Increasing Tension in The Caucasus

The Caucasus is a relatively small, but geostrategically significant region between the Black and Caspian Seas, athwart Europe and Asia, at the northern edge of the Middle East, and near one of the ends of the fabled Silk Road where today China’s imaginatively bold Belt and Road Initiative reaches Europe. An incredible ethnic and linguistic diversity lies within this geographically divided and largely mountainous region. Indeed, depending on how they are counted, there are as many as 50-200 different ethnic groups and 5 different language families (not just languages) including Indo-European (Russian and Armenian being two examples) and Turkic (Turkish and Azerbaijani being two examples). Various forms of Christianity and Islam constitute the two main prevalent religions. Interestingly, there are even small, but long-established Jewish settlements in the northern regions of Azerbaijan. Representatives of yet other religious groups such as the Yezidis and neopagans also exist. 

However, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Caucasus had been ruled by Russia for more than a century. Thus, with brief intervals such as during the two World Wars of the twentieth century, the Caucasus was relatively quiet under Russian and then Soviet rule. The demise of the Soviet Union created an entirely new situation of reemerged indigenous rivalries and the return of former neighboring hegemons Turkey and Iran. Post-Soviet Russia was demoted to being merely the leading neighboring hegemon, but now facing rivals. However, even this continuing Russian role is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain because its now three-and-a-half-year-long war in Ukraine has drained its ability to influence events for the time being at least. 

Georgia, however, is a noted exception. While Russian peacekeeping troops have been withdrawn between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the illegal Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia since 2008 continues. Thus, a weakened Russia still plays a role in these increasing tensions. In the long run, it is likely Russia also will return to other parts of the Caucasus, possibly with a vengeance. Nevertheless, for the time being, increasing tensions redound throughout the region involving not only the indigenes such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, but also such interested outsiders as Turkey, Iran, the United States, Israel, the European Union, and even China. 

Historically, the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) had long played an important part in the neighboring Caucasus. It quickly returned to the fray when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, mainly by supporting its ethnic kin in Azerbaijan against Armenian aggression in Karabakh where the saying to describe the situation became “one nation, two states.” This quickly reawakened old animosities between Turkey and Armenia dating back to what Armenians and their many supporters throughout the world call the “Armenian genocide” during World War I. Nevertheless, Turkey’s role in the Caucasus continued to grow. 

For a while, the other historic neighboring hegemon Iran also played an important role in the new Caucasus. However, Iran’s recent crushing defeats at the hands of Israel and its ultimate supporter the United States has effectively reduced Iran’s role for the time being at least. Thus, the path was now opened even more for the entry of Israel, who long had been supporting Azerbaijan against Iran as a way to monitor events bordering Iran. Azerbaijan welcomed this Israeli support because it and Iran both feared each other’s counter claims regarding ethnic Azeris on both sides of their mutual border. Thus, ironically, radical Shiite Iran supported Christian Armenia, the oldest Christian nation in the world, not fellow Shiite Azerbaijan. Of course, helping to explain their opposition, Azerbaijan is a secular model, while Iran is notoriously the opposite. 

Enter the United States. Until recently, the most powerful state on earth did not seem to be evincing much interest in the Caucasus given its more immediate concerns in the adjoining Middle East and throughout the rest of the world. However, US president Donald J. Trump’s patently obvious desire to win the Nobel Peace Prize, brought his attention to the continuing Armenian-Azerbaijani stand-off regarding Karabakh. Incredibly, the American president proceeded to host Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev in the White House on August 8, 2025, where they supposedly signed a peace framework designed to normalize relations between the two hostile Caucasian neighbors. 

Under this agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan promised to terminate their hostilities, establish diplomatic relations, facilitate commerce and travel, and recognize each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Trump also announced the lifting of US restrictions on military cooperation with Azerbaijan— constraints the Armenian lobby in the United States had long supported—as well as plans for substantial US investments in both states, especially in their energy, infrastructure, and technological sectors. In addition, the US president also declared that his country would make separate agreements with both Caucasian states regarding border security, economic collaboration, technological partnerships, and trade. 

For its part, the United States would receive exclusive development rights to the long-proposed Zangezur Corridor strategic transit route across the South Caucasus now also dubbed the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).  The proposed corridor would run along Armenia’s border with Iran and connect Azerbaijan with its isolated, landlocked exclave Nakhichevan. It was not immediately clear how Armenia would share its current sovereignty over the territory, a territorial concession that troubled many Armenians still suspicious of their traditional foe, Turkey. 

More importantly, of course, the proposed corridor would constitute a direct connection between Turkey and its Turkic kin states in Central Asia. Thus, for Ankara, the corridor could be a critical link in its ambitions to become a major energy and trade hub between Europe and Asia, while bypassing Russia to the north and Iran to the south. For Armenia, it would mean an end to its geographic and economic isolation and thus a path to badly needed prosperity and security. To what extent Turkey knew what should be largely good news for it was not immediately clear. However, the entire affair certainly stunned negatively the other two immediate hegemons, Russia, and Iran.

More than a quarter of a century ago, the prominent geostrategist and US President Jimmy Carter’s realist national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, had perceptively recommended Western support for Baku when he explained that “Azerbaijan, with its vast energy resources, is also geopolitically critical. It is the cork in the bottle containing the riches of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia.” Elaborating, Brzezinski argued how “an independent Azerbaijan, linked to Western markets by pipelines that do not pass through Russian-controlled territory, also becomes a major avenue of access from the advanced and energy-consuming economies to the energy rich Central Asian republics.” Therefore, to balance Russia’s position in the Caucasus, strengthen the Western geostrategic position and access to energy resources, and appeal to the Turkic populations in Central Asia, a strong and independent Azerbaijan would be valuable. 

Of course, it remains to be seen if this latest US foray into the ancient Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish animosities will be any more successful than the so-called Zurich Protocols, partially sponsored by the US in 2009, were. In addition, one must mention the influential Armenian diaspora as well as Pashinyan’s many domestic enemies, both of whom viscerally oppose any such deal with Turkey that might be construed as opening its path to its central Asian Turkic cousins at the expense of Armenian territory. Iran too sees the US gambit as a threat bringing the US military up to its border with Armenia, while also closing off the Iranian-Armenian border contact. If the desire is to bring economic progress to the region, why not simply open the Turkish-Armenian border that has been closed for more than 30 years because of the now seemingly settled quarrel over Karabakh? Does Trump have any idea what US involvement in this Caucasian quagmire might lead to? Or is this just another flippant dream about building a riviera, this time in the Caucasus? 

On the other hand, 2025 is not 2009 as the time might now be ripe for Armenia’s isolation to end by bringing it into economic and territorial understandings with its supposedly inveterate Turkic enemies. In Armenian eyes, Russia failed to support its supposed ally Armenia in its lost war over Karabakh in 2020 and the subsequent forced deportation of ethnic Armenians in 2023. The European Union has done little for a long time, so maybe the road is open for the United States. If so, among others, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and now its great-power supporter in this Trumpian deal, must be sure that Armenian prime minister Pashinyan and his long-suffering people receive tangible, guaranteed economic rewards that will overcome the knee-jerk opposition he already is facing from the Armenian diaspora and his domestic Armenian opponents. It will be a heavy order and reminds one of what happened to Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin when he boldly made a deal for peace with his Palestinian enemies in 1995. 

On top of Russia’s diminishing role is the deterioration of its relations with Azerbaijan after the Russians accidentally shot down an Azerbaijani passenger plane on December 25, 2024, killing 36. Azerbaijani president Aliyev demanded punishment for those responsible. Russian president Vladimir Putin at first vacillated, but finally apologized and approved financial compensation. However, even more recently, several dozen Azerbaijanis were arrested in the Russian city of Ekaterinburg in connection with a series of murders that had taken place a decade and a half ago. In prison, the Azerbaijanis were beaten and two of them, who were the main suspects, died. 

Baku protested strongly by accusing Moscow of deliberately killing its nationals. Azerbaijan also canceled all cultural events related to Russia, raided the Baku office of Russia’s Sputnik news agency, and detained its employees and several Russian IT specialists who apparently were then beaten and accused of drug dealing and cyberfraud. Given its present problems in Ukraine, Russia could scarcely react in its former violent ways such as occurred on January 19-20, 1990. “Black January,” as it is called in Azerbaijan, saw some 11,000 Soviet troops attack Baku, killing 131-170 and injuring some 700-800. Prominent memorials still exist to mark this tragic event during the immediate run up to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

However, it is unlikely that the current animosities will increase as both sides are too closely tied economically and thus still need each other. For example, despite its growing ties with the United States, Azerbaijan continues to be a discreet violator of Washington’s secondary trading sanctions against Russia that have recently bitten India very heavily. How long Baku can continue this game before it calls forth Trump’s wrath remains to be seen. In addition, additional frozen conflicts, corruption, and human-rights concerns also complicate relations. Nevertheless, the current contretemps between Russia and Azerbaijan illustrates that Russia no longer controls events to its own liking. Azerbaijan has become a much more equal player. Clearly, recent tensions in the Caucasus mark a significant potential for both increased stability, but also heightened tensions.

Note: 

1. Hakan Yavuz and Michael M. Gunter are the authors of The Karabakh Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan: Causes & Consequences (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023).