Trump Brought Erdoğan Back to the NATO Axis

As a historian, I can say that after the so-called coup attempt of July 15, 2016, President Trump undertook a move to end the advantages Russia and Iran had extracted from Turkey—and he succeeded. As a result, Turkey has begun to re-enter the NATO axis in foreign policy. Given the nature of this process, it is reasonable—even necessary—to expect steps from Trump that would also reset Turkey’s domestic politics to the pre-July 15 orientation, namely a return to the NATO axis.

Strictly speaking, current events are not the subject of history, yet historians can analyze the same events. Sometimes, when we accurately locate an event along the longue durée, a historian’s analysis can be more realistic—while remembering that the outcomes of dynamic processes can change. The reverberations from President Trump’s hosting of Erdoğan at the White House on September 25, 2025, continue. Many analyses have been written about the visit’s results, but in my view an important detail has been overlooked. For that reason, I would like to analyze this visit through a historian’s lens.

After Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt in 1798, the Ottoman Empire first put into practice a “balance-of-power” policy that leveraged conflicts of interest among European states to preserve the Empire. Like the Ottomans, modern Turkey has continued this policy into the present because, with its own political, military, and economic capacity, it has struggled to safeguard its independence and territorial integrity on its own.

Great powers, in turn, have had to grant numerous concessions to keep Turkey within their respective blocs. Following Stalin’s demands for territory and military bases from Turkey, Ankara chose to protect its territorial integrity by entering under NATO’s umbrella. Although there have been ups and downs within NATO, Turkey maintained the character of a loyal ally. Turkey’s accession to NATO effectively continued the status conferred by the Treaty of Paris (1856), under which the Ottoman Empire was recognized as a European state.

Accordingly, the alliance with NATO, which proceeded largely without major friction until 2010, began to change with the Gezi Park Protests of 2013—perceived as a continuation of the Arab Spring—and with Erdoğan being caught red-handed in the December 17/25, 2013 corruption probes. Although police officers affiliated with the Gülen movement were held responsible for those probes, the belief that the wiretaps and surveillance included in the case files were actually conducted by the United States and served to Gülenist police led Erdoğan to ally with NATO-skeptic “Eurasianist” cadres. Indeed, U.S. Consulate employees were arrested at the time.

Beginning in 2014, Erdoğan gradually reinstated Eurasianist generals and officers who had been arrested in the Ergenekon trials and expelled from the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). This quantitative change in the TAF culminated during the so-called coup attempt of July 15, 2016, in the mass purge of nearly all NATO-oriented officers. In one respect, what occurred on the night of July 15, 2016, was merely a milestone in the new process Erdoğan had launched in 2013. About 90 percent of the staff-college-trained officer corps, educated in NATO doctrine, was expelled from the TAF and sentenced by the courts of the post-July 15 regime. With the purge of NATO-oriented officers and generals—and their replacement by over 100,000 personnel hostile to the United States and NATO—the TAF underwent a profound transformation and, within NATO, became a threat to NATO itself.

As a result of all these developments, Erdoğan and the TAF under his control paved the way for Russia to move one step closer to its long-standing ambitions.

Russia’s position in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Caucasus was consolidated with the help of Erdoğan and the TAF. The purchase of S-400 missiles from Russia; allowing Moscow to construct the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and port facilities on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast—effectively a kind of military foothold—just 135 miles from the U.S. Incirlik Air Base; agreements that made Turkey even more dependent on Russia for energy; and even joint military patrols with Russia in Syria—all enabled Moscow to achieve objectives it had previously failed to reach.

Since 2013, Erdoğan had been flirting with China and Russia in the defense realm. After a failed attempt to acquire China’s FD-2000 air defense systems developed by CPMIEC, he turned to Russia. Following the downing of a Russian warplane by Turkish jets on November 24, 2015, on grounds of repeated airspace violations, Erdoğan paradoxically purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia—almost as though paying blood money. The S-400 deal, finalized in December 2017, was also a product of the July 15 events. Thus, Russia achieved defense cooperation with a NATO member state.

In response, it was announced on July 17, 2019, that Turkey was removed from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program over security concerns. Subsequently, in December 2020, the United States imposed CAATSA sanctions on Turkey. Turkey’s defense posture began to regress. Having lost the right to procure F-35s, and facing difficulties modernizing its F-16s, Turkey’s vulnerabilities in fighter aircraft and air defense persist.

Since 2003, Turkey had been importing natural gas from Russia via Blue Stream. The TurkStream project, however, was formalized through an intergovernmental agreement signed on October 10, 2016—shortly after July 15. Considering that this pipeline’s throughput is double that of Blue Stream, the scale of Turkey’s energy dependence on Russia becomes clear. Indeed, after China and India, Turkey is the third-largest purchaser of Russian gas.

Viewed through these outcomes, it becomes clear that Russia was the real power behind July 15 and that Erdoğan has been paying a July 15 “tribute” to Moscow. It should also be remembered that Iranian officials themselves have stated that Iran was another foreign actor supporting Erdoğan on July 15, 2016.

After July 15, the Turkish government’s accusation that the United States was the main power behind the so-called coup attempt triggered a surge of anti-Americanism in Turkey. In my view, the most important problem in U.S.–Turkey relations is this anti-American sentiment—which peaked amid the toxic atmosphere of July 15 and has since taken deeper root. Addressing this problem is vital for the long-term continuation of the U.S.–Turkey strategic partnership and cooperation within NATO.

The coups of 1960, 1971, 1980, and the “post-modern coup” of February 28, 1997, gave the putschists political life for only two to three years; power was then handed back to civilians. Erdoğan, who presented himself as the man who crushed the so-called July 15 coup attempt, has sustained the real coup—his own—for nine years. Political scientist Prof. M. Hakan Yavuz of the University of Utah describes this as a “captured state.” By using legal and illegal tools, Erdoğan has taken over the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, to return Turkey to its former codes and to its position as a loyal NATO ally—or, in today’s more sharply polarized world, to keep Turkey anchored to NATO and the Western bloc—many instruments will have to be employed.

The process that produced the White House agreements of September 25, 2025, can be summarized briefly:

When Reza Zarrab—briefly detained in the December 17/25, 2013 corruption probes but later released by the Erdoğan government—traveled to the United States in 2016 and was arrested, he opened the path to a case against the state-owned Halkbank in 2019 that continues to this day. Zarrab testified about how he violated U.S. sanctions on Iran in cooperation with Erdoğan. The information Zarrab provided in U.S. courts continues to pose a major threat to the future of Erdoğan and his family. In a sense, by tracing international crimes involving Erdoğan and his family and the money transferred abroad, this information could provoke even larger international cases—making closure of the Halkbank case Erdoğan’s paramount objective.

Another case concerns Sezgin Baran Korkmaz, who was investigated for “money laundering,” “usury,” and “forming a criminal organization,” arrested in Austria, and extradited to the United States in 2022. In March 2022, the Wels court in Austria accepted the U.S. extradition request after both Turkey and the United States issued Red Notices for him. Like Reza Zarrab, Korkmaz reached an agreement with U.S. authorities and gained his freedom in exchange for telling all he knew. His disclosures also pose problems for Erdoğan and his circle.

After Senators Graham and Van Hollen introduced a resolution in 2019 to investigate Erdoğan’s assets outside Turkey, Erdoğan began to acquiesce to many U.S. demands, especially on Syria. Fearing the domestic repercussions of revelations about his wealth—closely linked to the Halkbank case—Erdoğan found himself compelled to bow to the United States.

Just before the White House visit, U.S. Ambassador to Ankara Tom Barrack stated: “When I asked, ‘All right, Mr. President, what does he need?’ he said, ‘Legitimacy.’ He’s very smart. It’s not about borders, S-400s, or F-16s. It’s about legitimacy.” The meaning beneath those words appears to be legitimacy for Erdoğan’s untroubled disposition of the funds he moved abroad. The partnership reportedly formed by Erdoğan’s son-in-law with Italy’s Leonardo can be seen as the first step in that legitimization. In this way, billions in illicit funds are laundered through Leonardo and made available to the Erdoğan family.

In return for this bestowed legitimacy, Erdoğan accepted Turkey’s obedient return to the NATO axis. With Russia losing its status as a regional great power due to the war in Ukraine, and Iran’s capacity to aid its allies diminished after the killing of Qassem Soleimani and subsequent developments following the Gaza war of October 7, 2023, Erdoğan has been left exposed. This left him no choice but to move into Trump’s orbit.

Consequently, the agreements of September 25, 2025, include a 20-year deal under which Turkey will purchase a total of 70 billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the United States between 2026 and 2045. Trump is also expecting Turkey to halt purchases of Russian gas. In addition, as an alternative to Russia’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, the United States is to build a nuclear plant in Turkey. These agreements do in fact aim to terminate the special privileges Russia has gained in Turkey. The plan to acquire roughly 225 Boeing aircraft should also be noted.

Disturbed by Erdoğan’s departure from Russia’s orbit and his submission to the United States, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan—known for his sympathies toward Iran—voiced his reaction by announcing that engines for the KAAN fighter could not be procured from the United States and thus could not be produced. This was a message from the Eurasianist camp to Erdoğan—and only the beginning.

In domestic developments since September 25, 2025, one can detect traces of the tension between Eurasianist cadres and Erdoğan’s attempt to return to the NATO axis. For instance, the recent summoning of Hakan Fidan’s son to give testimony can be read as part of this struggle.

By contrast, to neutralize Eurasianist reactions, support Erdoğan’s return to the NATO axis, and even bolster Turkey’s standing in NATO, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Turkey on October 27 and signed a Eurofighter Typhoon agreement. At the signing ceremony, Starmer said that 20 British fighter jets would be sold to Turkey. We should expect similar moves from the United States and Europe.

For the external manifestations of Turkey’s return to the NATO axis to be sustainable, they must be reinforced by developments in domestic politics. The dominance of Eurasianist cadres in the military and civilian bureaucracy stands as an obstacle to Turkey’s return to NATO’s axis and values. Erdoğan’s personal capitulation is not enough. The military and civilian bureaucracy must also be transformed, and a struggle waged against anti-Americanism and NATO-skepticism.

Given the sharpening polarization in the world, time is running out. At a minimum, the rapid reinstatement of NATO-oriented cadres who were dismissed from the TAF by decree laws would be a vital step to support the new course. I believe such a development would be a natural outcome of the current process. Otherwise, after Erdoğan, the Eurasianist cadres who now dominate politics and the military-civilian bureaucracy will inevitably bring Turkey into renewed conflict with NATO.