2nd Week of November: Is Erdoğan Preparing to Shut Down the CHP?

Weekly Turkey Report: 2nd Week of November 2025 – Is Erdoğan Preparing to Shut Down the CHP?

Executive Summary

• Prosecutors filed a 3,809-page indictment against Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, portraying him as leader of a “profit-driven criminal organization” and laying legal groundwork for a potential closure case against the CHP.
• The indictment seeks confiscation of the CHP’s Istanbul provincial headquarters and was followed by a referral from the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor to the Court of Cassation under constitutional and party law provisions on closing political parties.
• Four prominent journalists were indicted alongside İmamoğlu for allegedly spreading “misleading information” and “aiding a criminal organization” through their reporting and social media activity.
• The Constitutional Court rejected CHP’s challenge to the election of five HSK members, opening what critics describe as an unprecedented area of decisions shielded from constitutional review.
• Selective justice persisted as Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer was released after more than a year in pre-trial detention, while former Diyarbakır Mayor Selçuk Mızraklı remained in prison for being “not of good conduct.”
• A widening betting scandal shook Turkish football, with 1,024 players and club figures, including Eyüpspor President Murat Özkaya, implicated in illegal betting investigations.
• Authorities intensified money-laundering and terror-financing probes with large-scale asset seizures, a trustee appointment at Investco Holding, and actions against COINO A.Ş., as new data highlighted accelerating youth emigration, ongoing internet censorship and a growing public and private debt burden.

This week was dominated by the long-awaited indictment against Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and fresh signs that the Erdoğan–Bahçeli alliance is prepared to weaponize the judiciary against the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). While Ankara tests the waters for a potential closure case against the CHP, Turkey is shaken by a deadly military plane crash, a widening betting scandal in football, renewed asset seizures in money-laundering investigations, and sobering data on youth emigration and digital freedoms.

Politics & Judiciary – Will Erdoğan Move to Close the CHP?

Eight months after İmamoğlu’s arrest, prosecutors finally submitted a 3,809-page indictment accusing him of being the “founder and leader” of a profit-driven criminal organization and seeking punishment for 142 separate acts. The document is legally weak, heavily borrowing Erdoğan’s “octopus and its tentacles” rhetoric and failing to convincingly match claims with evidence.

The most controversial move, however, came when Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek – known for his proximity to Erdoğan – petitioned the Court of Cassation’s Chief Prosecutor to consider a closure case against the CHP under Articles 68–69 of the Constitution and Article 101 of the Political Parties Law. In parallel, prosecutors asked for the forfeiture of the CHP’s Istanbul provincial headquarters building in Sarıyer, arguing that part of the purchase funds allegedly stemmed from criminal proceeds rather than donations.

Buoyed by geopolitical shifts, support from Trump, and a weak and fragmented European Union, Erdoğan appears willing to consider every tool available to secure his rule – including, potentially, a party closure case against the 102-year-old CHP. His recent rapprochement with coalition partner Devlet Bahçeli and the absence of any early-election talk suggest that Erdoğan believes he has time: even if he ultimately stops short of shutting the CHP down, a drawn-out case could be used to exhaust, distract and delegitimize the opposition before the next vote.

CHP reacted sharply. Group Deputy Chair Ali Mahir Başarır described the indictment as “not a legal document, but a memorandum,” adding that “no one has been born who can close this 102-year-old party.” While the Istanbul Chief Prosecutor attempted to deny there was a “closure request,” CHP’s Gökhan Günaydın countered by publishing the letter sent to the Court of Cassation, underlining that the prosecutor was effectively saying “I lack the authority, you open the case.”

The İmamoğlu Indictment and Media Dragnet

The indictment targeting İmamoğlu also pulled in the media. Four prominent journalists – Ruşen Çakır, Soner Yalçın, Yavuz Oğhan and Şaban Sevinç – are listed as defendants. Prosecutors accuse them of “spreading misleading information to disturb public order” and “aiding the İmamoğlu criminal organization” under the guise of journalism.

The indictment further claims that payments made to their social media accounts were in return for “manipulative content in favor of the organization.” The case reinforces the picture of a judiciary willing to criminalize critical journalism and fold independent media into the government’s narrative of an alleged “network” centered around İmamoğlu and the CHP.

From his cell in Silivri Prison, İmamoğlu condemned the indictment as a “slander and conspiracy text” that targets both himself and the CHP, the founding party of the Republic. He called for the trial to be broadcast live, arguing that the public has the right to see how the justice system is being used.

Adding to the government’s nervousness, access was blocked to the website and X account titled “Istanbul Indictment”, which had been set up to publish materials related to the case, indicating continued sensitivity and censorship around the proceedings.

Erdoğan–Bahçeli Summit

After the İmamoğlu indictment was finalized, Erdoğan and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli met for forty minutes at Bahçeli’s residence in Ankara. Bahçeli greeted Erdoğan at the door, signaling a carefully choreographed show of unity.

The timing – immediately following the indictment’s completion – suggests that the ruling bloc is tightly coordinating its legal and political strategy on Istanbul, İmamoğlu, and potentially the CHP itself. The meeting also confirms that no early elections are on the agenda; instead, the focus is on consolidating power under the current configuration.

Deadly Military Plane Crash

The country was also shaken by tragedy. A transport aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Force crashed in Georgia after taking off from Azerbaijan. All 20 soldiers on board were killed.

The incident highlighted both Turkey’s expanding regional military footprint and ongoing questions about flight safety, training and maintenance in an overstretched armed forces.

Constitutional Court Steps Back

The Constitutional Court (AYM) rejected the CHP’s application challenging the election of five members to the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSK) by the Grand National Assembly. The decision, published in the Official Gazette, sparked outrage among constitutional scholars and the opposition.

Professor Tolga Şirin called it a critical “breaking point” in Turkey’s constitutional order, arguing that the Court had opened an unprecedented area of non-review in Turkish constitutional history. CHP Group Deputy Chair Murat Emir warned that the ruling creates a dangerous path for the government to package key regulatory changes as mere “parliamentary decisions,” thereby escaping judicial scrutiny and further hollowing out the rule of law.

Selective Justice: Esenyurt Mayor Freed, Mızraklı Stays in Prison

In the realm of local governance and Kurdish politics, the justice system continued to send mixed – but ultimately repressive – signals.

Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer, who had been in pre-trial detention for 1 year and 20 days on charges of PKK/KCK membership, was released. However, a similar request from former Diyarbakır Metropolitan Mayor Selçuk Mızraklı was rejected on the grounds that he was “not of good conduct.”

The DEM Party condemned the decision as a deliberate attempt to “sabotage the peace process,” while Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan described it as the “peak of unlawfulness and arbitrariness.” The decisions underscore the highly political and selective nature of detentions involving Kurdish politicians.

Match-Fixing and Betting Scandal Widens

A mushrooming scandal over referees’ involvement with betting sites continues to rock Turkish football. In the latest operation, 19 suspects were detained and referred to a criminal judgeship with a request for arrest. Among the eight individuals who were ultimately jailed is Eyüpspor President Murat Özkaya.

Separately, the Turkish Football Federation’s Professional Disciplinary Board (PFDK) announced that 1,024 playershad been identified as having placed illegal bets. Those referred to the PFDK include several Süper Lig players such as Ersin Destanoğlu, Necip Uysal, Eren Elmalı, Metehan Baltacı, Boran Başkan and Salih Malkoçoğlu. The scale of the scandal raises serious doubts about the integrity of domestic competitions and the strength of regulatory oversight.

Crackdown on Dirty Money and Corporate Seizures

Under pressure from the U.S. Treasury and facing the risk of once again landing on international blacklists, the government intensified its actions against alleged money-laundering networks.

The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor announced that, based on a MASAK (Financial Crimes Investigation Board) report, authorities seized 31 vehicles and 74 real-estate properties worth a total of 335 million TL. In a fourth wave of operations focusing on alleged laundering through foreign-exchange bureaus in the Grand Bazaar, 76 suspects were detained.

In another major step, prosecutors revealed critical findings in an investigation into the crypto-asset platform COINO A.Ş., accusing it of playing a role in illicit financial activity. At the same time, the Terrorism Financing and Asset-Laundering Bureau announced that a trustee (kayyum) had been appointed to Investco Holding A.Ş.

These moves continue a pattern of selective but high-profile interventions: while some networks are targeted – often with political overtones – others linked more closely to the regime remain untouched, reinforcing the perception of a politicized and instrumental use of financial crime enforcement.

AYM Neutralized, Symbolic Prison Visits

In a separate but related front in Turkey’s rule-of-law crisis, the AYM’s decisions are increasingly ignored by lower courts, rendering the high court largely toothless in practice.

The latest example came with the rejection of Tayfun Kahraman’s request for release. His wife, Meriç Kahraman, announced that their appeal against the Istanbul 13th High Criminal Court’s ruling had been dismissed by the 14th High Criminal Court, which found the lower court’s decision “procedurally and legally appropriate.” The message is clear: courts aligned with the executive feel no obligation to heed the standards set by the AYM or the European Court of Human Rights.

Amid this climate, former Speaker of Parliament and AKP founding member Bülent Arınç paid highly symbolic prison visits to former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş and businessman Osman Kavala, both held despite ECHR and AYM rulings in their favor. Arınç stressed that these judgments “must absolutely be implemented” and predicted that releases will begin soon. Whether this is a genuine signal of intra-AKP debate or merely a pressure valve for domestic and international audiences remains to be seen.

Youth Exodus and Brain Drain

Fresh data from TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) lays bare the scale of Turkey’s demographic hemorrhage. Over the last five years, the number of young people leaving the country has increased by 80%. In 2024, the largest group of emigrants were aged 20–24, accounting for 14.7% of all those who moved abroad, followed by those aged 25–29 (12.1%) and 30–34 (10.3%).

The brain drain among university graduates is also accelerating. While the emigration rate of higher-education graduates was 1.6% in 2015, it rose to 2% in 2023. That year, the rate for women stood at 1.6%, compared to 2.4% for men. Notably, 6.8% of emigrants had studied information and communication technologies – precisely the kind of high-value human capital Turkey desperately needs.

More than one-fifth of those who left chose the United States as their destination, followed by Germany (17.5%), the United Kingdom (11.2%), the Netherlands (6.8%) and Canada (4.9%). The data confirms that for many young, educated Turks, the exit door has become more attractive than the ballot box.

Turkey as a Leader in Censorship

The latest Freedom House “Freedom on the Net 2025” report once again ranks Turkey among the countries where the internet is “not free.” Ankara is singled out for widespread social-media blocking, access restrictions and mounting pressure on online expression, especially during protests and election cycles.

The report highlights an entrenched pattern: as political tensions rise, so does digital censorship, reinforcing the broader authoritarian trajectory of the regime.

Growing Debt Burden

Finally, the international credit rating agency Fitch Ratings released its outlook on Turkey’s debt capital markets, projecting that total debt capital stock will reach 550 billion USD by 2026.

This mounting debt burden, combined with persistent inflation and structural weaknesses, underlines the economic fragility beneath Erdoğan’s assertive political and geopolitical posture. While legal engineering and repression may help the regime stay in power in the short term, the underlying economic and demographic trends continue to point to a more fragile and uncertain future for Turkey.