The detention of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu on March 19, 2025, amid terrorism and corruption investigations marks a new stage in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s path toward totalitarianism.
One of the main reasons for the high political tension in Turkey is the candidate selection process initiated by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) under İmamoğlu’s leadership for the upcoming presidential elections. With the deepening economic crisis, public support for the ruling cadre has been steadily eroding. In response, this ruling elite is desperately seeking ways to retain power at any cost.
Erdoğan’s Playbook for Survival
To understand how Erdoğan might maneuver through this crisis, one must analyze the political and legal scenarios he has previously orchestrated to maintain his rule. What some academics refer to as a “counter-revolution” is, in fact, a prolonged coup process stretching over a significant period.
The failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was merely one milestone in Erdoğan’s long-term power grab. While consolidating his control, Erdoğan consistently portrayed himself as the victim of coups. A large portion of Turkish society, including political parties, believed this narrative and supported him as a supposed victim. His efforts to consolidate power began with the 2013 Gezi Park protests, which culminated in Erdoğan’s counter-coup. Even today, 12 years later, artists and journalists are still being imprisoned over their involvement in these protests.
Similarly, the December 17-25, 2013 corruption investigations that exposed Erdoğan’s financial misconduct triggered another wave of political purges. Under the guise of fighting a coup attempt, Erdoğan struck a heavy blow to the judiciary and law enforcement institutions, shedding crocodile tears while portraying himself as the target of a conspiracy.
After losing the 2015 elections, Erdoğan orchestrated yet another political maneuver. On July 15, 2016, he decisively crippled the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) by suppressing what he labeled as a coup attempt, eliminating the military as an obstacle to his rule. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu later referred to this as the “July 20 coup.”
The 2017 constitutional referendum further entrenched Erdoğan’s power, with the Supreme Election Council (YSK) controversially accepting unstamped ballots, facilitating the constitutional amendments. In the 2023 elections, the same YSK unlawfully allowed Erdoğan to run for a third term, despite the constitutional prohibition. By this point, YSK, like other state institutions, had been transformed into a body that blindly obeyed Erdoğan’s will under the influence of the July 20 counter-coup.
The Unfinished Coup
The July 20, 2016 counter-coup remains incomplete. On July 15, elements within the TSK were lured into a trap by their own commanders, particularly then-Chief of General Staff Hulusi Akar, who was secretly colluding with Erdoğan. These forces were led to believe they were initiating a coup, only to be crushed in a premeditated counter-coup. This resulted in an unprecedented dismantling of the military, allowing Erdoğan to restructure it entirely under his control.
However, even for Erdoğan, this counter-coup was only partially successful. He primarily used it as a tool to eradicate and suppress the Gülen movement, which he perceived as the greatest obstacle to his transformation of Turkey. Unlike the 1960 and 1980 military coups, opposition political parties were not entirely eliminated; though weakened, they managed to survive. Now, these same parties, once intimidated, are rising again to challenge Erdoğan’s rule.
To secure his hold on power, Erdoğan must swiftly neutralize opposition parties. The only way to achieve this is by completing his unfinished coup. Only then, like in the military interventions of May 27, 1960, and September 12, 1980, can he dissolve political parties and establish a new political order under his absolute control. The ongoing closure case against the pro-Kurdish opposition party HDP (now DEM Party) is part of this strategy. But could the CHP also be shut down?
On November 9, 2021, Mehmet Barlas, the chief columnist of the pro-government Sabah newspaper, revealed Erdoğan’s new coup plan, stating, “One day, you might wake up to find that the CHP, led by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has been shut down and barred from participating in elections.” His statement outlined how Erdoğan’s unfinished coup could be completed.
The Political Landscape of 2024-2025
Since October 2024, Turkey has entered a new political phase. On one hand, the process of disarmament and dissolution of the PKK, initiated by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and carried forward by Abdullah Öcalan, is still unfolding. This process has two potential negative consequences for Erdoğan and one possible advantage.
The positive outcome for Erdoğan would be securing DEM Party’s support for constitutional amendments that could grant him another term as president. However, the two potential negative outcomes are significant:
1.The collapse of Erdoğan’s polarization strategy, which has been built on the terrorism paradigm, leading to a decline in public support for his security-based policies.
2.The possibility that peace with the Kurds could lead to a withdrawal of the Turkish Armed Forces from the Syrian conflict.
The Role of the Turkish Military
Erdoğan treats the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) as if they were a defeated army from World War I. The Syrian conflict is one of Erdoğan’s strongest tools for keeping the military under his control. The first step for the TSK to regain its autonomy would be withdrawing from Syria. Erdoğan is well aware of this and is doing everything in his power to keep Turkish troops engaged there.
I believe this is why CHP voted “no” on the 2021 motion to extend the TSK’s cross-border operations in Iraq and Syria for another two years. It is widely known that some high-ranking officers serving in Syria have resigned, frustrated by their involvement in murky operations. These resignations reflect broader discontent within the military. By voting against the motion, CHP was signaling support for these disillusioned officers.
CHP’s opposition to the military mandate is not an isolated instance. When 13 Turkish soldiers were killed in the failed Gara operation, Kılıçdaroğlu held Erdoğan responsible, stating, “The person accountable for these 13 martyrs is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” This remark was an attempt to voice the military’s dissatisfaction with Erdoğan’s leadership.
Following Kılıçdaroğlu’s departure, new CHP leader Özgür Özel continued this approach by supporting dismissed military officers. In response, Erdoğan issued a direct threat, saying:
“Mr. Özel, as the Commander-in-Chief, I am addressing you: Watch your step! If you don’t, we know how to make you. You have no right to criticize the military command. Know your place!”
Erdoğan also announced plans to file lawsuits, including for moral damages, against Özel. This overreaction highlights Erdoğan’s extreme sensitivity to any challenge that might weaken his grip on the military.
İmamoğlu’s Arrest: The Next Step in Erdoğan’s Strategy
Having long relied on polarization to consolidate power, Erdoğan sees the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue as a direct threat to his political strategy. This is why he has orchestrated terrorism charges against Ekrem İmamoğlu, citing the so-called “Urban Consensus” between CHP and HDP in local governance.
This move runs counter to the peace process initiated by Bahçeli and Öcalan. Even as Erdoğan continues appointing government trustees (kayyums) to DEM Party municipalities, he now appears to be taking the same approach with CHP.
Ultimately, it is highly likely that Ekrem İmamoğlu will be imprisoned, and a trustee will be appointed to the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. While this move may temporarily remove İmamoğlu from the political scene, it will likely fuel CHP’s rise. If this escalation continues, Erdoğan may attempt to cancel the CHP congress and appoint a trustee to the party itself. In doing so, he would take yet another step toward completing the coup he began on July 20, 2016.
