Europe, Turkey and US in 2026

A year ago,  Donald Trump entered office recommitting to “an America First” foreign policy. To many of his supporters that meant disengaging from the world and focusing on domestic affairs. Trump’s promise to be, quote unquote, president of peace, putting an end to US interventions around the world and brokering deals to terminate violent conflicts has been part of the package. Same for raising tariffs and pulling out from global institutions such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) constraining American power or imposing unfair burden. 

Yet soon enough we discovered the Trump doctrine, if there is such a thing, is not antithetical to projecting military power overseas. The apparent toppling of Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela proves the point. The US strikes against Iran, in support of the Israeli air campaign, offers another, telling example. What the world is grappling in is an US which is both trying to downscale its international commitments and prone to act unilaterally in applying coercion – targeted at both allies and competitors.   

Europe (EU, its members, the United Kingdom) and Turkey have been adapting to this reality. So far, Turkey has done a better job at it.  That will remain the case in 2026 too.  

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan appears to have forged a strong relationship with Trump, dating back to the US leader’s first term back in 2017-2021. Ankara is making headway in being readmitted into the F-35 consortium. Turkey and US have been partnering in Syria after the deposition of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. They are both backing the current leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, helping him consolidate his power and gain international legitimacy. Even more importantly, Trump is reportedly pushing for the inclusion of Turkey in the international consortium to take over Gaza under the second phase of the settlement. That second phase might or might not come into being. But what matters right now is that the US is doing Turkey’s bidding by pressuring Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu who is deeply hostile to the Turks.  

Europe has had a much rougher deal. Its leaders have been scrambling to enlist Trump in their effort to stop Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. They have gone along with his diplomatic charm offensive vis-à-vis Russia, in the hope they could prevent a total trainwreck with a bad deal throwing Kyiv under the proverbial bus. Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron are touting a force deployed by “a coalition of the willing” in Ukraine should there be a ceasefire. It is a gambit targeting America rather than Volodymyr Zelensky and his administration who insist that Washington, not Europe, should lead on security guarantees. Europe has further accepted to pay for US weapons deliveries and committed, at NATO’s Hague Summit, to ramp up core defence spending to 3.5% of GDP. The EU furthermore refrained from pushing back against Trump’s protectionism, swallowing instead a 15% tariff with a framework agreement skewed in US favour. All things considered, European leaders have been overall tight-lipped with regard to the US new national security strategy which calls for far-right, anti-immigration parties to take over in core countries and for “strategic stability” with Russia. Trump might be pulling the rug under Europe but Europeans have no other choice but to limit the damage. 

Why is Turkey better attuned to this new stage? Largely because it has a better starting position and therefore the stakes involved are much lower. Turkey does not need the US anymore to such an extent as in the past. Its elites have long absorbed the lesson that America cannot be relied upon in case of a war or security crisis putting national interest or even survival at test. That realisation has informed Turkey’s policy vis-à-vis regional rivals such as Russia and Iran. It has been geared towards managing the threat and avoiding at all cost a direct confrontation, unless it is absolutely inevitable (as happened between Turks and Russians in Syria in early 2020). In addition, Turkey is not highly dependent on trade and investment with the US, though it is vulnerable to financial sanctions and relies on American technology (F-35 shows it). In other words, it enjoys a room for manoeuvre that major European countries do not have. Add to the mix the chemistry between Trump and Erdogan, based on deals and transactions fusing foreign policy and family business, and you understand why Turkey is in a decent position.

Contrast that with Europe. For all the talk of strategic autonomy, Europeans are still a long way from being able to come to terms with a world where America is either AWOL or, worse, acting as a competitor. There is the strategic piece: US-led NATO underwrites European security and it will take years and decades if the current rearmament drive creates sufficient capabilities for Europeans to match the US. Even if they do, which is a big “if” given the technology and innovation gap, there are questions around the ability for collective action. Who is to lead an Europeanised NATO, for instance, in defending from Russia? How about joint intelligence capacity – or nuclear deterrent, for that matter? Economy tethers the two sides of the Atlantic too. The EU is US’s leading trading partner. The US remains the EU’s top export market – and second in imports after China. Collectively, they account for 30% of global trade, with turnover at around EUR 1.5 trillion in 2024. That gives some power to Europeans but also further limits their options. Sure, they have struck bilateral agreements to diversify trade relations  – e.g. with Canada and Japan. But as the pending deal with Mercosur – still not signed after long years of negotiations because of opposition in France – shows, there are hurdles along the way.   

Last but not least, Europe will probably have to make a choice between US and China in an increasingly fractured technological order. Unless Europeans develop independent capacity in critical sectors such as AI where they are currently lagging behind, they will probably choose America.  Same for critical minerals: de-risking from China might lead to stronger reliance on US-centered supply chains. Europe has a China problem which is rooted in unfair competition it faces and the damage on core industries it entails. Beijing is furthermore supporting Russia’s war of aggression. In an ideal world, it should be able to play off the US against China as a third pole in international politics – and make strategic gains. In practice, Europeans are stuck with America.  

All those trends and tensions will be on display in 2026. Some on Europe will be trying to salvage as much as from the old international order as possible, hoping the US will eventually come to its senses and re-embrace the transatlantic relationship. Other voices will be calling for a more self-reliance. Emmanuel Macron might be on his way out but his thinking is getting traction.   

All this is more or less good news for Turkey. The EU is much more open to working with Ankara on all fronts, including security and defence, trade, environment and technology. Europeans hope that Erdogan will be leaning to them in the stand-off with Russia, to the degree that is feasible. Do not expect a great deal of criticism coming from European capitals with respect to the further autocratisation in Turkish domestic politics. Turkey is resetting relations with both US and Europe but is doing it on its own terms.