A Historical Perspective on the New Law Granting Expanded Seizure Powers
On January 30, 2025, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly (TBMM) passed a new law expanding the powers of the Presidency’s State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). The law, which came into effect immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Türkiye, grants the government enhanced authority to seize assets more quickly and easily. Concerns regarding this legislation are said to be one of the underlying reasons for the criticism directed at the government by the President of TÜSİAD (the Turkish Industry and Business Association) in mid-February.
This legislation marks a significant shift back in time. In 1839, during the Tanzimat Reforms, the Ottoman Sultan officially abolished confiscation (müsadere). Now, with this new law, Turkey is essentially reverting to its pre-1839 legal framework.
Shortly after the law’s enactment, Turkish authorities seized Maydonoz Döner, a recently established company with 416 branches, along with 22 other businesses. A total of 126 individuals were arrested. The sole justification for these actions was the alleged affiliation of the company owners with the Gülen movement.
Seizure as a Political and Economic Tool in Turkey
Over the past decade, the Turkish government has conducted large-scale operations against the Gülen movement, led by Fethullah Gülen, who passed away in Pennsylvania on October 20, 2024. During this period, assets worth an estimated $ 45 billion have been confiscated and subsequently transferred to individuals and entities with close ties to the ruling elite. Despite thousands of raids, no weapons have ever been discovered, yet the Erdoğan government continues to label the movement as a terrorist organization, arresting its members and seizing their assets.
The legal and religious justification for these confiscations has been provided by Hayrettin Karaman, a pro-government theologian often referred to as Erdoğan’s Sheikh al-Islam. Writing in Yeni Şafak, a pro-government newspaper, Karaman cited a 13th-century Islamic fatwa, arguing that:
“If necessity compels someone to seize another’s property, it becomes permissible; if starvation, cold, or heat threatens a person’s survival, seizing what is needed is not just permissible but obligatory. … Maintaining the community of God’s chosen servants is more important than addressing an individual’s need and must take precedence.” (Yeni Şafak, May 4, 2018)
Karaman’s argument effectively justified the seizure of private property to sustain a regime loyalist elite. Following the 2017 constitutional referendum, which granted Erdoğan sweeping executive powers, the government institutionalized asset confiscation through the establishment of two key entities via presidential decree in 2018: The Extraordinary Economic Affairs Coordination Board, and The Commission for Evaluating Asset Freezes.
Historically, regime changes are often accompanied by a redistribution of wealth. In Turkey, confiscated assets are not being directed to the state treasury but rather to wealthy individuals aligned with the regime, who in turn provide financial support to pro-government networks. As Karaman suggests, the goal is to sustain the community of “chosen” elites at the expense of broader economic fairness.
Confiscation in Ottoman and Islamic History
The current confiscation policy echoes pre-modern Islamic and Ottoman practices. While the Prophet Muhammad (571–632) and the early caliphs (622–661) limited confiscation to state officials who amassed illicit wealth, later regimes used it as a tool of political repression.
The Umayyads (661–750) institutionalized confiscation as a form of reprisal, targeting political opponents and their families. The Abbasids (750–1258) extended this practice, using confiscation to eliminate rivals and fund military campaigns, often seizing the wealth of merchants and aristocrats.
In the Ottoman Empire, confiscation became prominent under Mehmed II (Fatih Sultan Mehmet, r. 1451–1481), who dismantled the Çandarlı family by executing Çandarlı Halil Pasha and seizing his estate. Under Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839), confiscation became a systematic means of centralizing power. The Bektaşi religious endowments and the wealth of Kurdish leader Bedirhan Bey were among the major assets confiscated during this period.
Opposition to confiscation within Ottoman intellectual circles was rare but notable. Defterdar Mehmet Pasha warned that wrongful asset seizures could weaken the state and damage public trust, while Ahmet Cevdet Pasha criticized confiscation as inconsistent with Islamic principles.
Confiscation and Turkey’s Modern History
Confiscation in Turkey is not a new phenomenon. Historically, it has been used as a political and economic tool in various contexts:
1915: The Armenian Genocide led to the seizure of Armenian properties.
1924: The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange resulted in the confiscation of Greek assets.
1934: The Thrace Pogrom targeted Jewish properties.
1942: The Wealth Tax (Varlık Vergisi) imposed disproportionate financial burdens on non-Muslims, leading to mass confiscations.
1955: The Istanbul Pogrom (6–7 September) saw large-scale looting of Greek, Armenian, and Jewish businesses.
The Economic and Political Consequences of Asset Confiscation
Confiscation has long been used as a wealth redistribution tool by successive Turkish governments. However, its continued use in the modern era exacerbates economic instability and undermines property rights.
With Turkey facing a deepening economic crisis, even pro-government business circles are beginning to feel the financial strain. The recent legal changes are widely seen as a prelude to a new wave of asset seizures, designed to sustain the regime’s patronage network. TÜSİAD’s recent public criticisms suggest that business elites now fear they may be the next targets. While many TÜSİAD members—such as Boydak Holding—have already experienced asset seizures, the widening scope of confiscations raises alarm across the business community.
Turkey’s historical experience suggests that confiscation-based economic models are unsustainable. The Ottoman Empire’s inability to accumulate industrial capital due to arbitrary confiscations hindered economic development and ultimately contributed to its decline. In contrast, European economies—protected by strong property rights—flourished during the Industrial Revolution, leaving the Ottoman economy dependent on foreign creditors.
Conclusion
The latest expansion of confiscation laws represents a troubling return to an arbitrary and politically motivated economic policy. Historically, confiscation has been a hallmark of authoritarian regimes rather than modern democratic states. Today, as economic conditions worsen and government legitimacy erodes, the Turkish government appears increasingly reliant on confiscation not just as a punitive measure but as a means of wealth redistribution to its loyalist networks.
However, if history is any guide, this policy risks deepening economic instability, alienating investors, and further damaging Turkey’s already fragile rule of law.
