character. With the entrance of “agent provocateurs,” it turned into a bid to overthrow the government—especially Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. At the time, I argued that if democratic and sound decisions are not being taken, society and the opposition need not wait for an election cycle; issue-centered demonstrations can legitimately pressure decision-makers toward better outcomes. I hold the same view today. Yet once protests cease to be issue-focused and become efforts to topple the government—or the regime—they exemplify what Imam Ali described as using “a true statement for a false objective.”

In the current case, the target is not merely the governing cadre; it is the regime itself.

Pezeshkian’s Thesis: Reorienting Iran’s Priorities

In both his campaign discourse and his post-election remarks, Pezeshkian—without feeling compelled to conceal his objections—has concentrated his critique in three principal themes:

1. Misallocated national wealth. Iran is among the world’s major oil producers and possesses vast resources—oil, natural gas, and more. Yet, since 1979, Iran has allegedly spent its wealth on the Palestinian cause and allied groups (Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen’s Ansar Allah, among others). For 47 years, he argues, Iran has faced heavy pressure from the United States and Europe, endured isolation, and assumed excessive defense expenditures. If Iran abandons these policies, it could supposedly live in prosperity comparable to wealthy Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
2. The futility of direct confrontation. In Pezeshkian’s framing, fighting Israel and the United States offers little benefit because Israel effectively represents the United States and the broader West. The Gaza war since 2023 and the June 2025 war are presented as evidence.
3. A challenge to exclusivity over Palestine. Pezeshkian asks whether the Palestinian cause should be treated as uniquely Iran’s responsibility. He underscores that many Arab states have normalized relations with Israel; that the Sunni world does not uniformly embrace Sunni Palestine; and that Iran and the Shiite world should not be left carrying the burden alone.

To reinforce this argument, Pezeshkian reportedly points to Turkey as an example—indeed, as a model. In his depiction, Turkey maintains maximal rhetorical criticism of Israel while sustaining high-level relations in practice: trade, diplomacy, and political links continue; visas are not imposed on Israeli citizens; oil flows via Ceyhan persist; and commerce declared “cut” continues through alternative routes and intermediaries. Meanwhile, civil society—and at times the government—organizes mass pro-Gaza demonstrations. The implication is clear: Iran should emulate this approach.

Domestic Coalition Dynamics

Opposition forces bringing together Azeri, Kurdish, and Persian nationalists, secular Iranians, and Sunni Baluchis have mounted relentless demonstrations against Khamenei and the Revolutionary Guards. Their strategic objective is to strengthen Pezeshkian’s thesis and compel the “Line of the Imam” (Hatt-ı İmam) to retreat from its role as the determinant of state policy.

There are also domestic circles that support Pezeshkian’s approach. Some, including conservative elements rooted in the earlier revolutionary tradition, criticize factions around Khamenei for enriching themselves through reckless use of public resources and opportunities. Their posture suggests a desire to join the emerging trajectory—something that, in their view, would require at least partial liberalization of economic policy.

External Support and Strategic Calculus

It is not a secret that the thesis and the protests it motivates are welcomed by the United States and Israel. Where covert methods once relied on intelligence services, the author argues that the June 2025 “12-Day War” revealed the depth of foreign penetration into Iran’s most strategic institutions. Today, while similar practices allegedly continue, U.S. and Israeli support for opposition forces is described as increasingly open.

The text recalls that on 13 June 2025, Netanyahu announced a move to overthrow Iran’s regime and called on opposition groups to take to the streets, portraying Israel’s actions as intended to “liberate” the Iranian people. Trump likewise issued threats and declared support for the demonstrations. The author further claims that after the eighth day of the war—when Israel was close to defeat—U.S. bombing of Iran altered the outcome, and that Israel was “saved from heavy defeat” a second time after HTS took control of Syria.

Following Syria’s strategic realignment in favor of the United States and Israel, the author contends that Israel’s control over Palestine has become total and that Gaza’s population faces extreme vulnerability without adequate assistance or protection.

From the perspective of the United States and Israel, an opposition victory inside Iran would remove the need for direct military intervention. Trump continues to warn that if Iran violently suppresses protesters, the United States will respond. Israel, at least for now, is portrayed as unlikely to launch a new strike; the author notes that Netanyahu reportedly conveyed such a message through a phone call with Putin in October 2025.

The Core Dispute: Iran’s Post-1979 Legitimacy Doctrine

The author’s central claim is that the U.S., Western, and Israeli bloc oppose Iran’s regime primarily because the 1979 Revolution’s foreign-policy doctrine defines the United States as the principal adversary, with Israel as the main theater of confrontation.

Attribution is given to Imam Khomeini’s view that:

• America is the true enemy of Muslims who seek to govern themselves and control their resources;
• as the Soviet Union collapsed despite superpower status, America will also collapse;
• Muslims must be prepared for direct confrontation with America;
• the battlefield of this confrontation is occupied Palestine, and war with America and Israel will continue until Israel withdraws and Jerusalem is “liberated.”

This foreign-policy concept is presented as the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy doctrine. If abandoned, the Revolution would lose its meaning and legitimacy. Hence, the author argues, Khamenei and the “Line of the Imam” cannot relinquish the Palestinian cause. For the United States and Israel, Iran is depicted as the final redoubt of resistance to be broken.

The Open Question

A final question follows: if the demonstrations are suppressed and Khamenei’s bloc restores calm and initiative, would Israel and the United States attack Iran?

In protests surpassing the scale of those in 2022, the “Line of the Imam” camp must also decide how to treat Pezeshkian and his circle, who are described as influential from a distance. In recent days, as the author perceives growing belief that the anticipated uprising will not succeed, Pezeshkian has spoken both of external provocation and, simultaneously, in a manner protective of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij.

One point, the author concludes, commands broad agreement: while demonstrations continue, a U.S. intervention would delegitimize an already unorganized and leaderless opposition, ultimately serving Khamenei and his bloc.