Turkey’s path to the dictatorship
The first phase of Erdoğan’s plan to neutralize the main opposition party — carried out in cooperation with former CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu — has been completed. The crisis escalated when figures close to Kılıçdaroğlu, along with individuals linked to organized crime, made their way to CHP headquarters. It intensified further after Kılıçdaroğlu submitted a petition to the Ankara Police Department demanding that the building be handed over to him. Özgür Özel and his colleagues ultimately vacated the headquarters under a police assault involving water cannons and tear gas.
Erdoğan had conceived this plan even before ordering İmamoğlu’s arrest. He began by bringing figures close to Kılıçdaroğlu onto pro-government television channels to foster internal opposition within the CHP and to psychologically prepare the public for the “absolute nullity” ruling — establishing at least a semblance of legitimacy for the decision among his own base. This mattered, because his earlier move to annul İmamoğlu’s first election victory had unsettled even his own supporters and ultimately led to İmamoğlu winning the repeat election by an even larger margin. This time, Erdoğan proceeded more cautiously.
This episode also laid bare how deeply corrupted Turkish politics has become — not only within the ruling bloc, but across the board. Figures who once positioned themselves as opponents of Erdoğan show no compunction about collaborating with the Palace the moment they lose their shot at a parliamentary seat or mayoral office. The rot that began in the Özal era with the motto “My civil servant knows his job” has now reached its logical endpoint: the complete disappearance of shame. In a country where money and wealth have become the only measure of value, this reality makes it genuinely difficult to feel hopeful about the future.
The fact that Kılıçdaroğlu and his inner circle are Alevi carries the risk of opening a new fault line in identity politics and turning the CHP into a narrowly Alevi party. That said, given that the vast majority of Alevis are politically aware and opposed to Erdoğan’s Islamist project, it is more realistic to expect this community to throw its support behind Özel and his colleagues.
For now, Özel and his allies are likely to remain within the CHP, making their voices heard in parliamentary group meetings and opposing the Kılıçdaroğlu leadership. However, once Kılıçdaroğlu — now in control of the party apparatus — begins expelling members who are seen as a threat to Erdoğan, a full break from the CHP and a transition to a new party they have already been quietly building seems probable. At the closed parliamentary group meeting on May 23rd, 96 of the CHP’s 138 MPs attended; Özel was elected group chair with 95 of those votes. A further 15 MPs who could not attend sent their support, while 27 failed to appear without any stated excuse.
In terms of sheer seat count, any new party would almost certainly hold more parliamentary seats than what remains of the CHP. However, Treasury funding for parties is determined not by seats but by votes received in general elections. The CHP currently receives around 1.5 billion TL annually from the Treasury — money that will now pass entirely into Kılıçdaroğlu’s hands. Özel and his team may push for an early party congress for a while, but with the old party apparatus, the delegate structure, and the Palace-aligned judiciary all backing Kılıçdaroğlu, he is unlikely to agree. A split therefore appears increasingly inevitable.
What happens next will be determined by the roadmap and methods of struggle that Özel and his team — now stripped of financial resources — choose to adopt. Without abandoning the statist political line in favor of a genuinely society-centered approach, their prospects look bleak. In such a scenario, we could be looking at a CHP hovering around 3–5 percent of the vote and a new party sitting at 20–25 percent — an outcome that would suit Erdoğan perfectly. It would allow him to bury the CHP as a historical force while locking in his electoral advantage.
If Erdoğan’s plan succeeds — and given Turkey’s internal dynamics, as well as the international community’s collapsed capacity to defend democracies, his odds are high — Turkey will complete its transition to an Islamist dictatorship of the Assad-era Syrian variety. Erdoğan’s advantage lies in his grip on the machinery of the state and in the population’s historically passive, state-deferential reflexes. Özel’s advantage lies in an economy in worse shape than at any point in the history of the Republic: deepening poverty, minimum wages falling below the hunger line, and a rage at rampant corruption that has no outlet. Whether Özel and his colleagues can channel that rage into active political energy — and whether they will find the courage to build a genuine democratic front with the Kurds — remains to be seen.
Summary of the Past Two Days
- Background: How the Crisis Began
Following a court ruling of “absolute nullity,” Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu moved to reclaim the party leadership. CHP leader Özgür Özel and MPs began keeping a vigil at headquarters. Kılıçdaroğlu demanded the building be vacated and handed over to him. In the morning, his supporters marched on the building demanding entry; clashes broke out between the two sides.
- Police Intervention
CHP officials spoke with Interior Minister Mustafa Çiftçi, requesting that no force be used against the building. Barely ten minutes later, police moved in.
Riot units broke through the chains and gates at the parking entrance.
Tear gas and gas canisters were deployed to clear all party members and journalists from the premises.
The interior of the building filled with smoke.
Electricity to the building was cut.
Members of the press were physically removed by police.
- Özel’s Statement and the March on Parliament
Upon leaving the building, Özel addressed the crowd waiting outside in the sharpest language he has ever directed at Kılıçdaroğlu:
“I am deeply saddened, but we are leaving to take back our party’s home. The next time we return, this government and its collaborators will not dare do this again.”
Özel then marched toward the Grand National Assembly alongside citizens gathered outside. Those remaining near the headquarters were dispersed by riot police. The Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced it had opened an investigation into both the events at headquarters and the march on parliament, on charges of violating the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations and resisting officers on duty.
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