NATO in Question

Is NATO on the way out? The Trump administration seems to think so but is not shedding a tear all the same.   A leaked Pentagon email argues for punishing US’ European allies for not supporting the war against Iran.  UK, long the poster child of Atlanticism, is in the crosshairs too. The memo toys with the idea of the US changing position on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.   As far as MAGA is concerned, Javier Milei is welcome to take action to recover the “las Malvinas”.   For his part, the Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth indulged in some good ole Euro-bashing,  blaming the Europeans for “freeloading” on Uncle Sam.  Neither last year’s pledge by NATO members to scale up defence spending to 3.5% of GDP in the 2030s nor the words of praise Secretary General Mark Rutte pours over Donald Trump appear to soften the White House attitude.  It seems that the president and his courtiers are firmly convinced the military alliance does little except to drain America’s treasure and occasionally blood.  In this reading, NATO is a liability, not an attribute of US power. 

The war against Iran has laid bare, yet again, the rift within the Alliance. The Trump administration is expecting Europeans to join in the effort. Unblocking the Hormuz Strait should justify support from transatlantic allies. After all, they bear the brunt of oil prices spiralling out of control.  Yet the Europeans have been unwilling to take part in a high-stakes gamble, glaringly devoid of any strategic purpose. They furthermore contend that NATO is by nature a defensive pact and not a coordination platform for offensive action of the kind seen in Iraq back in 2003. Some leaders like Spain’s Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez have gone a step further in criticising the US. He called the war “illegal and a big mistake”. Obviously, this didn’t go down well in Washington. The leaked Pentagon email considers expelling Spain from NATO.

Of course, Spain’s reaction has been on the extreme. Others have taken a more conciliatory position – e.g. enabling the US to use infrastructure and logistics (e.g. airfields to ship materiel to the Gulf or refuel aircraft). Still, the most European powers such as the UK and France could offer to placate Trump has fallen short of expectations. That includes talks about a future demining operation in Hormuz – pending a durable settlement between the US and the Islamic Republic.  But that halfway approach hasn’t ingratiated the states in question to Washington.  The point is that a freedom of navigation operation still puts the burden on the US to strike a deal with Iran.  It therefore prevents Trump from offloading the war to the Europeans as part of his exit strategy.  Europe is de facto taking a neutral stance.  

The ongoing crisis clearly adds to NATO’s multiple woes.  Europeans have ample reasons to doubt the US commitment to Article 5, the collective defense clause in the 1949 Atlantic Treaty. In an event of attack against the EU by, say, Russia,  American support might simply fail to materialise.  That is the reason experts and even policymakers are shifting their attention to the respective clause in the Treaty on the EU (Art 42.7).   Even in peacetime, Trump has a way to undermine the credibility of the Alliance – e.g. by drawing down the 100,000-strong American troops stationed in Europe.  Legislation adopted by Congress before his second term prevents Trump from withdrawing using his presidential powers.  But he can deliver a death by a thousand cuts, which he is sort of  already doing.  Lastly, the US can starve its allies of weapons and materiel badly needed to supply Ukraine. Under a deal struck last year,  Europeans pay for America’s military assistance which previously under the Biden administration was provided for free to Kyiv.   Europe alone cannot manufacture enough interceptors to meet the need of Ukraine’s air defences which exposes Ukrainian cities to attacks by Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.   The Iran war also redirected scarce supplies away from Europe/Ukraine to the US allies in the Gulf.  

What  – if anything – could be done to repair the damage?  Most European states will try to talk and calm down Trump.  They will be reaching out to people in the administration whom they see as mildly sympathetic to their predicament, such as State Secretary and National Security Advisor Marco Rubio, as well as to congressional Republicans who tend to be on the pro-NATO side.  Arguments already rehearsed last year, e.g. the increase of defence spending in Europe to 3.5% (or even 5%) of GDP, much of which would presumably go into the purchase of US-made arms would crop up again.  American top brass and military planners at the Pentagon will be reminded of the strategic value of European logistics to force projection.  The US would not be in such an advantageous position to carry out operations in the Middle East and Africa without an extensive infrastructure developed over decades by NATO. Eventually,  Europe is also a security and foreign policy asset for the US.  Many around Washington are fully aware of the fact but the question is how much of that reaches the commander in chief.

Longer-term, the game for Europeans is the achievement of “strategic autonomy”.  First and foremost, that entails the ability to defend the continent against Russian aggression without the US involvement, whether through the EU or via an Europeanised NATO.  Since 2022 and especially Trump’s election,  Europe has made strides forward –  e.g. by ramping up defence spending.  However, there are enormous gaps in what experts call “strategic enablers” –  intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, precision strikes, air defences, and unmanned platforms.  These are technology-intensive areas where Europe is lagging behind others, notably US and China.  Another set of questions concern nuclear deterrence.  Without the US, will France and/or Britain extend protection over all EU members and beyond?  Or other countries such as Germany and eventually Poland will go nuclear. Overall,  Europe has to tackle major dilemmas concerning its security architecture. What will be the shape of a future Europeanised NATO?  How will it operate in conditions of crisis, let alone war, in terms of decision making and sharing the burden.  How will such an entity balance Russia  – or other adversaries in the future?

On 7-8 July, the Turkish president’s compound in Ankara will host a NATO summit.  Hopefully, by then the Iran war would be over – and Europe as well as the rest of the world would be spared from an energy shock.  But even if that happens, the questions about NATO’s future will remain as acute as ever. 

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