Can Europe defend itself with Turkish help?

For all the efforts of European leaders to paper over frictions with Donald Trump, there has been no shortage of transatlantic drama over the past couple of weeks.  At the start of May, the Pentagon announced that the US would be pulling out 5,000 troops from Germany.  The news came after Trump lashed out at Germany’s Prime Minister Friedrich Merz for “doing a terrible job” on issues such as immigration and energy.  Irked by Merz’s remark that the US had been humiliated in Iran, the president also threatened to withdraw American forces from elsewhere in Europe.  He mentioned Italy and notably Spain whose Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez has spared no criticism of the war.  Then on 14 May, Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth stunned everyone by cancelling the scheduled deployment of some 4,000 personnel to Poland.   The fact that some troops and equipment had already been despatched, let alone Warsaw’s reputation as one of Washington’s staunchest and most dedicated allies in Europe, only added to the shock.   

A week later, passions appear to have calmed down a tad.  And there are two reasons broadly speaking. 

First, there is no major pull out of US forces from Europe yet.  There are currently about 68,000 troops stationed on the continent, of which about 38,000 are in Germany and the rest in Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain and across Eastern Europe. The contingent in Germany – e.g. at the Ramstein Air Base in Rheinland-Pfalz – will not be dramatically downsised.  The timetable for the withdrawal of the 5,000 troops is not clear either.   The 4,000-strong contingent which was not transferred from Texas to Poland, on the other hand, accounts for about a half of the troops stationed there.  However, there is a chance some of that soldiers withdrawn from Germany will actually be shifted to Poland, reinforcing NATO’s flank. Poland’s President Karol Nawrocki, a key Trump ally in Europe, will be lobbying the White House intensely, as he has done for months now. Nawrocki is selling this line currently, though Prime Minister Donald Tusk has remarked that Warsaw should not “poach” troops from its European allies.  It remains to be seen whether US will be pulling out from both Poland and Germany – a potential gamechanger. 

Second,  European decision makers are likely not taken by surprise.   The US has been signalling disengagement for some time.   The Pentagon is currently conducting a global “force posture review”, which includes Europe.  There is a strong faction, represented by Hegseth’s deputy Elbridge Colby, arguing for a redirection of resources to the Indo-Pacific.  In Colby’s opinion, the US is “spread too thin” and cannot simultaneously deter China and underwrite regional security in Europe at current levels. With the Iran war afoot, it is hard to foresee a scale-down of deployments in the Middle East elsewhere.  And with NATO committed to 3.5% GDP in defence spending and Europe rearming,  there is an argument that the time is ripe for European countries to take up the burden of containing Russia.     

Of coruse, this is easier said than done.  The endless discussion around a coalition of the willing to be sent to Ukraine highlights Europeans’ continued dependency on US “strategic enablers”.   That includes intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR), missile defence, precision strike capabilities, airlift capacity – and ultimately the nuclear umbrella.  Even those European leaders and experts arguing for a decoupling from the US and possibly Europeanising NATO admit that achieving self-sufficiency in those critical areas would take at least a decade. 

Despite the rearmament drive in Europe, familiar problems stymie progress.  Top amongst them is the fragmentation of the defence procurement market – a challenge between the EU, composed of 27 member states with their defence policies and national champions in the defence industries, and even more so between EU and the UK and Turkey, allies within NATO.   UK and Turkey have been excluded from the SAFE (Security Action for Europe) instrument, the EUR 150 billion fund developed by the EU to boost defence production, innovation and cross-border cooperation.  There are financial hurdles –  e.g. contributing to the common pot of money which is currently barring the UK participation – as well as political issues – e.g. Turkey being blocked by Greece and Cyprus. 

At the same time, cooperation and integration is underfoot at the level of companies. MBDA, Europe’s missile champion, is jointly owned by Airbus, BAE Systems, and Leonardo, linking the UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain in one integrated producer. Rheinmental and BAE Systems manufacture together armoured vehicle and provide upgrades to the Challenger tank.  Turkey is pursuing a similar path.  Baykar’s partnership with Italy’s Leonardo for the production of drones is a case in point.  Turkish firms such as Repkon are opening ammunition-making facilities in Germany and Estonia. As they are based in the EU, these factories are eligible for funding from Brussels.  And of course, flagship companies in the sector such as Aselsan and Roketsan source components form Europe.  TCG Anadolu, a drone carrying assault ship launched in the run-up to the 2023 presidential elections, is a case in point. Its hull, propulsion, and naval architecture is based on components from Spain (providing the overall design), Germany, and Italy. 

Most of those issues will come once again in the spotlight at the NATO summit in Ankara on 7-8 July.  Turkey will try to play a bridge builder between the Trump administration and the Europeans.  It will also talk up its strategic value to Europe too, be it as a hedge against Russian revisionism or a positive influence in the war-torn Middle East.  These pronouncements will be met with some good will by the EU and UK.  But there will be scepticism too.  Turkey won’t be able or willing to fill the gap left by the US should disengagement proceed further.  Nor will Ankara ever share most European countries’ assessment of Russia as an existential threat.   There will be positive rhetoric at the summit, for sure, but Turkey does not hold the answer to the security dilemmas haunting Europe.