1st Week of December: Poverty Deepens amid Contentious Kurdish Peace Debates

Weekly Turkey Report: 1st Week of December 2025 – Poverty Deepens amid Contentious Kurdish Peace Debates

Executive Summary

• A new Metropoll survey confirms that the cost-of-living crisis is now Turkey’s most acute problem: 75.5% of citizens say they cannot make ends meet and support at least a 50% increase in the net minimum wage to 33,150 TL; distrust of official inflation data is widespread across party lines.

• The self-immolation of Nuh Mercimek, a dismissed municipal worker and father of five in Afşin, who later died of his injuries, starkly illustrates growing social despair and the perception that there is “no justice” in provincial Turkey.

• A DEM Party delegation’s visit to İmralı and Abdullah Öcalan’s call for a “comprehensive peace law based on authentic and holistic legality” revive debates on a political solution to the Kurdish issue and the role of democracy versus “extra-democratic interventions.”

• However, the parliamentary commission tasked with overseeing the new initiative produces only a fragmented four-page summary of the 16-page İmralı meeting transcript, fuelling controversy and distrust among opposition parties.

• Tensions between the government and the CHP escalate as Erdoğan accuses CHP leader Özgür Özel of “Stockholm syndrome”; CHP’s Murat Emir and Özel respond by highlighting trustee appointments, mass prosecutions, and emblematic abuses in the Kurdish provinces, as well as the continued imprisonment of Selahattin Demirtaş.

• CHP submits its own 17-page report on the Kurdish issue, calling for full implementation of Constitutional Court and ECtHR rulings, an end to trusteeships, the release of detained politicians, and a democratic political environment for resolving the Kurdish question.

• Within the AKP, strategist Mustafa Şen signals a shift by arguing that, since the PKK has declared an end to its activities, trusteeship (kayyım) practices imposed on municipalities on “terror” grounds should now be lifted, hinting at internal debate over the future of these measures.

• The government’s 11th Judicial Package draws fierce criticism for offering effective sentence reductions to suspects in the Sinan Ateş assassination, thousands of earthquake cases, and the Soma mine disaster, while explicitly excluding Selahattin Demirtaş and Gezi Park prisoners.

• In the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB) corruption investigation, seven of nineteen defendants who were ordered released are immediately re-detained at the prison gate based on a new investigation, reinforcing perceptions of politically driven justice.

• Former KRG President and KDP leader Masoud Barzani’s visit to Cizre triggers a mini-crisis after images emerge of his guards in military uniforms with long-barrel weapons, drawing sharp criticism from MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and a rare public rebuttal from Barzani’s office.

• AKP and MHP deputies block a CHP proposal to have TRT broadcast trials of elected officials live, effectively preventing public scrutiny of politically sensitive cases such as that of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.

• Pressure on the so-called FETO community continues, with the Edirne Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announcing new operations against an alleged “current student structure” across five provinces, while a joint Agos–Ukrainian media investigation reveals sexual abuse of Ukrainian orphans placed in Antalya hotels.

• ENAG again reports annual inflation far above TÜİK’s figures, underscoring the persistence of Turkey’s structural economic crisis and the widening credibility gap between official data and households’ lived experience.

Poverty as the Country’s Most Acute Problem

The November public opinion survey by Metropoll, one of Turkey’s few remaining reputable and trusted research companies, confirms that the most painful issue for citizens is no longer abstract questions of geopolitics or identity, but daily survival.

According to the poll, 75.5% of respondents state bluntly that they “cannot make ends meet” and demand that the net minimum wage be increased by at least 50%, to 33,150 TL. Support for such an increase is broad-based: 66% of AKP voters, 85% of CHP voters, 68% of MHP voters, 77% of İYİ Party voters, and 82.4% of DEM Party voters endorse it.

The data also show that a large majority of the public does not trust the inflation rates announced by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). The gap between official figures and the prices people face in rent, food, utilities, and basic services is eroding the credibility of the state’s economic narrative and deepening feelings of injustice.

A Tragic Protest in Afşin

Against this backdrop, a tragedy in the Afşin district of Maraş captured national attention. Nuh Mercimek, a dismissed municipal worker and father of five, appeared in a live broadcast in front of the municipality and stated that he had been assaulted by municipal personnel and that his demand for justice had gone unanswered.

Mercimek said, “I have five children, I live in a rented house. The mayor did nothing. Mr. President, I have applied to the relevant authorities; there is no justice in Afşin.” He then doused himself with a flammable liquid and set himself on fire.

According to local outlet Yeşil Afşin, Mercimek was first treated in Maraş and then transferred to Urfa for burn treatment, but he could not be saved. His death has become a symbol of how economic hardship, perceived arbitrariness in employment, and lack of access to justice intersect to create a climate of hopelessness.

Öcalan’s Call for Democracy and a Peace Law

The DEM Party’s İmralı delegation met with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and later released a statement summarizing his message. According to the delegation, Öcalan called on the government to enact “a peace law based on original and holistic legality,” arguing that such a framework would remove “political violence and extra-democratic intervention” from Turkey’s agenda.

The statement signals that Öcalan wants the current process to be framed not merely as a security dialogue but as a comprehensive democratic restructuring grounded in the rule of law. This framing directly challenges the existing paradigm in which security institutions and extra-legal interventions have overshadowed political solutions for decades.

Stockholm Syndrome Rhetoric and the War of Narratives

The renewed focus on İmralı coincides with an escalation in the rhetorical conflict between the government and the main opposition CHP. President and AKP Chair Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accused CHP leader Özgür Özel of suffering from “Stockholm syndrome” for seeking DEM Party’s contribution to the process, adding, “If Mr. Özel has the courage and wants to see the executioner, he should look into the mirror.”

CHP MP Murat Emir responded by recalling the government’s record of appointing trustees to replace elected Kurdish mayors and imprisoning them, saying in effect: “You would think it was not you who invented the ‘crime’ of preventing Kurds from entering municipal councils in the West.”

Özgür Özel went further, reminding the public of emblematic human rights violations in Kurdish provinces during Erdoğan’s rule. He cited incidents such as:

• The body of Taybet Ana being left on the street for seven days, and women carrying white flags coming under fire as they tried to retrieve her so the corpse would not decompose in public view.

• The ordeal of an MP whose mother’s coffin was attacked with the claim that “we will not allow that body to remain here,” and the refusal to allow a proper burial, all under AKP-era ministers who remained silent in the face of these abuses.

• The continued imprisonment for nine years in Edirne of Selahattin Demirtaş, whose “crime,” Özel stressed, included saying “We will not let you become president.”

Özel’s remarks highlight the opposition’s strategy of countering Erdoğan’s historical accusations against the CHP with a contemporary ledger of state violence and lawlessness under his own rule.

A Controversial Summary of the İmralı Meeting

Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş announced that, with the İmralı visit, the “listening phase” of the parliamentary initiative had been completed and that the process would now move into the reporting phase.

The National Solidarity, Brotherhood, and Democracy Commission met for the first time after the visit to İmralı, where a delegation consisting of one member each from the AKP, DEM Party, and MHP — Feti Yıldız (MHP), Hüseyin Yayman (AKP), and Gülistan Kılıç (DEM) — held a roughly three-hour meeting with Öcalan on 24 November.

The main agenda item was the minutes of this meeting. The original 16-page transcript, prepared based on audio recordings submitted to the Speaker’s Office, was condensed into a four-page summary that was read out in the commission. However, the fact that this summary was fragmented and revealed very little about the substantive content of the dialogue provoked controversy. Opposition members questioned why such a critical conversation was reduced to a few vague fragments and warned that this opacity could undermine public trust in the process from the outset.

Competing Party Reports on the Kurdish Question

Following Kurtulmuş’s remarks, CHP Group Deputy Chair Murat Emir stated that his party would continue to contribute to the process, but insisted that the commission’s final report must not be narrowly focused and should instead be a comprehensive document.

Emir outlined the key headings of the CHP’s own 17-page report on the Kurdish issue:

• Removal of administrative and political obstacles to the implementation of Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rulings;

• Elimination of barriers to the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms;

• Creation of a democratic political environment to address the Kurdish issue;

• Ending the practice of appointing trustees (kayyım) in place of elected local officials;

• Ending political interference in the judiciary and releasing all politicians detained since 19 March;

• Effective measures against violence targeting women and children;

• Ending anti-democratic practices in the judicial and penal system;

• Establishing a system in which the state is neutral toward all beliefs;

• Improving the employment conditions and personal rights of civilian staff working within the security bureaucracy.

From the AKP side, strategist Mustafa Şen stated that their own report also contained proposals to advance democratization, including further reforms to the election law, political parties law, local administrations law, and relevant administrative mechanisms. Most notably, with regard to trusteeships, Şen said: “The terrorist organization has ended its activities. Therefore, if a trustee was appointed to a municipality for that reason, we believe that this practice should now be terminated.”

His comments suggest that, even within the ruling party, there is at least some recognition that continuing trusteeship practices in their current form is politically and legally difficult to justify in the new context.

The 11th Judicial Package: A Selective Amnesty?

The government’s draft 11th Judicial Package has sparked strong reactions across the opposition. The most controversial elements relate to planned sentence reductions and infaz (execution of sentence) adjustments that would benefit:

• Suspects implicated in the assassination of former Grey Wolves leader Sinan Ateş;

• 2,380 defendants in earthquake-related negligence cases;

• Those held responsible for the Soma mine disaster, which killed 301 workers.

At the same time, the package explicitly excludes high-profile political prisoners such as Selahattin Demirtaş and those convicted in the Gezi Park trials. This selective approach reinforces the perception that the law is being used to shield actors close to the regime while keeping key opposition figures behind bars as hostages in a broader political struggle.

The İBB Case: Release, Rearrest, and Politicised Justice

In the corruption investigation targeting Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (İBB), a court ordered the release of nineteen defendants. However, seven of them were immediately re-detained at the exit of Silivri Prison on the basis of a new investigation.

Prosecutors subsequently obtained arrest warrants for a total of eleven individuals. No detailed explanation has yet been provided on the grounds for the new detentions. The sequence — release on one file, instant re-arrest under another — feeds into the widespread view that the judiciary is being instrumentalized to maintain pressure on İBB and Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu ahead of future electoral cycles.

Barzani’s Visit and a Mini-Crisis with the MHP

Former KRG President and KDP leader Masoud Barzani visited Turkey on 29 November to attend the Melayê Cizîrî Symposium in the Cizre district of Şırnak. During the visit, images circulated on social media showing Barzani’s guards wearing military-style uniforms and carrying long-barrel weapons.

These images triggered a harsh reaction from MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, who criticized both the symbolism and the security arrangements. In an unusual move, Barzani’s office publicly responded to Bahçeli’s criticism, sharply raising the temperature of the debate and revealing underlying tensions in Ankara’s management of its relations with Iraqi Kurdish actors and its own nationalist coalition partner.

Blocking Live Broadcasts of Trials Involving Elected Officials

CHP submitted a draft law requiring that trials of individuals elected to public office be broadcast live on the public broadcaster TRT. The proposal aimed to ensure transparency and public oversight in politically sensitive cases, particularly those involving mayors and MPs.

However, the motion to place this draft on the General Assembly agenda was rejected by the votes of AKP and MHP deputies. As a result, upcoming cases such as those involving Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu will continue to be conducted away from live public scrutiny, reinforcing concerns about closed-door justice in politically charged trials.

Continuing Pressure on the so-called FETO Community

The Edirne Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced a new operation in five provinces targeting what it described as the “current student structure” of the so-called FETO network. According to the state-run Anadolu Agency, twelve individuals were detained, including current students at Trakya University and some graduates.

The focus on students underscores how, nearly a decade after the 15 July coup attempt, the crackdown on the so-called FETO community continues through waves of investigations, often based on shifting and opaque criteria, with long-term consequences for young people’s educational and professional futures.

Sexual Abuse of Ukrainian Orphans in Antalya

A joint investigation by Agos newspaper and Ukrainian media outlets has exposed a deeply troubling scandal involving Ukrainian children who were orphaned following Russia’s invasion and later transferred to Turkey.

According to the reports, 510 Ukrainian orphans were housed in hotels in Antalya after the occupation. During this period, they were subjected to neglect, violence, and serious security failures, culminating in cases where hotel employees impregnated two teenage girls. The revelations highlight grave deficiencies in child protection mechanisms for vulnerable refugee and war-orphan populations and raise questions about both Turkish and Ukrainian authorities’ oversight.

A Bleak Economic Picture

Finally, the economic data released this week once again underline the severity of Turkey’s structural crisis and the credibility gap between official statistics and independent measurements.

The Inflation Research Group (ENAG), an independent team of economists, reported that its own Consumer Price Index (E-CPI) for November 2025 rose by 2.13% compared to the previous month. According to ENAG, cumulative inflation over the past twelve months reached 56.82%.

By contrast, TÜİK announced that November inflation was just 0.87% month-on-month and 31.07% year-on-year, significantly below ENAG’s figures and far from households’ lived experience of rent, food, and energy prices.

This widening gap between official and independent data, combined with the Metropoll findings on poverty and distrust of TÜİK, suggests that the social and political costs of the economic crisis will continue to mount in the coming months.