What About Iran’s Proxy Forces in Turkey?

What About Iran’s Proxy Forces in Turkey?

Before the Iranian “mullah regime” collapses, it has already built a serious infrastructure inside Turkey—under Erdoğan’s protection—to reproduce itself in exile. Iran has pursued this infrastructure through three main channels: influencing and directing certain political Islamist groups; generating sympathy for the Iranian state and regime through cultural activities; and embedding itself within Turkey’s state bureaucracy. Especially after 2002, when Erdoğan came to power, Turkey—under the patronage of the political leadership—was turned into an open field for Iranian activity.

Iran’s religious, political, and cultural expansionism is, of course, not confined to Turkey. After the 1979 Revolution, Iran succeeded in building what is often called the “Shiite Crescent” by establishing proxy forces in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen. Through these proxies, it claimed to be fighting the so-called “Great Satan,” America, and Israel. It is also possible to speak of Iranian influence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, and Muslim-majority Balkan countries. Indeed, in response to recent U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran, a group attacked the U.S. Consulate in Pakistan, and it was reported that nine civilians were killed after police intervened.

Following Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack and the subsequent military response, Iran’s proxy networks in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen were substantially degraded. Now, the heart of the “mullah regime” itself is being targeted. It is highly likely that the latest attacks by the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom will end with the regime’s collapse. We will see this together in the near future.

So what happens to Iran’s proxy forces in Turkey? Will they be dismantled like Iran’s other proxy networks? Or will Turkey allow them to resurrect the dying mullah regime on Turkish soil?

The “Qom Generation” and the Export of a Regime Model

After the 1979 Revolution, many young people from Turkey’s conservative provinces traveled to Iran’s city of Qom, where they received doctrinal and religious education in seminaries and universities. Even if only a small portion adopted Shiism as a sectarian identity, many internalized the mullah regime’s doctrine and, more importantly, its model of political organization. After returning to Turkey, they maintained their ties with Iran and continued their activities with a long-term objective: to establish a similar regime in Turkey.

For years, secular and Kemalist circles in Turkey protested Islamist political movements with the slogan, “Turkey will not become Iran!” These demonstrations peaked when Necmettin Erbakan became a coalition partner, and they helped shape a broad social sensitivity against the Iranian regime. Yet when the AKP—emerging from Erbakan’s Milli Görüş tradition—came to power in 2002, a new process began: Islamists raised within the cultural ecosystem of the Iranian Revolution started embedding themselves in state institutions and pursuing a strategy of capturing the state.

Cultural Patronage, Blackmail Networks, and Influence Operations

One of Iran’s most consequential cultural operations under AKP rule has been the financing of travel to Iran. Senior bureaucrats, academics, and politicians frequently visited the country and formed relationships that did not befit public office. Turkish media reported cases in which some officials fell into what could be described as “Epstein-style” traps—using the cover of mut’a (temporary marriage). Thousands of individuals across key Turkish institutions became, in effect, influence agents for Iran.

The largest corruption scandal in the history of the Turkish Republic was also tied to Iran: the bribes distributed to Turkish politicians and bureaucrats. Police and prosecutors who acted within the legal framework exposed these corruption networks through the December 17/25, 2013 operations, which implicated the Erdoğan family, ministers, and senior bureaucrats. Erdoğan’s circle, using Reza Zarrab, took billions in bribes from Iran in exchange for helping Tehran circumvent U.S. sanctions—dragging Turkish state institutions into this illicit scheme. Today, the Halkbank case in New York continues to document the architecture of this corruption.

“Selam-Tevhid” and the Normalization of Iranian Penetration

Journalist Müyesser Yıldız, writing in the final days of 2025, summarized the “Selam-Tevhid” case—an investigation into Iranian espionage activities in Turkey—and conveyed details about the scope of technical surveillance and the political fallout. The reporting included a published list of 242 names who would have been detained under the “Tevhid Selam Jerusalem Force” file had the operation succeeded—along with references to individuals linked to senior AKP leadership. Ultimately, after an indictment prepared in October 2015 by then–Deputy Chief Prosecutor of Istanbul İrfan Fidan, a case was opened against those who conducted the wiretaps.

Today, İrfan Fidan—appointed by Erdoğan as a member of Turkey’s Constitutional Court—both closed the Selam-Tevhid file and, as alleged, transferred Turkish police intelligence to the Iranian consulate. The examples of Numan Kurtulmuş and İrfan Fidan illustrate the level of influence Iran has attained inside Turkey.

The Israel File: From Mavi Marmara to Mainstream Antisemitism

The deterioration of Turkey’s relations with Israel and the rise of antisemitism to historic levels cannot be separated from the role of Erdoğan and individuals and institutions operating in coordination with Iran.

One emblematic episode was the Mavi Marmara incident in the spring of 2010. This operation was neither designed to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict nor primarily intended to deliver humanitarian aid to Gaza. It was a calculated trap aimed at sabotaging the historically strong relationship between Turkey and Israel. The operation’s architects were Erdoğan and Iran-aligned influence networks. By deliberately provoking Israel and violating its sovereignty, the flotilla created a rupture whose consequences far exceeded the event itself. Fifteen years later, the diplomatic damage remains unrepaired—despite the fact that Turkey and Israel are two countries that could have served as pillars of regional stabilization. The deterioration has benefited neither Turkey, nor Israel, nor the Palestinians, nor the Arab states.

Another Iranian “success” in Turkey has been the institutionalization of antisemitism. Antisemitic currents moved from Christian Arabs to Arab nationalists and then to the Muslim Brotherhood milieu; they gained momentum after Israel’s establishment and Arab defeats in successive Arab–Israeli wars. The diffusion of Muslim Brotherhood–origin ideas into Turkey became one entry route for antisemitism.

A second, equally important route emerged after the Iranian Islamic Revolution, when Khomeini declared the United States the “Great Satan” and framed “liberating Jerusalem” as a civilizational objective—normalizing antisemitism as an ideological instrument. Shiite Hezbollah placed hostility toward Jews at the center of its political identity. The importation of Iranian revolutionary Islam into Turkey thus carried antisemitism and anti-Americanism as part of the same ideological package.

Today, antisemitism, anti-Americanism, and anti-Westernism have become normalized—accepted assumptions across many political and social movements in Turkey.

“Iranian Islam” vs. “Anatolian Islam”—and the Post–July 15 Landscape

In the 2000s, Turkey debated two competing frameworks: “Iranian Islam” and “Anatolian Islam.” The latter emphasized love, tolerance, and coexistence; the former elevated fear, polarization, and radicalism. These two currents had been in tension since the 1990s. The July 15, 2016 coup attempt decisively tilted the balance in Iran’s favor—an outcome Iran does not deny having played an active role in.

The Gülen movement—often described as representing “Anatolian Islam” and historically uninvolved in violence—was branded as a terrorist organization. Meanwhile, Iran-aligned groups such as Hezbollah and Selam-Tevhid, which have been implicated in political violence in Turkey, gained expanded space and influence within the state apparatus.

A Choice Turkey Cannot Postpone

The Middle East and Turkey stand on the threshold of a major transformation. Turkey is approaching a moment of choice: will it remain a European country within the Western alliance system, or will it become a Middle Eastern state anchored in the Iran–Russia–China axis and pulled ever deeper into the region’s conflict zone? Turkey’s approach to Iran’s proxy forces operating inside Turkey will be a revealing indicator of which path Ankara has chosen.

The United States and Europe also face their own decision. Do they still want to see Turkey as a NATO and Council of Europe member aligned with democratic norms—or do they accept Turkey’s drift into the opposing camp?

My hope is that Turkey—and the United States and Europe—will conclude that the right path for Turkey lies in democracy, freedom, and the rule of law anchored in NATO commitments and EU criteria, and that Turkey will launch a new “Tanzimat” program of political and institutional reform.

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