Most observers wish the Turkish framework law supposedly regarding peace with the PKK and approved by the Turkish parliament on August 10, 2026, would have made a serious attempt to begin granting constitutional rights to ethnic Kurds and provide for the incarcerated PKK leader Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan to have more freedom and ability to negotiate with the state. However, this is simply not the case.
Unfortunately, all the framework law has offered the PKK is a form of disguised surrender and assimilation lacking any real meaningful concessions. Indeed, there is not even a single mention of the word “Kurd” in the entire framework law that is supposed to be dealing with the Kurdish issue! All it offers is to let lower-level PKK supporters possibly have some type of amnesty, but only after Turkish security institutions have verified that the PKK has completely disarmed and the National Security Council (MGK) has formally activated the law.
There is not even a guarantee that those who do surrender will not simply be imprisoned as Ali Sapan (a former PKK leader) and his companions were in 1999 when they returned to Turkey and surrendered on Ocalan’s orders. Moreover, there is nothing in the framework law for Ocalan or other senior leaders. In addition, the framework law also does not even mention Selahattin Demirtas, the former leader of the pro-Kurdish HDP, twice candidate for the presidency of Turkey, and imprisoned for nearly 10 years.
The 12-article framework law’s provisions are written in narrow, tightly controlled security language and placed under strict state control at every stage. One would have to be under an illusion to trust that this law would lead to constitutional rights for the Kurds and some type of release for Ocalan. That is why the Turkish Parliament passed it with 468 votes and only 88 opposed.
Mustafa Karasu, a leading member of the Executive Council of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK)—another name for the supposedly abolished PKK—presented the PKK’s largely negative evaluation: “The fact that it [the framework law] does not [even] mention the Kurdish issue—and that it is not a law that sets forth a solution to the Kurdish issue or reveals the Kurdish reality—is, of course, a significant shortcoming.” Continuing, the PKK leader explained, “In particular, the fact that this law does not use the term “Kurd” at all, does not make any reference to or define future steps to be taken, and does not mention democratization is crucial.” In addition, “Framing the problem solely in terms of disarmament is truly mistaken. If we adopt such a one-sided, one-dimensional approach now, inadequate approaches to the root causes may emerge later.”
Furthermore, “Reber Apo’s [Ocalan] role is not specified in the law is truly a shortcoming. If Reber Apo is not at the center of this effort—if he does not play a role in managing and guiding this process—it will be impossible to implement what is stipulated in the law. Let’s be clear: a law without Reber Apo’s involvement will remain a dead piece of paper. This needs to be emphasized in particular.”
Despite attempts, in Karasu’s words, to put a brave face on it as “a good start to lay the groundwork for future dialogue and the legal amendments needed to resolve the century-long Kurdish problem,” the long-anticipated framework law amounted to little more than a humiliating PKK capitulation. As already said, Turkey’s only concessions were limited to minor PKK members and supporters accused or convicted being reintegrated into civilian life. Even this was predicated on the complete disarming of the PKK as certified by the Turkish government. Any persons accused of “intentional homicide committed within the framework of organizational activities,” as well as of “crimes committed before 1 June 2025 that require life imprisonment or aggravated life imprisonment” were excluded from even applying for parole.
Abdullah Ocalan was prominently excluded from any mention. There was no reference to eliminating the so-called trusteeship for elected pro-Kurdish mayors removed from office for political reasons. Even more debilitating, the bill made no mention of promoting Kurdish constitutional, political, or language rights. Finally, there was no guarantee that any further concessions would follow. The so-called peace process was concluded on grounds that amounted to little more than a virtual PKK surrender. Indeed, if anything, the framework law is a rhetorical mountain giving birth to a disappointing mouse. It simply strengthens the Turkish project.
Given its apparent military victory, the Turkish government had no immediate incentive to offer anything more. Indeed, given the hopes aroused, but meager results achieved, it was possible that among the Kurds Ocalan himself would be discredited, the PKK divided, and Erdogan ironically elected for yet another presidential term with crucial pro-Kurdish DEM support. Even those minor PKK members eligible for parole were given no guarantees once they had surrendered their arms and returned to civilian life. It would be relatively easy for the government to rearrest them on any manufactured excuse.
In addition, Cemil Bayik, the Co-Chair of the KCK (in effect the PKK by another name), declared about the framework law, “It is certain that it is not possible to achieve lasting peace and a lasting solution unless the existence of the Kurds is recognized, the Kurdish language and culture are set free, and the political will and local democracy of the Kurdish people are acknowledged. The existence of the Kurds—and consequently their language and culture—was not recognized.” Bayik added, “We view the absence of provisions in the law stipulating that steps toward democratization would be taken alongside disarmament as a shortcoming. A law that seeks peace and the resolution of problems should not be phrased this way.”
In addition, Bayik criticized the framework law for not even mentioning Ocalan: “It cannot be said that the process has progressed or achieved its goal unless he [Ocalan] attains a position where he can work freely and independently and subsequently regains his physical freedom.” Bayik added, “The approach toward a people’s leader is the approach toward that people itself.”
Finally, as long as Erdogan continues to consolidate his power even more by, for example, forcing his main opposition the RPP to legally split, it is a further illusion to think that somehow Ocalan’s “Democratic Republic” project to allow meaningful Kurdish participation in a democratic Turkey will solve the Kurdish problem. As already stated, Erdogan is simply using the Kurds, in part, through the pro-Kurdish DEM to unconstitutionally win yet another term as president.
Anyone in prison for more than a quarter of a century and for much of the time in virtual isolation, as Ocalan has been, would be at least somewhat detached from reality. Because of superior war material and specifically Turkey’s mastery of drone warfare, the PKK was losing its long military struggle against the state, so Ocalan opted for a Plan B, the current so-called peace process. Democratic integration with the current Turkish state amounts merely to surrender to it.
Of course, the PKK has to make way for the logic of the state. What else can Ocalan do, wish the state away? Clearly, domestic and regional politics are closely related and drive each other. Erdogan’s domestic economic failures are covered up by his regional achievements, especially recently in helping preside over the liquidation of the pro-Kurdish SDF in Syria with U.S. help. Erdogan’s Turkey has many other regional and international achievements such as mediating between Russia and Ukraine, being the only non-Western state in NATO, and possessing the second largest army in NATO, which makes Turkey such an important ally of the US, among many others.
At the same time, armed non-state actors in the Middle East are not being eliminated. The Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, among others, remain viable threats. The so-called “Mecca Alliance” envisioning collective defense similar to NATO’s Article 5 could be very dangerous and even stupid for Turkey if it led it into a war against Hindu India because Muslim Pakistan fell into another conflict with India. What could Erdogan possibly be thinking of it here? India has the largest population in the world and one of the top 10 militaries and economies in the world. Surely Erdogan does not want to go to war against India because it fell into another conflict against Pakistan?
The Kurdish struggle will continue despite the current situation regarding the so-called peace process and framework law. New leaders will rise up as older ones retire. The PKK will continue although under a different name such as the KCK along with pro-Kurdish parties such as the DEM or whatever new name the Turkish government forces them to assume down the road. In time, new leadership in Turkey may come to see the wisdom of a genuine peace process with the Kurds that will benefit Turkey by satisfying legitimate Kurdish constitutional demands.
Both Erdogan and Ocalan are old men. New leaders unencumbered by past problems are already arising. Although the Kurds tend to exaggerate their importance in regional politics, they still do play an important role. Calling the last few years of violent struggle against Turkey before the current peace process began World War III, is an example of how the Kurds tend to exaggerate their importance. To most observers the recent war in Gaza and current war between the US and Israel against Iran were/are much more important than the Kurdish struggle. The Kurds should realize this.
The current Turkish-PKK peace process still has the same basic problem earlier ones such as the Kurdish Opening from about 2013-2015 had: Turkey frames the issue as ending terrorism, while the Kurds see it as gaining Kurdish constitutional rights. The two sides inhabit two separate universes. Hopefully, the current peace process has enabled each side at least to view what universe the other inhabits and thus learn how better to establish a meaningful dialogue that will lead to a genuine democratic peace.
As the great German sociologist Max Weber famously observed, a state controls a monopoly of the legitimate use of force within its borders. The PKK should disarm and seek the Kurdish future in a democratic Turkey. However, before this occurs, Turkey must achieve a genuine democracy that will allow this to occur. The framework law does not respond adequately to this requirement.
Michael M. Gunter is a professor of political science at Tennessee Tech University. He is the co-author with Joost Jongerden of the newly published Abdullah Ocalan and the Making of the PKK: A Political Biography (New York and London: Routledge, 2027), as well as the author of Erdogan’s Path to Authoritarianism (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2024).
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