There is an old witticism, sometimes attributed to Leon Trostsky: “you might not be interested in war but war is interested in you.” For what it’s worth, it captures well Europe’s predicament in the face of the ongoing war in the Gulf. European states had nothing to do with Donald Trump’s fateful decision to attack Iran together with Israel. But their security and economic welfare have been suffering the consequences of the conflict which is showing no signs of abating. “Strategic autonomy”, Europe’s mantra these days, is being tested. And sadly, lofty ambitions are at odds with harsh realities once more.
The economic fallout is where it all starts. Europeans have to cope with yet another energy shock, as back in 2021-2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine. The painful memories of the two oil crisis of 1973 and 1979 have cropped up too. The closure of the Hormuz Strait has sent oil prices sharaply up. Natural gas has shot up too, dragging with it electricity prices. Governments that are already in a tough fiscal position – like those of Britain and France – are under pressure to impose caps or find another way to support households and businesses feeling the squeeze. Rising fuel costs feeds into overall inflation through a variety of channels, from the increased transport bills to surging prices of fertilizer which then affect how much you pay for, say, a loaf of bread in your local supermarket.
There is a slight ironic twist in this story. In the 1970s, Europeans partly switched from oil to natural gas in response to volatility in the Middle East. They turned to the Soviet Union as an alternative but gradually Middle Eastern exporters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) like Qatar carved out a niche on Europe’s market. Their prominence rose after 2022, with Qataris meeting up to 14% of European LNG demand. But now the Iranian strikes on Qatari infrastructure and the closure of the Hormuz Strait has delivered a double whammy. Global but also European natural gas prices have shot up by 20-25%.
The energy shock has security implications too.
Some are short term: Donald Trump is calling on European nations to help the US in unblocking Hormuz only to be turned down. By now, leaders such are Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron have probably figured out that threats issued by the US president do not amount to much. Besides, military bases have been made available to the American forces as they prosecute their air campaign against the Iranians. In a largely symbolic act, France has despatched its navy – including the Charles de Gaulle air carrier – to Cyprus in order to protect the Eastern Mediterranean against Iranian missile attacks. But the European response highlights impotence. Europe’s interest is to have a ceasefire sooner rather than later and avoid deepening energy crisis. But it cannot influence neither party – Trump or the Iranian regime.
Europe has to reckon with the fallout of the Gulf war on Ukraine. Russia profits from the fighting economically but also in the field of international diplomacy. The rising cost of is gaining from sky-high oil prices which according to industry watchers could clear the $150 per barrel threshold in several months should the war drag on. Such windfall means sustaining record high military expenditure, possibly achieving growth higher than 1% forecast for 2026. Which in turn suggests Putin will carry on with the war, in the hope that eventually the front and Ukraine as a whole will crack. The US bogged down in the Middle East, yet again, is the best-case scenario for Moscow – but also for Beijing. The Russians already reaped benefits after the US government agreed to lift some of the oil sanctions imposed against the country. More broadly, the attack against Iran also favours Russia politically. It comes as a vindication of its “might is right” approach to international affairs. And it gives some credibility to Russia’s effort to portray itself as a responsible and influential global power. There are signs that Putin is offering Trump help in mediating with the Iranians.
There is a long-term security challenge too. As money is becoming tighter defence budgets in Europe will inevitably come under squeeze too. Governments may face tough choices – shore up living standards now or invest in costly military capabilities – anti-missile systems, advanced aircraft, drones, satellites, tanks and armoured vehicle, naval platforms, to name a few – to protect yourself from external threat. Under US pressure, NATO members committed to a new spending target of 3.5% GDP for core defence. Adherents of strategic autonomy, that is reducing dependence on America in terms of hard power and technology, have been by and large supportive. The vision of sovereign Europe capable of defending itself from Russia and projecting stability around its borders lures many in the age of Donald Trump. But the question remains whether citizens in key countries such as Germany, France, and UK are prepared to fund it – or vote for populists who often oppose foreign entanglements and prioritise short-term policies that score points with the electorate. The combination of low growth, high inflation and anxiety about the impact of the outside world on domestic societies and economies is the perfect environment for such parties and politicians to thrive. Europe’s future leaders, in other words, might well opt for a less ambitious foreign policy posture, slow down rearmament schemes, and – in effect rather than by design – prolong the structural dependence on the US.
Where is Turkey in all this? Clearly, it finds itself in the same boat as Europe in more than one respect. Turkey consumes vast volumes of imported gas, including LNG from the Gulf, and has reasons to fear price hikes. Especially, if the war continues into the next winter as demand for natural gas and electricity peaks. That is in addition to the more serious threat of chaos in Iran leading to a mass refugee exodus across the border. As ever, Trump oscillates between two roles: of a regional power with interests and influence, which can potentially talk reason to Trump and the Iranians and of a member of the Western bloc. President Erdogan obviously will be doubling down on the former. Yet Turkey has been shown to be dependent on NATO air defences to fend off Iranian missiles – three to date. As with Europe, it might turn out that Turkey does not have that many cards to play. What the Turkish leadership should hope for is a speedy deescalation. But right now, it is watching from the sidelines as a neutral power. Call it “strategic autonomy” if you will.
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