A critical development revealing the current state of Türkiye’s relations with the Turkic Republics of Central Asia must not go unnoticed.
According to a BBC report dated April 8, 2025, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan declared during a summit with the European Union on April 4 that they remain committed to UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550. These resolutions condemn the establishment of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”—a state recognized only by Türkiye—and call on all countries not to recognize it. Consequently, these three key Central Asian states finalized their decisions to appoint ambassadors to the Republic of Cyprus just before the EU–Central Asia leaders’ summit held on April 3–4.
To understand the trajectory of Ankara’s relations with the Turkic Republics, one must divide Türkiye’s Central Asia policy into two distinct phases: before and after 2010. Prior to 2010, Türkiye was progressing on the path toward European Union membership and strengthening its position within NATO, firmly embedded in the Western bloc. This policy was, in many ways, a continuation of Türkiye’s traditional foreign policy approach.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992, Türkiye pursued cultural and economic ties with the newly established Central Asian republics. A key role in this process was played by members of the Gülen movement, a civil society initiative from Türkiye. Educators affiliated with the movement opened hundreds of schools across the region, while businesspeople linked to Gülen made significant investments that contributed to local development. Presidents such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, and Abdullah Gül actively supported these cultural and economic efforts. Political leaders like Bülent Ecevit and Tansu Çiller also backed these initiatives. Thousands of students from Central Asia studied in Turkish universities, later returning to their home countries to take up prominent positions in public life—many maintaining ties to the Gülen movement.
However, Turkish Eurasianists—secular and nationalist figures aligned with Russia—criticized these activities, arguing that the Gülen network served as a Western and American proxy in the region. Radical Islamist groups in Türkiye, meanwhile, accused the Gülen movement of promoting moderate Islam to block the spread of Salafism and Iranian influence in Central Asia. This unusual convergence of Eurasianists and Islamists created a powerful coalition of opposition.
Following the Arab Spring and Erdoğan’s rapprochement with Iran—including Türkiye’s role in circumventing U.S. sanctions—Ankara’s foreign policy took a sharp turn. Erdoğan’s close personal relationship with Vladimir Putin also contributed to the transformation of Türkiye’s stance toward Central Asia.
The political rupture deepened after the 17–25 December 2013 corruption investigations revealed allegations that Erdoğan’s ministers, family members, and allies accepted bribes from Iranian agents in exchange for evading sanctions. Erdoğan responded by launching a full-scale purge of the Gülen movement. After the July 15, 2016, so-called coup attempt, which he blamed on the movement, thousands were arrested, over 1,000 educational institutions were shut down, and assets worth approximately $40 billion were confiscated.
As part of this broader campaign, Ankara also pressured Central Asian governments to close down Gülen-affiliated schools and expel Turkish-origin businesspeople. Over the past decade, this approach has effectively dismantled the decades-long infrastructure of Türkiye’s cultural and economic engagement in Central Asia. At the same time, no coherent alternative policy has been developed to replace it. Turkish diplomats, using bribery and political pressure, seized Gülen-linked institutions and orchestrated extrajudicial renditions of educators and businessmen via the Turkish intelligence agency, MIT. These coercive tactics have raised suspicion among Türkiye’s counterparts in the region.
The robust, visionary relationships initiated during the Özal era and further strengthened under Demirel and Gül have collapsed, and no new framework has been established in their place. As a result, the Turkic republics have been left vulnerable to the influence of Russia, China, and Iran. The decisions made at the EU–Central Asia Summit in Samarkand on April 4, 2025—attended by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—are a clear reflection of Türkiye’s strategic void in the region.
