Symbolism matters immensely. The Munich Security Conference (MSC) is a prime example to that effect, and Turkey proves the point. It thinks of itself as a first-rate political player in Europe. But it was conspicuous by its absence in this year’s strategic conversation at the international jamboree hosted by the Bavarian city. Remembered by the tough love offered to Europeans by US State Secretary and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, the 2026 MSC featured no big Turkish name. President Tayyip Erdogan was not on the list. Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek, the technocratic face of the current administration in Ankara, cancelled. Contrast that with 2025 when Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan came. Fidan held talks with Rubio on Syria, Ukraine, and other pressing issues, highlighting Turkey’s central role on security. He also met Nechirvan Barsani of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the EU Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos as well as with dignitaries from the following countries: United Kingdom, Germany, France, Finland, Jordan, Kosovo, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan and Sudan.
What does that tell us about the direction of Turkish foreign policy? To my mind, it shows that Ankara prefers to watch from the sidelines the ongoing transatlantic psychodrama. Erdogan is waiting to see what shape the future transatlantic bargain before taking decisions. He has other external priorities, mostly in the Middle East with Iran currently top of the list. But that does not mean that Turkey does not have a stake in European regional order.
The Rubio speech underscored that the US is not pulling out from Europe but rather rethinking its position and objectives. The Trump administration has been calling for a transatlantic alliance based on shared culture and religious heritage, a key point in the recently promulgated National Security Strategy. It is also clear that the US does not think highly of the European Union (EU) but rather prefers to deal with its member states individually. Right after Munich, Rubio hopped over to Budapest to shake hands with Viktor Orban and put on display America’s support for the Hungarian prime minister ahead of a critical election where the opposition appears to have an edge.
On the face of it, the Trump administration’s civilisational outlook is bad news for Turks. If the Euro-Atlantic alliance is being recast as a latter-day version of Christendom and the coordinated clampdown of migration is the top policy item, there is no upside for a Muslim-majority Turkey. The country has sizeable diasporas is several EU members and has long pushed for inclusion, be it in the form of membership or visa-free access as enjoyed by other neighbours of the Union. Historically, the US has been supportive of this effort but now the White House is siding with far right, conservative parties in Europe who’d rather see Turkey walled off.
Another consequence of Trump 2.0 the hollowing out of multilateral organisations like NATO. The US would prefer to transform it into a hub-and-spoke arrangement as opposed to a club based on mutual obligations, rules or even values. It is highly doubtful whether US would honour its Article 5 commitments in a scenario where a member state comes under attack. NATO is one of the last threads linking Turkey and (what used to be known as) the West. But now it appears that the thread in question is getting thinner by the day and, for a change, the current Turkish leadership is not the main culprit.
Yet Erdogan and his associates have proven time and again they can live with an US run by nativist, hostile to European integration as well as the traditional liberal concept of the West. The Turkish president has cultivated a strong personal relationship with Trump, has a direct line to the Oval Office, and thus does not need to be seen in Munich or Davos (which he has been boycotting for years). When there’s state-to-state or strongman-to-strongman business you simply pick up the phone or head to Washington, as Erdogan did back in September. The two leaders see eye to eye on Syria, having both embraced interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rule. For all differences in Turkish and US policy on Gaza, they seem to have been converging on this file too. Turkey is amongst the founding members of the Peace Board launched by Trump, now touted, controversially enough, as an overseer of the United Nations. Ankara is keen to act as mediator between Russia and Ukraine, supporting the US quest for a deal ending the war. The only issue Turks and Americans appear at odds is presently Iran, but should Trump steps back from the brink and claim he had extracted concessions from Tehran there could be little doubt Ankara would claim some credit as peacemaker and go-between. All in all, the bilateralisation of the Turkish-US relationship works for Ankara. There is no urge to be part of the choreographics in Munich which have more to do with the Europeans’ frustrations than with Turkish national interest.
That view might prove shortsighted however. After all, Turkey is trying to make a case that it is an indispensable to European security and defence. Ankara bemoans its exclusion from the collective initiatives such as the EU’s SAFE fund, a EUR 150 billion pot of money earmarked for defence industrial projects. Policymakers and pundits in Turkey point at the added value of companies such as drone manufacturer Baykar, in addition to the country’s sizeable and experienced military. Surely, a Europeanised NATO – a step towards Europe’s coveted strategic autonomy – would need a strong next-door partner. EU members are already collaborating with third countries such as UK, Norway, Japan and South Korea in developing advanced platforms. In an ideal world, Turkey could also leverage its contribution to security to deepen economic and institutional relations with the EU, e.g. through the updated of the 1996 Customs Union. Brussels is hectically wrapping up trade talks with major states and blocs such as India and Mercosur, which have implications for Turkey which is opening its markets to external competition. The Customs Union would benefit from a revision to mend this and other shortcomings. That was the message Fidan conveyed to Marta Kos during her recent visit to Turkey. In light of the above, not coming to Munich was a missed opportunities to spell out a vision of strategic relations between Ankara and its NATO partners but also the EU.
The above point speaks about the duality of Turkish foreign policy. On the one hand, Erdogan et al see their country as an ambitious “middle power” asserting its interests across several regional arenas, with the Middle East having a priority and the ability to balance between the US and its competitors – China and Russia in the first place – as the modus operandi. On the other, Turkey is economically and strategically tethered to Europe. More than two decades ago, Oxford academic Philip Robins wrote a seminal article of Turkey as a “dual-gravity state”. Much has changed since then, but his observation still rings true.
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