NATO’s Hague Summit: a Post-Mortem 

Donald Trump must be feeling content after the summit NATO just wrapped up in The Hague.  “Very big news”.  That’s how he called the European allies’ commitment to raise the 2% GDP defence spending target to 5%.   Europeans have a reason to breathe a sigh of relief too.  The notoriously NATO-sceptic Trump reaffirmed the US commitment to the alliance. “We’re with them all the way,” the US president said. “If you take a look at the numbers, we’re with them.” 

It is easy to grasp why the issue of burden sharing, a transatlantic classic, has been front and centre of the discussion.   Donald Trump’s second term in the White House has been sending shivers down the spine of Europeans, including heavyweights such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany.   The US commitment to the Washington Treaty’s famous Article 5,  a clause obliging each of the allies to come to another state’s defence should it come under attack,  stands in question.   Exposed to a growingly aggressive Russia on its eastern flank, Europe needs America’s security provision as much as it did at the peak of the Cold War.   Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine raises fears that Vladimir Putin could be tempted to use military force against other countries, which are now part of the European Union (EU) and NATO but before 1991 were included in or indirectly controlled by the Soviet Union.   The Trump Administration’s lukewarm – and at times overtly hostile – attitude to Ukraine coupled with sharp criticism of Europeans and overtures to Putin raise doubts whether  the US is willing to be the lynchpin of regional order it has traditionally been.   

NATO Secretary General Mark Rute’s job is to act as a go-between the White House and European capitals, a pursuit he excelled in under the first Trump administration when he had his office in The Hague too.  The obsequious text messages the US president leaked ahead of the summit, showed Rutte was doing his best this time around.  And judging by the tone at the summit,  petting Trump’s ego did work.    Before the summit, the US president mused that there could be different interpretations of Article 5 – essentially casting doubt on whether America will be there to defend Europe in case of a Russian aggression.  But his statements towards the end were much more encouraging.

Most importantly, Rutte helped broker a compromise.   The Hague communique talks about defence- and security-related spending  (emphasis added).  In other words,  a chunk of the money will go not into military equipment or hard-core defence but other, adjacent sectors.   That is made explicit in point 3: “Allies will account for up to 1.5% of GDP annually to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base.”  That offers some room for interpretation.  The brevity of the communique (just 427 words compared to 5341 for the one at last year’s Washington Summit) – apparently to make it more digestible to Trump –  helps the fudge too. 

The critical issue going forward is whether and how Europeans will deliver on the commitment. Germany is the critical piece in the conversationThe largest economy on the continent but also beholden to a pacifist strategic culture shaped by the memories of World War II, Germany was long subject to criticism of free riding in Washington and, less vocally, in London and Paris.   But Russia’s full-scale invasion has produced a shift in Berlin’s thinking, exemplified by former Chancellor Olaf Scholz oft-quoted Zeitenwende (Historic Turning Point) speech delivered on 27 February 2022.  Currently, Germany spends some 2.1% GDP on defence, meeting the current target.   More importantly, the new grand coalition put together by the sitting Chancellor Friedrich Merz overhauled the constitutional “debt brake” enabling the government to borrow more – for both defence and infrastructure development. In other words, Germany has the fiscal space to modernize and expand its armed forces, invest into capabilities required to deter a future Russian aggression, buy more US-made kit – bringing billions to defence contractors across the Atlantic.     

Yet will the Germans commit to such a bump in spending,  from an annual EUR 90 billion to an whopping EUR 160 billion?  It depends.  Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, a member of Chancellor Merz’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU), says “yes”.   Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, hailing from the Social Democrats (SDP),  is talking about 3% GDP but invested in capabilities – e.g. missile defence systems, battle tanks and state-of-the-art  jets such as the F-35 –  rather than other expenditure.  

Germany is hardly exceptional.  France spends on defence 2%, UK – 2.3%. The 2025 British defence review envisions getting to 2.6% GDP by 2027.  Getting to the 3% threshold by the early 2030s will be a challenge given the high levels of indebtedness – a whopping 115% of GDP in France and 95% in Britain. To balance the books, governments will need to cut elsewhere in order to pay for larger and more capable armies.  The classical dilemma of butter vs guns will be weighing upon countries which are anyhow facing a populist wave threatening to overpower established political parties.  

One should not forget that  there are large countries like Italy and Spain which – largely because of their location on the map- are not eager to pump up their military budget. Spain is currently at 1.28% and Italy 1.5% GDP.  These countries do not see an imminent threat from Russia but rather care about softer challenges such as illegal migration and the spread of radicalism from North Africa and the Middle East.   Contrast that with Poland or the Baltic States which top the league when it comes to share of GDP set aside for defence.   In The Hague, Spain refused to sign up to the 5% pledge – it secured an opt-out but in exchange did not block the collective decision.  Italy’s Giorgia Meloni for her part went with the rest of NATO.  But again, there is a twist.  Rome will reach 2% GDP this year not by ramping up direct expenditure but by reclassifying certain type of civilian spending as defence-related. 

The summit was a win for Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky.  His bilateral meeting with Trump apparently went well.  Though the summit spent less time on the war and arguably the language on Russia was somewhat softer than at previous NATO meetings, to placate Trump, Europeans confirmed their strong commitment to defending Ukraine.   The main question going forward is how much military assistance the US will be providing – particularly critical supplies such as interceptors needed to fend off Russian aerial attack – and under what conditions.  It is safe to assume that Europe will be paying the bill, which Trump will present to his MAGA constituents – sceptical of foreign entanglements and scornful of “woke” Europeans – as proof of his deal-making skills. 

Lastly, there is Turkey.  By hosting next year’s NATO summit,  Erdogan is signaling his country’s continued commitment to the Alliance.  While Turkey has been engaging with Russia – notably by hosting talks between Moscow and Kyiv in Istanbul – it looks at NATO as its ultimate security guarantee.  Public support for membership remains relatively high.  Liberals value NATO as one of the few remaining anchors to the West.  Erdogan’s nationalist supporters appreciate the voice Turkey has, most recently demonstrated by holding off Finland and Sweden’s accession.  There is an European angle to this too.  Ankara wants a stake in the multi-billion spending surge in Europe geared towards rearmament.  Cooperating directly with the EU is difficult because of a Cypriot veto but there are workarounds.  These include joint ventures such as the one Baykar established with Italy’s Leonardo which will probably draw in European and national subsidies.  In other words, recommitting to NATO happens in a context where Turkey – much like the post-Brexit UK – is seeking to deepen security ties with the rest of Europe in flexible ways.