Turkish Mediation in the Ukrainian War

Although Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been roundly criticized by many observers including this one for backsliding on democracy in his own country, his role in attempting to mediate a solution to the war in Ukraine is worthy of praise and deserves analysis. At first glance, one might be surprised at the Turkish president’s interest in the matter as Turkey is usually viewed as a Middle Eastern country, and thus, presumably has its hands more than full with all the problems endemic to that region.

Historically, however, Turkey’s predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, also took a keen interest in the Black Sea region, including the Crimean peninsula and what today is modern day Ukraine, dating back to the second half of the 15^thcentury. Along with the Crimean Tatars, the Ottomans raided Ukrainian territories and ruled portions of the land. Roxelana (1505c.-1558), the famous wife of Suleiman the Magnificent (1494-1566), was born in what today is the western part of Ukraine. Famously, the Ottomans initially captured and brought her to Istanbul as a slave. Ottoman rule only began to recede in the latter half of the 17^th century and especially after Russia conquered the Crimean peninsula in 1774-1783. Today, both Turkey and Ukraine view the Crimean Tatars as part of their historic geographic and cultural heritage.

Thus, it is only natural that—given Erdogan’s well-known neo-Ottoman ambitions—he has taken an interest in Ukraine, especially after it gained independence in 1991. On the other hand, despite (because of?) Turkey being a member of NATO and for a variety of other reasons involving their common and overlapping ambitions, Russian president Vladimir Putin and Erdogan have shared numerous initiatives in recent years. For example, Putin views friendship with NATO-member Turkey as an important way to weaken NATO, undoubtedly one of his most important strategic goals. Therefore, Erdogan is in a unique position to talk to and even attempt to mediate between both sides involved in the Ukrainian War.

Indeed, more than five years before the current war began, Erdogan told the then Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, that Turkey would not recognize Russia’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula, calling it “Crimea’s occupation.”  Shortly afterwards, then Turkish foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, affirmed, “We support the territorial integrity of Ukraine. . . . We do not recognize the annexation of the lands of Ukraine.” In 2021, a year before the current war began, Erdogan added, “Russia has usurped Crimea. . . Things cannot go on with a mentality of occupation.”  Thus, when the current war first began in February 2022, Erdogan sent much-needed weapons to Ukraine including Bayraktar drones, which have been so important in Ukraine’s amazing ability to keep its head above water so far. Turkey took such a pro-Ukrainian position because of its historical interest in the contested areas and continuing interest in seeing it not fall under total Russian domination to the detriment of modern Turkish interests.

Furthermore, the Turkish president most importantly brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative that began in July 2022. This allowed Ukraine (once and still famous as a breadbasket for others) to renew shipping much-needed grain abroad. Russia had been blocking such Ukrainian exports fearing they would facilitate weapons smuggling and as a natural wartime measure against its enemy. Without Erdogan’s mediatory presence here, this invaluable grain initiative to very needy African states such as Sudan, among others, would have been impossible. Although Russia terminated the grain deal a year later, the principle had been set, and Ukraine has been able to continue its grain exports by using the territorial waters of NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

On the other hand, when the current war began in February 2022, Erdogan also showed some support for Russia. For example, although he quickly closed the Bosphorus to Russian warships under the Montreux Convention of 1936, Erdogan did not join his NATO allies in imposing crippling economic sanctions on Russia. He also maintained important transactional energy links with it.

Of course, US president Donald J. Trump initially seemed to construct a much stronger position from which to mediate between the two warring sides, especially after he hectored a beleaguered Ukrainian president Volodymir Zelinsky in the White House in March 2025 and implicitly placed part of the blame for the war on him, while at the same time making nice to Putin. At first, these Trump initiatives seemed a stupid betrayal, but then for a while appeared to be winning Putin over to accepting him as a mediator. However, the next few months proved Putin only to be playing the American president as a useful pawn. Trump soon grew tired trying to play the mediating role and as of this writing seems to be more interested in mediating the problems in Gaza and pursuing a non-nuclear deal with Iran.

This opened the door again for Erdogan, much in need of some favorable international aura, given his many domestic problems in Turkey involving his internal political opposition and long faltering economy, among others. Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, elaborated, “We sincerely think that it is possible to cap the first and second direct Istanbul talks with a meeting between Mr. Trump, Mr. Putin and Mr. Zelensky, under the direction of Mr. Erdogan.”

Thus, on two separate occasions the two warring sides met in Istanbul in May and June 2025. These were the first direct negotiations between them since Turkey had hosted talks shortly after the war had begun in 2022. Erdogan declared, “the road to a resolution goes through more dialogue, more diplomacy. We are using all our diplomatic power and potential for peace.”  However, despite initial international hopes, no deal for even a temporary ceasefire let alone a long-term solution proved possible except for a prisoner exchange swap. What happened?

Although Zelensky arrived for the peace talks, Putin disdained even attending them, sending instead a low-level delegation headed by Vladimir Medinsky. Earlier this Putin aide had led the failed talks in 2022, written school texts justifying the Russian invasion that really had begun in 2014 when Russia had first seized Crimea, and even questioned Ukraine’s right to exist. The gulf between the two sides became even more apparent when the Ukrainian leader renewed his call for an immediate full and unconditional ceasefire, and called for a direct meeting with Putin, proclaiming, “The key issues can only be resolved by the leaders.”

Putin, however, questioned Zelensky’s very legitimacy. Indeed, all through the war he had called for the removal of Zelensky. Continuing, Putin explained he wanted to address the “root causes” of the war. This, of course, was code for limiting Ukraine’s military, seizing huge territorial areas from it, and banning it from joining NATO. More to the point, why should the Russian president agree to the end of a war he felt he could eventually win?

Although Ukraine carried out spectacular air raids against Russia early in June 2025 and Russian advances in some areas had become slower than grueling Allied advances on the Somme in World War I, Russian talking points reminded observers that it took more than 20 years to defeat Sweden in their war in the early 1700s—ironically climaxed by the great Russian victory at the Ukrainian city of Poltava. Putin’s message was clear. Despite embarrassing setbacks so far, he was prepared to keep the struggle going until he had reduced his Ukrainian foe to a mere vassal, even if it took many more years. Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s former president and close Putin ally, aggressively proclaimed that negotiations were “not for striking a compromise peace on someone else’s delusional terms but for ensuring our swift victory and the complete destruction of the neo-Nazi [Zelinsky] regime.” In response to all this, a large majority of US senators expressed support for a proposal made by US senator Lindsey Graham to place strong secondary sanctions against Russia that would impose tariffs as high as 500 per cent on countries that bought Russian oil, natural gas, uranium, and other exports.

Thus, Zelensky was left to thank Erdogan for his “efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace,” but concluded that “Unfortunately, Russia is doing everything it can to ensure that the next potential meeting brings no results.” The Ukrainian president continued, “We can’t be running around the world looking for Putin. . . .  I feel disrespect from Russia. No meeting time, no agenda, no high-level delegation – this is personal disrespect. To Erdogan, to Trump.”

Given these incompatible positions, neither Trump nor Putin arrived in Istanbul for the talks in May and June 2025. Indeed, for his part, Trump declared, “Nothing’s going to happen until Putin and I get together.” One month later in July, Putin launched his biggest air strikes of the entire war. Trump now crudely declared that Putin throws a “lot of bull s…,” was “playing with fire,” and threatened “really bad things” happening to Russia. Friedrich Merz, the new German chancellor, concluded that diplomacy had been exhausted. Although prepared to mediate, Erdogan never even had the opportunity.

However, the Turkish leader still received some international credit for trying. He will continue to monitor the situation closely, while leveraging his unique position between the east and west as well as Russia and Ukraine. Furthermore, Erdogan’s admittedly minor mediatory role in the Ukrainian war still played well domestically as it illustrated his ability to operate independently of all involved sides as an important regional and even international actor. It showed the Turkish people that their leader was respected in the world as an international statesman. Erdogan sorely needed such deference as he began to survey his re-election possibilities scheduled for 2028, but possibly earlier depending on events.

Michael M. Gunter is the author of the recently published Erdogan’s Path to Authoritarianism: The Continuing Path, 2024.