The year 2024 may be recorded in history as the year when the balance policy, which has formed the backbone of Turkish foreign policy for 200 years, collapsed.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, prompting Israel to strike back heavily—first against Hamas and then against Hezbollah. This sequence of events led to the dismantling of the long-established Iran-Russia-Assad alliance in Syria. With Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), supported by Turkey, capturing Damascus, both Russia and Iran were forced to withdraw from Syria. This new reality, which signaled that Iran and Russia were too weak to protect even their allies, will trigger profound changes in global politics, including a major shift in Turkey’s foreign policy.

The Historical Foundation of Turkey’s Balance Policy

The Ottoman Empire entered a new era when the Governor of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha, rebelled, seized Syria, and advanced toward Istanbul. Subsequently, Russia assumed its unique role as a balancing power in Ottoman foreign policy. At that time, the Ottomans could no longer preserve their territorial integrity solely through their political and military strength. Instead, they maintained their existence by creating a balance among more powerful states. However, in exchange for support, the Ottomans had to grant concessions to these great powers.

Typically, this balance involved Russia on one side and a Western power opposing Russia on the other. The Western powers in this equation varied depending on the geopolitical context—sometimes Britain, sometimes France, Germany, or the United States played the counterbalancing role, either separately or collectively.

As the balance policy became a fundamental characteristic of both Ottoman and Turkish foreign policy, Turkey sought to establish similar relationships with nearly every country. Under Erdoğan’s rule, this approach reached its peak, shaping almost all diplomatic relations. Turkey pursued similar partnerships with Iran, Brazil, Libya, Venezuela, and China.

In 2018, when Turkey’s removal from the F-35 project was being discussed, İbrahim Kalın stated: “Turkey is not a country that can be easily cast aside; everyone should understand this. Whether it’s the F-35 or other matters, Turkey is not without alternatives.” This rhetoric echoed İsmet İnönü’s response to President Johnson’s 1964 letter, where he had famously declared, “A new world will be established, and Turkey will find its place in it.”

Ironically, nearly 200 years after the balance in Syria was first established, Erdoğan himself has now dismantled it—leaving Turkey in a position with no alternatives. 

The key question remains: Was this outcome part of Erdoğan’s plan?

Turkey’s Strategic Miscalculation in Syria

Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Turkey has played a pivotal role in arming the insurgents, strengthening its position within the regional balance of power. Turkey’s support for rebel groups fighting against the Iranian- and Russian-backed Bashar al-Assad earned Erdoğan greater credibility in the eyes of the U.S. and the UK. This dynamic allowed Erdoğan to bypass U.S. and European sanctions on Iran and Russia, while also consolidating his authoritarian rule domestically. Meanwhile, the EU, in an effort to control the flow of refugees—many of whom were Syrians—paid Erdoğan billions of dollars to act as a gatekeeper.

In this context, why did Erdoğan decide to abandon such a profitable position?

In the final phase of the war, Assad persistently refused Erdoğan’s requests for a meeting. It is highly likely that Erdoğan deployed HTS to force Assad into negotiations. However, when Israeli airstrikes led to Assad’s departure from Syria, HTS quickly seized Damascus. This exposed the military and political vulnerabilities of both Iran and Russia, making it clear that Russia could no longer serve as Turkey’s counterbalance against the West.

The Broader Geopolitical Consequences

The collapse of the balance policy centered on Russia was not the only consequence of recent developments. These events also reignited historical traumas for Arabs and Iranians. In the early 16th century, Ottoman Sultan Selim I (Yavuz Selim) launched his conquest of the Arab world by capturing Aleppo, later taking Cairo to complete his campaign. The fact that the road to Cairo historically opened through Aleppo could significantly damage Erdoğan’s already fragile ties with Arab states. Erdoğan’s attempt to send HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to secure funding for Syria’s reconstruction appears to be a thinly veiled maneuver. The Arab nations are well aware that a significant portion of the funds they provide would likely end up in the hands of contractors close to Erdoğan, which could hinder Syria’s rebuilding efforts.

Additionally, Erdoğan’s admiration for Sultan Selim I—who massacred approximately 40,000 Alevis in Anatolia—has not gone unnoticed in Iran. The decision to name the bridge spanning the Bosporus after Yavuz Selim sparked strong reactions from Alevis both in Turkey and the region. Iran, which has historical grievances stemming from Ottoman rule, also closely monitors HTS’s treatment of Syria’s Alevi population.

The Return to ‘Precious Loneliness’

With HTS now in control of Syria, Turkey appears poised to return to what İbrahim Kalın once termed “precious loneliness.” Turkey, already suffering from economic collapse, has never been weaker against the West.

Adding to this vulnerability is the personal wealth issue surrounding Erdoğan and his inner circle. In 2019, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham introduced a sanctions bill against Turkey in response to its military operations in Syria. The proposed sanctions include restrictions on financial transactions, penalties on Halkbank, bans related to the S-400 missile system, and an investigation into Erdoğan and his family’s assets. The bill stipulated that Erdoğan’s net worth would be assessed, and a report would be published within 60 days.

The prospect of such an investigation forced Erdoğan to take a step back in Syria. However, the issue extends beyond Erdoğan; it also implicates his political allies and key figures within the Turkish state.

Conclusion: A Weakened Turkey Facing a New U.S. Policy

In the event of Donald Trump’s re-election, the U.S. will have a free hand to redesign the Middle East without Turkey posing a significant obstacle. Trump will be able to reshape relations with Turkey on his own terms, and his leverage has never been stronger—nor has Europe’s.