Syria: The Next Phase 

In a lightening offensive reminiscent of their overthrow of Assad in December 2024, Syria’s new president Ahmed al-Sharaa’s forces took some 80 percent of the territory occupied by the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in a mere three days. Of course, this was only accomplished by both the United States and many Arab tribes switching their support from the SDF to Damascus. 

In implementing what might be termed US President Donald J. Trump’s “Three T’s Strategy” (Temporary, Tactical, & Transactional), Tom Barrack, the US Ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Damascus as well Trump’s personal friend, simply announced that his country’s decade-long support for the SDF had “largely expired.” His words reminded observers of what former US national security advisor and secretary of state Henry Kissinger explained 50 years earlier when the US deserted the Iraqi Kurdish movement led by the legendary Mulla Mustafa Barzani in favor of what was then the Shah’s Iran, “Covert action should not be confused with missionary work.” And similarly, two millennia earlier, Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian in his epic History of the Peloponnesian War, recounted how the powerful Athenians explained to the weaker Melians why they were being invaded, “The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” As yet another pedant observed, the US was accommodating Islamists, appeasing Ankara, and exposing vulnerable minorities. 

Of course, all this is rather tendentious as there are valid reasons for the US to support its NATO ally Turkey instead of the much smaller and less important Syrian faction of the stateless Kurds. Furthermore, the SDF claim of democratic government for the area it was controlling rings rather hollow if so many putative Arab tribal allies so quickly and happily switched sides once given a chance to reunite their country. As of mid-February 2026, Syria’s political and military setting has seemingly undergone a massive transformation characterized by a much more unified country than has existed since the horrific civil war began in March 2011. What was mostly an autonomous Kurdish-led 40 percent of Syria a mere two months ago, now seems reintegrated into the larger state. 

As a result, after more than a decade of fighting against ISIS with its boot-on-the-ground SDF ally, US forces finally seem to be withdrawing. The irony here is that the US has abandoned its SDF ally for a new one headed by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former jihadist enemy who earlier had spent over a half a decade in US detention as well as being a part of the jihadists who in 2014-15 were attacking Kurdish Kobane in an existential battle that at that time had seemed the successful defining moment in the Syrian Kurdish cause. Will the former jihadist wolves, now reborn as an American ally led by al-Sharaa really guard the defeated ISIS wolves who had been guarded by the SDF until all these recent events occurred? 

Admiral Brad Cooper, the head of US Central Command, tried to reassure skeptics on February 12, after an “orderly departure” from the Al-Tanf base a day earlier, that US troops would “remain poised to respond to any ISIS threats that arise in the region.” After all, the US base had been serving successfully as a small, but strategic location bridging Damascus to Baghdad near the meeting of the Iraqi, Jordanian, and Syrian borders. Over the past decade thousands of US soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines had rotated through it to train SDF fighters. As such, they had been constantly attacked by Islamic jihadists and Iranian proxies. During just the past two months, US forces had also struck more than 100 targets and captured or killed more than 50 ISIS fighters.

Will Damascus really take up the slack? Their departure to nearby Jordan may also be seen as part of Trump’s new national defense strategy to draw down in the Middle East and elsewhere on the other side of the globe to refocus attention on the Western hemisphere a la Venezuela, a new strategy analyzed just last month by this author in these pages. 

Skeptics, however, may argue that all this withdrawal has been tried before, especially in October 2019 when Trump 1.0 pulled his support for the SDF in favor of Turkey and its Kurd-hating, jihadist-leaning militia allies. At that time, Trump’s aides either fudged the US numbers who remained or simply talked the US president into partially reversing his withdrawal. This time, however, it appears that Trump’s 2.0 aides are more subservient to their master and really are implementing his wishes. After all, as Trump infamously explained earlier, the Kurds had not supported the US on D-Day in June 1944. 

Nevertheless, approximately 1,000 US troops still remain in Syria. They might stay there or even be augmented given Trump’s threats to go to war against Iran. Even if Trump is only bluffing, withdrawing all his assets from Syria does not seem a viable strategy to influence Iran and might even encourage the Islamic Republic to begin returning to Syria where in the past it had wreaked havoc from the American point of view. 

However, has Damascus really completely crushed the Kurds? Despite its seeming betrayal, renewed US intervention probably proved crucial in ending the fighting before the SDF had lost everything. Influential US Senator Lindsey Graham announced intentions to introduce “crippling sanctions” via a “Save the Kurds Act” unless Damascus reined in its assault. This probably enabled the SDF to reach a new and better deal with Damascus on January 30 compared to the earlier one signed on January 18.   

Indeed, al-Sharaa did issue Presidential Decree No. 13 of 2026, which provided for the recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights as well as for addressing existing issues including those of unregistered and stateless Kurdish persons and accumulated property-rights claims from decades past, the notorious ajanib (foreigners) and maktoumeen(concealed) designations so bitterly hated by the Syrian Kurds. Kurdish will be recognized as a national language and their ethnic spring holiday Newroz also acknowledged. The governor of the Kurdish-majority province of Hasaka will be Kurdish and four SDF brigades will remain intact well being integrated into the Syrian national army. The Kurds will also keep some of the oil fields. 

In addition, Mazlum Abdi, the long-time SDF commander, suddenly appeared on February 13 in a coat and tie at the important international Munich Security Conference along with many world leaders. He was even photographed meeting with US secretary of state Marco Rubio. The last recorded time the Syrian Kurdish leader had visited Europe was when he had been the head of the European section of the PKK between 1995 and 1999. As is well known, the supposedly disbanded PKK remains on the US, Turkish, and EU terrorism list. 

At the same time, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan can now claim that his policies have helped dismantle the “Terrorist State” in Syria. Indeed, as a goodwill gesture, 100 non-Syrian PKK fighters were relocated to the PKK Kandil base in Iraqi Kurdistan. His American NATO ally no longer seems to be working at cross purposes against him in Syria. For now, things seem to be moving in the right direction. This may lead him to soften his red lines regarding the Syrian Kurds on his southern borders and lead to better relations with them. 

However, the Syrian crisis has not ended. It has just entered a new phase. The nation still faces many existential problems. The one with the Kurds analyzed in this article is but one. Several other minority challenges regarding the Druze, Alawites, Christians, and others remain. The new al-Sharaa government faces risks of returning to authoritarianism or even collapsing because of its limited experience with pluralism. Turkey and Israel represent challenges to Syria’s territorial integrity. The former supports in-country jihadist militias in the north, while the latter continues air strikes to prevent new Syrian military buildup in the south and elsewhere. Both maintain significant numbers of troops in the country. Security remains volatile with more than 3,400 killed in sectarian violence following Assad’s fall. 

The long-suffering economy must be revived. Approximately 90 percent of the population lives in poverty and the Syrian pound reels from extreme hyperinflation. The country faces chronic shortages of electricity, potable water, and fuel. More than 16.7 million people need aid, including 7.5 million children. There are more than 7.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). A decade and a half of civil war have destroyed many health facilities. Only 58 percent of the hospitals are fully functional. The country urgently needs medical supplies. A severe and continuing drought has ruined farmland and caused major water shortages, contributing to extreme hunger. Rebuilding the ruined nation will cost more than $200 billion, but there is an acute shortage of investment. Unexploded ordnance remains a menace to health and life. 

Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Tech University. He is the Secretary-General of the European Union Turkey Civic Commission (EUTCC), an NGO that lobbies the EU parliament on behalf of the Kurds, and author of Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, 2014.