The dramatic escalation of tensions in the Middle East in recent years has renewed interest in a long-standing question: how should Iran’s foreign policy be understood? Is the behavior of the Islamic Republic driven primarily by revolutionary ideology and religious fervor, or does it reflect deeper geopolitical and historical forces that shape the Iranian state’s strategic outlook regardless of regime type?
Two influential works provide key insights into this question. The first is Graham E. Fuller’s The Center of the Universe: The Geopolitics of Iran, written in 1991 after the Cold War. The second is Vali Nasr’s recent book, Iran’s Grand Strategy: A Political History, published in 2025, which aims to explain the Islamic Republic’s strategic behavior in today’s Middle East. Although these two works were written over three decades apart, they share a notable intellectual connection. Both authors challenge the common Western tendency to see Iran’s actions mainly through ideology. Instead, they highlight that Iran operates as a rational geopolitical actor, with its foreign policy shaped by long-term structural factors rather than the personal goals of individual leaders.
Despite these similarities, Nasr does not merely repeat Fuller’s argument. Instead, he builds on Fuller’s insights but makes significant modifications and shifts focus toward post-1979 Iran. Fuller emphasizes the persistent geopolitical factors influencing Iranian behavior—geography, historical identity, and strategic culture—while Nasr stresses the historical experiences that have shaped the Islamic Republic’s strategic outlook, particularly the trauma of war, revolution, and international isolation. Comparing these two interpretations offers valuable insight into the underlying logic of Iranian foreign policy.
The Myth of Revolutionary Discontinuity
One of the key arguments shared by both Fuller and Nasr is their rejection of what might be called the “revolutionary rupture thesis.” In many Western commentaries, the 1979 Iranian Revolution is seen as a sharp break in Iran’s strategic direction. Before the revolution, Iran under the Shah was often seen as a pro-Western, modernizing country integrated into the global system. After the revolution, the country is portrayed as a completely different entity—an ideologically driven Islamic regime motivated by hostility toward the West.
Fuller argued that Western observers often misunderstand Iran because they focus too much on ideological rhetoric and overlook deeper structural continuities. In his view, Iran’s foreign policy cannot be understood simply by examining the personalities or ideological preferences of its leaders. Whether the ruler is a monarch with a crown or a cleric with a turban, the strategic environment facing the Iranian state stays mostly the same.
A leader in Tehran confronts the same geopolitical realities: a vast yet vulnerable country surrounded by rival powers, at the crossroads of several major regions, and historically conscious of its role as a central actor in Middle Eastern politics. These structural conditions shape the strategic outlook of Iranian leaders regardless of regime type.
Nasr’s work echoes this insight. Although he focuses on the strategic behavior of the Islamic Republic, he similarly argues that Iranian policy reflects a coherent and rational strategic logic rather than the irrational impulses often attributed to revolutionary ideology. For Nasr, Iran’s policies are best understood as the product of a long-term strategy aimed at preserving the state’s autonomy and security in a hostile international environment. Both authors therefore reject the notion that Iran’s foreign policy can be explained primarily by ideological radicalism.
Geography and Strategic Centrality
Fuller’s argument is rooted in a geopolitical perspective that emphasizes geography. Iran is situated in one of the world’s most strategically important locations. Positioned between Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and South Asia, the country serves as a bridge among these regions. This geographic position has historically led Iranian elites to view their country as a key regional power. For centuries, Persian empires controlled large parts of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and sections of Central Asia, leaving a strong legacy of regional influence and cultural prestige.
According to Fuller, this history has helped foster a lasting belief among Iranian elites that Iran holds a unique and vital role in regional politics. In this perspective, Iran is not just another country; it is a civilizational hub whose influence naturally extends outward across the surrounding region. This view explains why Iranian leaders often consider regional events through a lens of strategic centrality. Whether under the Shah or the Islamic Republic, Iranian policymakers have often assumed their country should play a decisive role in shaping the political landscape of the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East.
Fuller demonstrates this continuity by looking at the Shah’s policies in the late twentieth century. After Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s, the Shah aimed to position Iran as the dominant power in the region. Using oil revenues to develop a strong military, he sought to make Iran the main security provider for the Gulf. In Fuller’s view, this ambition was not just about the Shah’s personal goals, but also reflected a broader geopolitical logic rooted in Iran’s geographic location and historical self-image.
Ideology and Strategic Interests
One of Fuller’s most provocative claims is that ideology often serves as a mask, obscuring deeper strategic motivations. Revolutionary rhetoric, nationalist discourse, and religious language may dominate public statements, but these expressions frequently serve as instruments for pursuing more traditional geopolitical goals. In the case of Iran, Fuller argues that Islamic revolutionary ideology does not fundamentally alter the strategic interests of the Iranian state. Instead, it provides a new framework for expressing long-standing ambitions.
Nasr broadly agrees with this perspective. He similarly argues that Iran’s policies cannot be explained simply by reference to religious ideology. The leaders of the Islamic Republic, despite their revolutionary rhetoric, operate within a strategic framework that emphasizes national security, deterrence, and regional influence.
However, Nasr’s interpretation introduces an important modification. Whereas Fuller emphasizes the enduring geopolitical determinants of Iranian behavior, Nasr focuses more on the “historical experiences” that shaped the Islamic Republic’s strategic thinking.
The Impact of Historical Trauma
Nasr’s central argument is that Iran’s contemporary strategy emerged from the profound experiences of revolution, war, and international isolation that shaped the early decades of the Islamic Republic. In particular, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) played a decisive role in shaping Iranian strategic thinking. The conflict exposed the vulnerability of the newly established Islamic Republic and reinforced a deep sense of insecurity among Iranian leaders.
During the war, Iran faced not only Iraqi military aggression but also widespread international hostility. Many regional and global powers supported Iraq, leaving Iran largely isolated. The experience convinced Iranian leaders that their country could not rely on external powers for security.
As a result, the Islamic Republic developed a strategic doctrine centered on deterrence, asymmetric warfare, and regional influence. Rather than attempting to compete directly with stronger adversaries through conventional military power, Iran sought to build networks of allies and proxy forces across the region. This strategy allowed Iran to expand its influence while avoiding direct confrontation with more powerful states.
Nasr therefore interprets Iran’s regional activities not as evidence of revolutionary expansionism but as elements of a defensive strategy designed to ensure the survival of the regime and the security of the state.
Nasr focuses on the processes through which these structural factors have been translated into specific strategic policies. His analysis highlights the role of historical experience, institutional development, and strategic learning within the Islamic Republic.
Regional Hegemony or Strategic Survival?
One key difference between the two authors relates to Iran’s strategic goals. Fuller tends to depict Iran as a nation that naturally aims for regional leadership. In his analysis, Iranian elites often believe their country should hold a dominant position in the Persian Gulf and nearby areas. Nasr, on the other hand, offers a more defensive view of Iranian strategy. He sees the main goal of the Islamic Republic as not regional dominance but regime survival. Iran’s policies focus on deterring external threats, maintaining strategic independence, and preventing hostile powers from isolating or destabilizing the country.
This distinction reflects the different historical contexts in which the two books were written. Fuller wrote at a time when the Cold War had just ended and the Islamic Republic was still consolidating its position. Nasr writes in a period marked by decades of sanctions, regional conflicts, and international confrontation. The Islamic Republic that Nasr analyzes is therefore a state that has learned to operate under conditions of sustained pressure.
Strategic Patience and Asymmetric Power
Nasr introduces the concept of “strategic patience” to describe Iran’s approach to regional politics. Rather than pursuing rapid or dramatic expansion, Iranian leaders often adopt a long-term strategy designed to gradually accumulate influence. This approach reflects both Iran’s limited conventional military capabilities and its desire to avoid direct confrontation with stronger adversaries. By relying on proxy forces, political alliances, and ideological networks, Iran can exert influence across the region while maintaining a degree of strategic ambiguity. From Nasr’s perspective, this strategy represents a rational adaptation to structural constraints. Iran cannot match the military power of the United States or its regional allies, but it can create a network of relationships that complicates the strategic calculations of its adversaries.
The works of Graham Fuller and Vali Nasr provide two complementary perspectives on the strategic behavior of Iran. Both reject simplistic explanations that attribute Iranian policy to ideological extremism or irrational leadership. Instead, they emphasize that Iran acts as a rational state responding to structural and historical forces. Taken together, these analyses suggest that Iran’s foreign policy cannot be understood solely by examining the ideology of its leaders. Instead, it must be interpreted within a broader framework that takes into account geography, history, strategic culture, and institutional learning.
The War and the Consequences
Keeping in mind the interpretations of Nasr and Fuller, Iranian foreign policy should be seen not just as ideological expansionism but as a strategy focused on regime survival, deterrence, and regional influence in a hostile geopolitical setting. Both scholars highlight that Iran’s dependence on proxy networks, regional alliances, and strategic depth reflects historical insecurity shaped by the Iran–Iraq War, ongoing sanctions, and long-standing conflicts with the United States and Israel. From this perspective, the current conflict should not be viewed simply as an American war against Iran but rather as a conflict largely driven by Israel’s strategic priorities, with the United States mainly acting to protect Israeli security interests and uphold its alliance commitments in the region. Analyzing the Israeli-American war against Iran through this framework indicates several possible future paths for the Middle East.
First, the war may significantly weaken the Islamic Republic and fragment the regional order that Iran constructed through networks of allied actors across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In the short term, this outcome could benefit states that view Tehran as a strategic threat, particularly Israel and several Gulf monarchies. Yet history shows that the destruction of political structures rarely produces stability; instead, it tends to generate political vacuums in which new actors and rivalries emerge. A weakened Iran is unlikely to become pro-Western. Rather, it may evolve into a more nationalist and militarized state, possibly dominated by security elites whose legitimacy derives from resisting foreign intervention. In such a scenario, revolutionary Shiite ideology may gradually lose centrality, replaced by a powerful form of state-centered Iranian nationalism that continues to challenge the regional balance of power, albeit in a different ideological form.
Second, the conflict shows a change in how American power operates in the Middle East. Unlike the large-scale occupations after the September 11 attacks, the current approach depends on precision warfare—drones, cyber actions, and targeted strikes aimed at weakening enemies without taking on the burden of rebuilding their political systems. This change comes from lessons learned from the expensive failures of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, such a “destructive strategy” involves serious risks. By weakening states without helping rebuild them, the U.S. might speed up regional fragmentation and open doors for rival powers—especially China and Russia—to grow their influence in the region afterward. At the same time, the war has sparked more intense domestic political debates in the U.S. about Israel’s role in shaping American Middle East policy. Critics increasingly claim that U.S. involvement reflects the sway of pro-Israel lobbying groups and strategic commitments to Israeli security rather than broader American national interests. Supporters argue against this, but it’s clear that discussions about the power and influence of the Israeli lobby in Washington will likely grow louder, especially as the true costs of the war become more apparent.
Third, the conflict is also creating new anxieties among the Gulf monarchies. For decades, these countries viewed their alliance with Washington and the presence of American military bases as a key part of their security. However, the current war has sparked a growing debate in several Gulf capitals about whether this relationship has become a strategic liability rather than an advantage. Many Gulf leaders are increasingly worried that the American military presence does not necessarily shield them from regional conflict but instead makes them targets for retaliation in wars mainly driven by U.S. and Israeli priorities. From this perspective, the view is emerging that Washington’s regional strategy puts Israel’s security above all else, while the security concerns of Gulf states remain secondary. Consequently, discussions have begun within some Gulf policy circles about whether American bases—long seen as symbols of protection—might instead put their territories at greater risk. This debate could have serious long-term effects on the future of U.S. military presence in the region and on the strategic stance of Gulf states.
Fourth, the war’s ideological impact could reshape the broader political landscape of the Muslim world. If the Iranian clerical regime becomes significantly weakened, the revolutionary Shiite Islam model that emerged after the 1979 revolution might lose some of its appeal. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean the decline of political Islam itself. Instead, the ideological focus could shift toward nationalist and civilizational forms of politics that mix Islamic identity with state-centered authority. In this way, the war might weaken the specific Iranian model of Islamic governance while also strengthening broader anti-Western and nationalist narratives across the region. For Israel, the outcome remains uncertain. While destroying Iran’s regional networks could temporarily remove a formidable strategic opponent, the long-term effects might include the rise of a more nationalist and technologically adaptable Iran or a region radicalized by perceptions of external interference.
Finally, the war is reshaping the political landscape both in the Middle East and within the United States. American public opinion toward Israel has been gradually shifting, especially among younger generations and parts of the political left, where skepticism about unconditional support for Israeli policies has grown. As the war widens, Israel risks losing parts of the American public that have historically supported the alliance, even as political leaders remain firmly committed to it.
Another emerging element in the regional debate concerns Turkey. More and more, parts of the Israeli security community are starting to see Turkey as a potential future strategic rival, sometimes describing Ankara as the “next Iran” after the Iranian threat is neutralized. This view reflects Turkey’s increasing regional influence, its independent foreign policy, and its growing tense relations with Israel. The implications of this new narrative—and the possibility that Turkey could become the next major concern for Israeli strategy—will be explored in the following essay.
Together, these developments suggest that the Israeli-American effort against Iran could lead to several long-term outcomes: the breakdown of Iran’s regional order and the rise of Iranian nationalism; the revealing of American limits in managing regional instability; new debates within Gulf states about the costs of alliance with the United States; and a broader change in the ideological and geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The impact of the conflict will therefore go well beyond the battlefield, reshaping regional geopolitics and domestic political debates in the United States for many years to come.
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